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ABSTRACT
The ebb and flow of federal Indian poliGy over the last 
two centuries is a well-studied phenomenon. Less prevalent, 
however, arc examinations of the localized impact of 
changing policies on specific tribes and reservations. The 
Omaha Tribe of Nebraska offers a particularly useful model 
for this type of "grass roots" analysis.
Virtually all of the federal programs tested on the 
Omahas in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were 
dismal failures, leaving the tribe impoverished and 
virtually landless as it entered the post-World War II era. 
Over the last fifty years, the Omaha Reservation has 
continued to serve as an involuntary proving ground for new 
directions in Indian policy. During this period, however, 
tribal members have begun to flex a new-found prowess as 
"legal warriors." By using the federal courts and other 
available forums, the Omahas have shed their historic roles 
as helpless victims of misguided "reformers" and rapacious 
"land sharks."
In the 1950s, the Omaha Reservation became a prominent 
example of the bureaucratic folly inherent in the passage of 
Public Law 280. This termination-era statute transferred 
reservation criminal jurisdiction from the federal 
government to state and local authorities. When inadequate 
state service led to lawless chaos on the reservation, the
Omahas became the first tribe in the PL 2 80 states to seek 
and obtain "retrocession" of federal jurisdiction.
Likewise, the Omahas played a leading role in the 
annals of the controversial Indian Claims Commission (ICC) 
during the 1950s and 60s. An analysis of the two claims 
they prosecuted before the Commission illustrates the 
intricacies of the ICC process, and the impact of its 
operations on a specific tribe. Their landmark compromise 
with the government after years of complex litigation laid 
the procedural foundation for many other ICC settlements.
In the 197 0s and 80s, the Omahas continued their quest 
for self-preservation on the judicial battlefield. Their 
partially-successful struggle for the return of the 
Blackbird Bend lands in Iowa is one of the more important 
Indian land claims of the modern era. The story of that 
litigation exposes a number of important issues in current 
Indian relations, including the dubious role of the federal 
government as the continuing "trustee" of Indian lands.
This thesis traces these episodes in the modern "legal 
history" of the Omaha Tribe. It suggests the manner in 
which the Omahas' experiences reflect the impact of broader 
trends in federal Indian policy. Just as importantly, it 
seeks to demonstrate the remarkable cultural resiliency of 
the Omaha Tribe as its moves forward to meet the challenges 
of the twenty-first century.
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INTRODUCTION
It has become axiomatic to conclude that federal Indian 
policy has vacillated wildly over this nation's 220 years of 
existence. Countless legislative committees, task forces, 
and academicians have chronicled the "pendulum swing" of 
Indian relations between the disparate goals of forced 
"assimilation" on the one hand, and tribal self- 
determination on the other. Not quite as commonplace, 
however, are examinations of the specific ways in which the 
historic ebb and flow of broader government policy has 
affected individual tribes and reservations. The "grass 
roots" impact of federal policies is an area that invites 
additional analysis, for it is only at the "micro level" 
that the full human impact of the government's execution of 
its trust responsibilities can be truly assessed.
This is particularly the case with the Omaha Tribe of 
Nebraska. Though they are relatively small in number and 
have not been the subject of widespread academic attention, 
the Omahas have borne more than their fair share of the 
burden created by the government's fluctuating goals.
Indeed, since the establishment of the Omaha Reservation in 
northeastern Nebraska in 1854, it has served as a virtual 
laboratory for federal experimenters, with each new program 
contributing to a cumulatively disastrous impact on the 
tribe's culture and economy.
2The Omahas suffered particularly grievous consequences 
as the reformers' "test case" for "detribalization" through 
the allotment of lands in severalty.2 Despite the 
pernicious impact of allotment on Omaha landholdings, 
government bureaucrats and assimilation advocates touted the 
Omaha experiment as a success, paving the way for the 
landmark 1887 Dawes Severalty Act. As historian Michael 
Tate has observed, the net effect of the allotment programs 
first instituted on the Omaha Reservation was "the 
impoverishment of Indians everywhere, the loss of more than 
ninety million acres of land once guaranteed by treaty, and 
the total assault upon Indian culture in the name of
-5
pragmatic assimilation."
The last fifty years have seen a continuation of the 
Omahas' role as a sacrificial pawn in the chess game of 
Indian policy-making. As Commissioner John Collier's 
relatively enlightened "Indian New Deal" of the 1930s gave 
way to the misguided post-war swing toward "termination," 
the Omaha Reservation in Thurston County, Nebraska once 
again became the proving ground for a new direction in 
Indian policy. With the passage of Public Law 280 in 1953, 
the federal government transferred civil and criminal 
jurisdiction over the reservations in five selected states 
to state and local governments. As the Omaha case would 
subsequently prove, virtually no one at the federal, state, 
or local level accurately envisioned the potential impact of
3that action on the designated reservations. Indeed, many 
Nebraska state officials proved to be woefully ignorant of 
the meaning and effect of PL 280 even years after its 
passage, despite the state's ostensible prior "consent” to 
its provisions.
Like the allotment experiments seventy years earlier, 
the transfer of federal criminal jurisdiction over the Omaha 
Reservation to the state of Nebraska produced disastrous 
results. A combination of inadequate state funding and 
racial tension between the Omahas and their white neighbors 
in Thurston County brought lawlessness and jurisdictional 
chaos to the reservation. The Omahas again gained unwanted 
national prominence, this time as the unfortunate victims of 
the bureaucratic folly inherent in PL 280.
Based in part on the jurisdictional debacle on the 
Omaha Reservation, Congress amended PL 280 in 1968 to allow 
states to "retrocede” Indian jurisdiction back to the 
federal government. The state of Nebraska, seeing an 
opportunity to rid itself of an expensive bureaucratic 
headache, but again not clearly understanding what it was 
doing, initially offered to return jurisdiction to the 
federal government. Its offer was accepted. Though the 
state later changed its mind and attempted to "rescind” its 
offer of retrocession, the federal courts negated that 
effort. The Omahas then became the first Indian tribe in 
the PL 280 states to escape state criminal jurisdiction.
4With retrocession, the tribe created its own police force 
and tribal court system, but conflicts between the Omahas 
and local law enforcement authorities concerning 
jurisdictional uncertainties continue to plague the county 
to this day.
The post-war years also saw a shift in federal policy 
regarding the resolution of Indian legal grievances stemming 
from 2 00 years of broken treaties. With the creation of the 
Indian Claims Commission (ICC) in 194 6, Congress sought to 
provide a "nonjudicial” forum for the final resolution of 
all lingering claims, as a precursor to the eventual 
termination of tribal existence and the full assimilation of 
Indians into white society. Like virtually every other 
tribe in the country, the Omahas took advantage of this new 
avenue of redress, filing two separate claims before the 
Commission.
Just as the Omahas' experience with PL 280 and 
retrocession offers an instructive case study for the 
localized impact of those policies, so too does the tribe's 
experience before the ICC offer insight into the merits and 
the flaws of the Commission's operations. While the Omahas 
ultimately prevailed in the prosecution of both their ICC 
claims, those successes came only after nearly twenty years 
of tedious and complex litigation. The Omahas also achieved 
another nationally-significant "first," as their path- 
breaking compromise with the government forged the
5Commission's "Omaha Rule" for the processing of similar 
settlements.
The resolution of the Omahas' ICC claims also 
demonstrates the unfortunate built-in limitations of the 
Commission's remedial powers. As was the case in all 
judgments rendered by the ICC, the Omahas were not awarded 
interest on the amounts they finally received, thus leaving 
them substantially less than "whole" for the injustices they 
had suffered. In addition, the receipt of the ICC judgment 
funds resulted in the development of disturbing intra-tribal 
factionalism over the distribution of proceeds.
Controversies centering on the use of tribal funds 
occasionally plague the Omahas to this day, generally 
pitting tribal members who live in urban areas against those 
who live on the reservation.
In the 1970s and 80s, the Omahas retained their 
prominence as "legal warriors," waging a prolonged and 
incredibly complex judicial battle in which they sought to 
regain possession of more than 11,000 acres situated east of 
the Missouri River. The tribe claimed that the land had 
been a part of its reservation before changes in the river 
channel moved it to the Iowa side, where it was occupied 
over time by white farmers. The story of the "Blackbird 
Bend" litigation exposes several recurring and important 
aspects of modern Indian relations. Among those themes are 
issues relating to Indian political and legal activism,
6racial tensions between tribes and their white neighbors, 
and the often-controversial role of the federal government 
as the continuing "trustee” of Indian lands. The Blackbird 
Bend litigation is particularly noteworthy on the latter 
issue, since the Omahas spent nearly as much energy fighting 
against the United States' "representation" of the tribe as 
they did in battling the white claimants in Iowa.
This thesis seeks to interpret each of these episodes 
in the modern "legal history" of the Omaha Tribe. The goal 
is not only to fill a void in the historical record by 
providing a synthesis of the facts, but also to suggest ways 
in which the Omahas' grass roots experiences reflect the 
impact of larger trends in federal Indian policy over the 
past five decades. By their determined efforts to obtain 
that which they considered "rightfully theirs," the Omahas 
provide a compelling example of a tribe struggling to 
preserve its unique cultural legacy in the face of daunting 
bureaucratic and judicial inertia. It is a story that 
deserves to be told, and one that will hopefully spur 
additional research relating to numerous other 
"underexplored" issues in the modern history of this 
remarkable tribe.
7NOTES
1 For a comprehensive examination of the government's 
"experimentation” on the Omahas throughout the nineteenth 
and early-twentieth centuries, see Judith A. Boughter, 
"Betraying Their Trust: The Dispossession of the Omaha
Nation, 1790-1916," (Master's Thesis, University of Nebraska 
at Omaha, 1995).
2 See Boughter, "Betraying Their Trust," Chap. 4; and 
Leonard A. Carlson, Indians, Bureaucrats, and Land: The 
Dawes Act and the Decline of Indian Farming (Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1981).
3 Michael L. Tate, The Upstream People: An Annotated 
Research Bibliography of the Omaha Tribe (Metuchen, N.J.:
The Scarecrow Press, 1991), vii.
CHAPTER ONE
ENTERING A "DRAGON'S NEST 
OF LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONFUSION"
* * * *
THE ARRIVAL OF PUBLIC LAW 280 ON THE OMAHA RESERVATION,
1946 - 1953
On August 1, 1953, the United States House of 
Representatives adopted House Concurrent Resolution 108, 
proclaiming "the sense of the Congress" that certain Indian 
tribes should be "freed from federal supervision and 
control" as rapidly as possible. [Appendix I]. Issued 
with the concurrence of the Senate, the Resolution served as 
one of the federal government's first overt steps in its 
ill-fated "termination" policy of the 1950s and 60s, and 
marked yet another momentous swing in the pendulum of 
federal policy regarding Indian relations.
Resolution 108 announced a return to the simplistic, 
misguided "assimilationist" policies of the late 19th and 
early 2 0th centuries, as the federal government once again 
sought to move Native Americans involuntarily into the 
"mainstream" of society. The terminationists aspired to 
"free" Indians not by way of privatization of tribal lands,
9as had been the case in the earlier allotment era, but 
rather by the outright extinguishment of tribal existence. 
Representative William H. Harrison of Wyoming, one of the 
sponsors of Resolution 108, succinctly noted its purpose by 
stating that it "is intended as a directive to the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (BIA) to start working itself out of a job."3
As a mandate for the federal government to cut 
expenditures by getting out of the Indian business, 
Resolution 108 marked a dramatic departure from the policies 
implemented during John Collier's tenure as Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs from 1933 to 1945. Collier's efforts had 
brought an end to the allotment process and served to 
strengthen and expand the BIA's role as an insulating bond 
between the federal government and the Indian nations. At 
the same time, Collier sought, through vigorous 
implementation of the provisions of the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934, to promote a strongly renewed 
sense of tribal sovereignty and self-government.4 
Resolution 108 announced an intent to reverse the policies 
of the Collier era by severing the federal government's 
unique trust relationship with American Indians and 
abolishing all federal supervision over the tribes as soon 
as possible.
Dillon S. Myer, who served as Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs in the Truman administration from May 1950 to March
10
1953, played a prominent role in the implemention of the
terminationist ideology. Myer wasted no opportunity to
advance the Congressional mandate of decentralization and
eventual withdrawal of BIA services. In a letter to all
Tribal Council Members dated October 10, 1952, Myer clearly
delineated the Bureau's aims:
The policy of the Bureau of Indian Affairs with respect 
to withdrawal contemplates two major objectives:
(1) that the responsibility which the Bureau now has 
for providing Indians with such services as education, 
health, welfare assistance, and law enforcement should 
be transferred to the agencies of State or local 
government which normally provide such services for 
other citizens, and (2) that the responsibility for 
supervision of Indian trust property should be 
transferred to the Indians themselves —  either as 
individuals or as tribal groups.
Myer pursued those objectives aggressively, frequently
sounding the need to move farther and faster in the
fidirection of termination.
Myer's enthusiastic endorsement of the new governmental 
policy did not go unchallenged. The National Congress of 
American Indians urged its members to resist the impending 
termination programs, and bitterly criticized Myer for his 
"stated intention of working, to the subordination of all 
else, for the abandonment of the Federal Government's 
trusteeship responsibilities guaranteed to many of you in 
your treaties."7 The National Farmer's Union voiced its 
opposition as well, issuing a resolution in which it vowed 
to "continue to.oppose the revocation of treaties and
11
abandonment of the Indian to rapacious, selfish groups who 
want the resources on the Indian lands."8 Other observers 
expressed their opposition in similar terms, viewing the 
shift in policy as "a sweeping betrayal of trust" and seeing 
the purported "liberation" of the Indians as nothing more 
than a smokescreen for a renewed land grab by non-Indians.9
Not surprisingly, John Collier was one of the most vocal 
critics of the termination ideology, calling it a 
"compulsive torrent" that had been "stampeded through 
Congress," ushering in a new "century of dishonor."10 
Collier aimed some of his sharpest rhetoric directly at 
Dillon Myer, describing his tenure as "a coercive, 
stereotyped and dictatorial one-track drive toward the 
destruction of Indian rights and specifically toward the 
throwing of all Indian properties 'to the wolves'."11
Notwithstanding that contemporary criticism, some 
modern commentatators are relatively charitable in their 
evaluation of Congress' intent, suggesting that the 
terminationist ideology may have been based upon true 
idealism, legitimate budgetary concerns, or even the "anti­
colonialist spirit of the post WW II period."12 Myer 
himself seems to have been a true believer to the end. In a
memorandum to the Secretary of the Interior issued on the 
day he left office, he frankly acknowledged that the great 
majority of Indians seemed opposed to his withdrawal
12
1 ^  « programs. Still, he maintained that "trusteeship and
other special forms of government services to the Indians
are holding the Indians back politically, socially and
economically," and urged that "a strong hand be taken by
both this Department and the Congress" to implement the
withdrawal programs.14
Regardless of whether the political dynamics and 
motivations of the termination era are viewed as benevolent 
or exploitive in nature, the results of termination proved 
to be disastrous for those tribes which actually experienced 
the process.15 For other Indian groups that were never 
actually "terminated," such as the Omaha Tribe of Nebraska, 
other Congressional enactments adopted in pursuit of the 
termination goal would result in far more harm than benefit. 
Indeed, the most notable of those enactments, the measure 
that would become known as Public Law 280, would prove 
devastating to both the Omahas themselves and non-Indians 
who lived on or around their reservation.
Just two weeks after the adoption of Resolution 108, 
Congress took the first substantive step in furtherance of 
its newly-announced termination policy. On August 15, 1953, 
President Dwight Eisenhower signed into law Public Law 83- 
280 (PL 280). The new statute provided that the state of 
Nebraska and four other states were to assume both civil and 
criminal jurisdiction over all "Indian country" within their
13
boundaries.16 [Appendix II]. Other states were authorized 
to pass legislation or amend their constitution so as to 
assume such jurisdiction at their option. The 
jurisdictional chaos that would result from this misguided 
legislation, coupled with other adverse effects of the 
termination push, would eventually lead to the renouncement 
of the entire policy and the close of the "termination era" 
some fifteen years later. In the meantime, however, the law 
enforcement and jurisdictional problems arising on the Omaha 
Reservation in northeast Nebraska made it the textbook 
example of the legislative folly inherent in the PL 280 
scheme.
The legislative history of PL 280 indicates that its
sponsors were ostensibly motivated by concern over the
confusing and overlapping jurisdictional bounds between
state, federal, and tribal law enforcement services, and the
resulting problems of law enforcement on and around specific 
1 7 . •reservations. The Senate Report of the bill provides:
As a practical matter, the enforcement of law and order 
among the Indians . . . has been left largely to the
Indian groups themselves. In many states, tribes are 
not adequately organized to perform that function; 
consequently there has been created a hiatus in law 
enforcement authority that could best be remedied by 
conferring criminal jurisdiction on States indicating 
an ability and willingness to accept such 
responsibility.18
Various other reports and correspondence in the 
Congressional records reflect extensive concern over the
14
"intolerable situation of lawlessness" in and around certain 
reservations as a result of confusion over jurisdictional 
bounds. During 1952 hearings on several bills that would 
eventually be melded into PL 28 0, the House Subcommittee on 
Indian Affairs heard testimony describing Indian 
reservations as "legal no-man's lands" and decrying the 
"complete breakdown of law and order on many of the
I Q . . .  . . .reservations.Significantly, there is no specific 
testimony or evidence in the legislative history regarding 
the law enforcement situation on the Omaha Reservation in 
1953. While conditions there were in fact quite poor, the 
passage of PL 280 would exacerbate the problem rather than 
alleviate it.
Much of the criticism of the PL 280 scheme, both before 
and after the bill's passage, focused on the absence of any 
provision requiring the consent of the affected Indian 
tribes to the transfer of jurisdiction. Eisenhower himself 
expressed "grave doubts" about this "unfortunate" omission 
from the bill.20 He signed it nevertheless, having 
apparently been advised that all Indians in the five 
mandatory states had been consulted and "enthusiastically 
endorsed" the legislation, and believing that "its basic 
purpose represents still another step in granting equality 
to all Indians in our nation."21 He went on to urge 
Congress to amend the bill in the upcoming session so as to
15
require consultation with the tribes prior to the enactment 
of legislation subjecting them to state control.22
Notwithstanding Eisenhower's indulgent attitude toward 
the act's basic intent, John Collier and many other critics 
were less sanguine about both the law's purpose and its 
likely effect. The New York Times editorialized against the 
bill, stating that it had been "whipped through Congress so 
rapidly that practically no one interested in Indian affairs 
—  least of all the Indians themselves —  knew what was 
happening until it had already happened" and that "it could 
do great wrong to the American Indian population of many 
states."23 The paper went on to note that many of the 
interest groups that opposed the bill, including the 
Association on American Indian Affairs, the Institute of 
Ethnic Affairs, and the American Civil Liberties Union, were 
"only now beginning to be heard."24 Collier was 
particularly prophetic in his criticism of the bill, 
accurately predicting that it would lead to "a dragon's nest
p 5
of legal and administrative confusion." He expressed 
dismay and bewilderment at the fact that Eisenhower had 
signed the bill despite his recognition of its "most un- 
Christian" approach.
As to the Indians in the five mandatory states, the 
proponents of PL 280 were artfully yague in their handling 
of the consent issue. In a letter to the House Committee on
16
Interior and Insular Affairs, dated July 7, 1953, Assistant 
Secretary of the Interior Orme Lewis indicated that the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs had consulted with state and local 
authorities, as well as with Indian groups in the five 
mandatory states of California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, 
and Wisconsin, and had reported that all of the states had 
"indicated their willingness to accept the proposed transfer 
of jurisdiction." The Indian groups in those states were 
likewise reported to be "for the most part, agreeable to the 
transfer."28
Lewis acknowledged that several tribes had objected to 
the proposed transfer, contending that they would be 
subjected to inequitable treatment in the state courts, and 
that their tribal police organizations were already capable 
of maintaining order on the reservation. Congress 
ultimately concluded that the tribal law enforcement 
operations on the Red Lake Reservation in Minnesota, the 
Warm Springs Reservation in Oregon, and the Menominee 
Reservation in Wisconsin were indeed functioning in a 
satisfactory manner, and it specifically exempted them from 
the provisions of the bill.
Lewis' representation to Congress that the Indians in 
Nebraska had been "for the most part agreeable" with the 
transfer of jurisdiction to the state had been preceded by 
similar Congressional testimony from Commissioner Dillon
17
Myer. Notwithstanding his ardent te^minationist philosophy, 
Myer did urge Congress to consult with the affected tribes 
before the proposed transfer of jurisdiction because of the 
"varying situation" in each of the states with respect to 
law enforcement concerns.30 At a February 28, 1952 hearing 
before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs, Myer proffered 
the only direct reference to the Nebraska situation in the 
entire legislative history of the bill. Explaining why no 
Nebraska tribes would be exempted from coverage, Myer 
stated, "Nebraska, I believe, would cover the whole State, 
because we have gotten in touch with the tribes there." 
(emphasis added).
Six months later, Myer made substantially the same 
representation at a meeting with his agency superintendents 
held at Aberdeen, South Dakota. There, Myer indicated that 
the Bureau had consulted with the individual tribes in each 
of the mandatory states, and that any tribe which objected 
to the transfer was not included m  the bill's coverage.
Four years after PL 280 went into effect, Winnebago 
Agency Superintendent Allen M. Adams presented a slightly 
more specific assertion of the supposed prior acquiescence 
of the Nebraska tribes. In a report delivered to a 
conference on "Indian Problems of Law and Order" at the 
University of South Dakota in June, 1957, Adams stated:
You've heard the remarks here that the Indians in
Nebraska are now under Public Law 280. Before those
18
Indians down there came under that law, the three 
active councils were contacted. All of them expressed 
their willingness to come under that law. The board of 
supervisors of the two counties where the Indians are 
located, Thurston County and Knox County, also agreed 
to that. It was taken up with the Attorney General who 
also agreed to it. (emphasis added). 3
BIA and Omaha tribal records appear to confirm these
representations of.Adams, Myer, and Lewis regarding the
prior consent of the Omahas. On March 9, 1951, Adams'
predecessor as Superintendent of the Winnebago Agency, H. E.
Bruce, convened a meeting of delegates from the four tribal
councils under his jurisdiction (Omaha, Winnebago, Santee
Sioux, and Ponca) for the purpose of discussing a matter
that he described as "the proposed bill to confer civil and
criminal jurisdiction over Indians on the State of
Nebraska."34 That meeting resulted in the adoption of a
joint resolution in which the tribal delegates announced
that they had "read, discussed, and carefully considered the
draft of a proposed bill to confer on the State of Nebraska
civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indians in the State,"
and that "sections 2 and 4 of said proposed bill meet with
the approval of the Indians of said tribes and have their
endorsement."35 The resolution was signed by Tribal
Chairman Amos Lamson on behalf of the Omahas, and was
certified by Superintendent Bruce as having been adopted
*5
unanimously.J °
In light of this apparent indication of consent by the 
tribe, and the Congressional testimony of Myer and Lewis on
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the issue, it is easy to understand President Eisenhower's 
belief that the Omahas and other Indians affected by the 
transfer of jurisdiction "enthusiastically supported" the 
passage of PL 280. Nevertheless, there are several factors 
in the historical record which serve to cloud the issue of 
the Omahas' consent. In the first place, the March 9, 1951 
resolution precedes the actual passage of PL 280 by more 
than two years. The resolution is not specific as to the 
precise piece of legislation being considered, nor does it 
specify the contents of "sections 2 and 4" of the bill, 
which were the only provisions endorsed by the tribe. The 
resolution thus does not definitively establish that the 
Omahas knowingly consented to the ultimate provisions of PL 
280.
Moreover, the Omaha tribe was subject to the same 
factionalization and political infighting that characterize 
any other governmental entity. Given the two year gap 
between adoption of the 1951 resolution and enactment of PL 
280, it is entirely possible that the political sentiments 
of the tribe and its leadership may have changed in the 
interim. Alternatively, there is some reason to suspect 
that the actions of the tribal representatives at the 1951 
meeting may not have accurately reflected the attitude of 
the tribal membership as a whole.
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Again, the records relating to H. E. Bruce's tenure as 
Superintendent of the Winnebago Agency offer some insight 
into the latter possibility. In a May 16, 1949 report to 
the Commissioner that is notable for both its thoroughness 
and its rather patronizing tone, Bruce provided his own 
subjective assessment of the character and abilities of each 
of the members of the Omaha Tribal Council. Writing of 
tribal Chairman Amos Lamson (who would sign the 1951 
"consent resolution" on behalf of the Omahas), Bruce stated 
"[Lamson's] thinking is rather superficial. He is only one- 
quarter or less Indian, does not speak the Omaha language 
and will have difficulty maintaining a position of tribal 
leadership for these reasons." He went on to note that 
other tribal members "resent his present efforts to help the
-5 Q
agency overcome [other problems described m  the report]." 
Other Council members were variously described as 
"unscrupulous and shiftless," "a slow and shallow thinker,"
TO
or "motivated by a desire to feather his own nest."
In a subsequent memorandum to the Aberdeen Area 
Director, Superintendent Bruce described Lamson as being 
"motivated first, last, and always by personal interest. . . 
he is thoroughly insincere and unreliable.1,40 Bruce 
recorded this assessment on May 1, 1951, just eight days 
before Lamson signed the "consent resolution" on behalf of 
the Omaha tribe. That resolution would be the only formal
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indication of the government's consultation with the Omahas 
regarding PL 280 —  a law that would in fact not even be 
enacted until more than two years after this questionable 
"endorsement."
A more tangible indication of the uncertainty 
surrounding the Omahas' "consent" to PL 280 may be found in 
a 1953 Congressional Investigatory Report on the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs. In July, 1952 Congress authorized the House 
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs to conduct a 
. comprehensive investigation of the BIA in order to
recommend steps that would effectuate the withdrawal of all 
federal supervision and control over Indians as rapidly as 
possible.41 To perform this investigation, a special 
subcommittee was created, which forwarded a request to the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs for a report from the BIA 
addressing numerous specific issues related to the ultimate 
termination goal.
The Commissioner, in turn, sent a memorandum to all 
Bureau officials ordering that certain data be gathered from 
each reservation so as to facilitate the ultimate withdrawal 
of Bureau services. One of the specific tasks assigned to 
agency officials was to ascertain the attitudes of Indians, 
state officials, and county officials with respect to the 
transfer of law and order jurisdiction over the reservation 
to the State. The responses to that inquiry were compiled
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and summarized in Table XII attached to the final Committee 
Report, titled "Data on Reservation Law and Order."
Contrary to the representations of Lewis, Myer, and Adams, 
and in sharp contrast to the apparent effect of the 1951 
"consent resolution," the Omaha Indians in Nebraska are 
clearly indicated as being "not favorable" to the proposed 
transfer.42 [Figure 1].
Additional evidence that the Omahas were not 
necessarily "willing" participants in the PL 280 experiment 
may be found in the text of an appellate brief filed with 
the Nebraska Supreme Court in 197 0. Arguing on behalf of an 
Omaha tribal member who had been convicted in state court of 
the murder of another Indian, attorney Lawrence E. Murphy 
challenged the constitutional validity of PL 280's 
jurisdictional transfer. Murphy asserted that "no 
referendum of the members of the Omaha Indian Tribe" had 
been conducted prior to the transfer of jurisdiction to the 
state in 1953, and that therefore the purported abrogation 
of their rights under federal law was constitutionally 
infirm.42
While Murphy's 1970 statement was unsubstantiated, the 
question of the Omahas' consent is further obscured by the 
statements of tribal representative Alfred Gilpin at the 
same 1957 conference where Allen Adams had indicated the 
tribe's prior consent. Gilpin did not directly refute
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Compilation of data relating to "Reservation Law and Order," 
prepared for Congress by BIA in contemplation of termination 
legislation- Note indication that attitude of Omaha Indians 
is "not favorable" to slate jurisdiction.
SOURCE: U.S. Congress, House, H. Rep. No. 2503, 82nd Cong.,
2d sess., Report With Respect to the House Resolution 
Authorizing the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs to 
Conduct an Investigation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(1953), Table XI I .
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Adams' statement (he had been delayed by bad weather and was 
not present at the conference at the time of Adams' report), 
but he repeatedly and bitterly lamented the "damage" and 
"destruction" caused to the reservation by its passage.44 
Thus, whatever "endorsement" of the transfer of jurisdiction 
may have existed among the Omahas prior to 1953 had 
apparently evaporated within just a few years.
It is also instructive to note that an examination of 
local and statewide newspapers during the period in which PL 
280 was being considered and enacted reveals very little 
public awareness of the transfer of jurisdiction from the 
federal government to the state. Moreover, even those few 
state and local officials who were aware of the bill's 
provisions seemed to have little appreciation of its meaning 
or likely effect.45 Just as the New York Times had 
suggested, the passage of PL 280 seems to have been a fait 
accompli long before any substantial portion of the Nebraska
• A gpopulace, Indian or white, realized what was happening.
Perhaps the apparent lack of public and governmental 
attention to the passage of PL 280 in 1953 may be explained 
by the most intriguing conclusion to be drawn from an 
examination of this law as it affected the Omaha 
Reservation. Surprisingly, PL 280 made very little change 
in the day-to-day jurisdictional status of the reservation 
because the State of Nebraska had been erroneously
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exercising criminal jurisdiction over the Omahas for some 70 
years prior to 1953!47 Enactment of PL 280 was therefore 
most likely viewed by Nebraska state officials, as well as 
the Omahas who purportedly "endorsed" its passage, as little 
more than a Congressional confirmation of the status quo.
An understanding of this situation requires an 
examination of several conflicting decisions of the Nebraska 
Supreme Court and the federal courts. These decisions 
reflected, and arguably contributed to, the uncertainty and 
confusion that has characterized criminal jurisdiction on 
the Omaha Reservation throughout its existence. Ironically, 
that jurisdictional turmoil was not addressed, or even 
appreciably acknowledged, by the state or federal courts in 
Nebraska until well after the passage of PL 280, which had 
been designed to eliminate those very concerns.
The Nebraska Supreme Court most directly addressed the 
pre-1953 jurisdictional status of the Omaha Reservation in 
Robinson v. Sigler (1971).48 In that case, Omaha tribal 
member Enoch Robinson had been tried and convicted in the 
Nebraska state courts for the 1969 murder of another Indian 
on the Omaha Reservation.49 Robinson sought a writ of 
habeas corpus from the Nebraska Supreme Court, arguing that 
the state did not have jurisdiction to prosecute an Indian 
for the murder of another Indian within the limits of the 
reservation. The bulk of the parties' arguments in Robinson
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were devoted to issues unrelated to the pre-1953 
jurisdictional status of the reservation. In the course of 
its decision, however, the Robinson court noted in dicta 
that the state of Nebraska had been exercising both civil 
and criminal jurisdiction over the Omaha Indians since at 
least 1882, over 70 years before PL 280 purportedly gave the 
state the right to do so.
The claimed basis for this pre-1953 state jurisdiction 
was set out in the brief filed on behalf of the state by 
Attorney General Clarence A. H. Meyer, much of which was 
accepted by the Court and repeated verbatim in its opinion. 
The state argued that it had been vested with criminal 
jurisdiction over Indians long prior to 1953 on the basis of 
an 188 2 allotment statute which authorized the Secretary of 
the Interior to convey tribal land to individual members of 
the tribe and retain certain portions in trust for the tribe
C A
as common property. The statute went on to provide that,
upon completion of the allotments, every member of the tribe
"shall have the benefit of and be subject to the laws, both
5 1civil and criminal, of the State of Nebraska." Based upon 
that language, the Robinson court held that the state courts 
of Nebraska had "either concurrent or residual criminal 
jurisdiction" over the Omahas prior to 1953.52 PL 280 had 




The state's position on this issue was reiterated 
several years,later in testimony before a Senate 
subcommittee considering the amendment or repeal of PL 280. 
On March 4, 1976, Nebraska Assistant Attorney General Ralph 
H. Gillan appeared before the Senate Subcommittee on Indian 
Affairs to present the views of the Nebraska Department of 
Justice with respect to the proposed Indian Law Enforcement 
Improvement Act of 1975. In the course of his testimony, 
Gillen matter-of-factly asserted that PL 280 had not 
appreciably changed the jurisdictional facts of life on the 
Omaha Reservation:
The history of jurisdiction over Indian country in 
Nebraska prior to 1953 is somewhat confusing, and it 
may well be that State jurisdiction was mistakenly 
exercised. . . in any event, it is clear that for many
years before 1953 the Nebraska courts did exercise 
civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indians on the 
reservation. apparently concurrently with the Federal 
courts. The exercise of this jurisdiction was not 
challenged before 1953 . . . State jurisdiction had, in
fact been exercised, rightly or wrongly, before 1953.
In 1953, under Public Law 28 0, Nebraska acquired 
exclusive civil and criminal jurisdiction over all 
Indian country in Nebraska. It probably did not 
involve anv great exchange, as a practical matter, from 
what had gone on before, (emphasis added^.5^
Gillan's statement was sufficiently provocative as to
prompt additional inquiry into the matter by the
subcommittee. Chairman Senator James Abourezk asked the BIA
to investigate and analyze the question of Nebraska's pre­
ss1953 exercise of jurisdiction. The request resulted in a 
responsive memorandum dated March 24, 1976 from the
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Winnebago Agency Superintendent to the Director of the 
Aberdeen Area Office. The Superintendent reported that, 
although he had been unable to locate agency records 
pertaining to law enforcement activities prior to 1953, he 
had determined through discussions with local residents that 
the state of Nebraska, specifically Thurston County, had 
indeed exercised both criminal and civil jurisdiction over 
Indians prior to the enactment of P.L. 280.56 The 
memorandum specifically recited conversations with various 
individuals, including Omaha Tribal Chairman Edward L. Cline 
and several persons connected with local law enforcement, in 
which each respondent confirmed that Indians were routinely 
arrested and prosecuted in the state courts of Nebraska 
prior to 1953.57
The Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in Robinson v. 
Sigler thus served as both a confirmation of, and an 
attempted justification for, the de facto state of criminal 
jurisdiction on the Omaha Reservation as it had existed for 
almost a century. Whatever clarity the state court may have 
thought it brought to this issue with Robinson, however, was 
quickly dissipated by the federal courts. In Omaha Tribe v. 
Village of Walthill (1971), decided just five months after 
Robinson. the federal district court specifically rejected 
the state court's reliance on the 1882 allotment statute as
. . . . .  Rfithe basis for its assertion of pre-1953 jurisdiction. The
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court held that the provisions of the allotment act had 
never been fully executed on the Omaha Reservation, and 
therefore criminal jurisdiction within the Omaha Reservation 
had not passed to the State of Nebraska by virtue of that
CQ
statute. Thus the "dragon's nest" remained intact.
While the state's exercise of jurisdiction prior to 
1953 was almost certainly erroneous, the fact that it 
proceeded without challenge by the federal government for so 
many years offers a compelling illustration of the complex 
and confusing state of jurisdictional issues surrounding 
Indian reservations in the pre-1953 era. A complete 
examination of the historical background of jurisdiction in
Indian territory is beyond the scope of this paper, and is
• finavailable in numerous other sources. u Suffice to say,
however, that throughout American history the problem of
criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian lands has
presented a chaotic and often conflicting morass of
treaties, statutes, and regulations, resulting in what one
commentator has accurately described as "a complex labyrinth
which many practitioners and courts find virtually
impossible to master."61
A great deal of this nationwide jurisdictional 
confusion stemmed, as it had in Nebraska, from the allotment 
ideology of the late 1800's, and the piecemeal 
implementation of the various allotment statutes enacted
30
during that era. Specifically, section 6 of the General 
Allotment Act of 1887 provided that Indians who were 
allotted lands under the Act would thereafter be subject to 
the jurisdiction of the state courts, just as the 1882 Act 
had been interpreted by the courts in Nebraska to confer 
jurisdiction on themselves, as the court held in Robinson v. 
Sigler.
For several reasons, however, section 6 of the General 
Allotment Act did not have the anticipated effect of 
substantially shifting criminal jurisdiction over Indian 
lands to the states. In the first place, section 6 was 
never intended to create an exception to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the federal courts over certain crimes 
committed on Indian reservations pursuant to the Federal 
Major Crimes Act. Furthermore, heirs of an allottee were 
deemed not subject to state jurisdiction, thus creating a 
totally unworkable practical dilemma for state law 
enforcement operations. That operational dilemma was 
expressly recognized by the Acting Solicitor of the 
Department of the Interior when he wrote in a 1954 opinion 
letter to Assistant Secretary Orme Lewis:
Such complexities and distinctions as these have 
rendered the grant of State jurisdiction over Indians 
contemplated by the general Allotment Act largely 
ineffective. The sponsors of that legislation assumed 
that the allotment of the Indians in severalty would be 
but the prelude to the termination of their tribal 
relations 4 . . When that program failed to be carried
out, and the Indians . . . continued to maintain their
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tribal relations and the Government continued its 
guardianship over them, the subjection of the Indians 
to the jurisdiction of the States ceased to have much 
reality. State law enforcement officers could not, 
after all, go around with tract books in their pockets, 
and being unable to distinguish a patent-in-fee Indian 
from a ward Indian, they did not commonly concern 
themselves with law violations by Indians, and the 
theoretical jurisdiction of the States thus fell into 
innocuous desuetude. 3
Given these and many other jurisdictional complexities, 
it would be unduly simplistic for modern observers to engage 
in sweeping criticism of the Nebraska courts for their 
invocation of jurisdiction over the Omahas in the pre-1953 
era. It can be plausibly concluded that the state courts' 
exercise of jurisdiction prior to the passage of PL 280 was 
not so much a "usurpation" of power as it was an attempt to 
pick their way through a jurisdictional quagmire.
For example, in Kitto v. State (1915), the Nebraska 
Supreme Court offered a rather compelling rationale for its 
exercise of jurisdiction in Indian cases. The court noted 
that the only way to give meaning to the apparent intent of 
the allotment statutes was to construe them so as to 
transfer jurisdiction to the state courts after the 
allotments were made. If such jurisdiction was not vested 
in the state, the court reasoned, it was vested nowhere. 
Indeed, this may have been the case on the Omaha 
Reservation, where there was no viable tribal judiciary 
before the early 1970s. On other reservations, however, the 
tribes themselves were empowered to handle all "non-major"
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crimes. The Kitto court concluded that Congress could not 
have intended for non-major offenses to go completely 
unpunished, and that therefore the Nebraska courts had no 
choice but to hear such cases, in order to provide "equal 
protection of the law . . .  to all, both Indians and white 
men. "6^
Nevertheless, by 1975 the state of Nebraska would 
itself acknowledge that its pre-1953 criminal jurisdiction 
over Indian matters should have been limited to: 1.)
offenses committed by Indians off the reservation and 2.) 
offenses committed on the reservation by non-Indians.65 The 
state's actual exercise of criminal jurisdiction over 
Indians in the years preceding PL 280 had far exceeded those
fk fibounds. Still, whatever errors had occurred in the 
state's invocation of Indian jurisdiction prior to 1953 were 
in fact obviated by the enactment of PL 280. As a 
"mandatory" state, Nebraska gained absolute and exclusive 
jurisdiction at that time regardless of what had gone on 
before.
Thus, the real impact of PL 28 0 on the Omaha 
Reservation was not to alter the entity that exercised 
jurisdiction over Indian matters, for the state had been 
doing that for decades. What the new law changed was the 
pattern of criminal law enforcement operations on the Omaha 
Reservation. An assessment of the effect of PL 280 on the
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Omaha Reservation therefore must begin with an examination 
of the law enforcement situation in Thurston County in the 
years immediately preceding 1953.
In his report to the Commissioner, dated May 16, 1949, 
Winnebago Superintendent H. E. Bruce presented a bleak 
account of the abysmal social, economic, and law enforcement 
conditions on the Omaha Reservation. In keeping with the 
assimilationist tenor of the times, Bruce scathingly 
criticized the attempts of the Collier era administrators to 
foster tribal self-government and cultural practices among 
the Omahas:
Since acceptance of the Indian Reorganization Act 
by the four Nebraska tribes . . . social problems which
were vital and basic . . . have been neglected and
ignored until they have become ugly sores . . . Vicious
social practices, once reasonably controlled, have 
multiplied with apparent official sanction and 
encouragement . . . All this has served to intensify
maladjustment, confusion, discouragement, and 
frustration in the collective pattern of Indian thought 
. . . Today a large majority of the Indians on the four
Nebraska reservations exist in a sort of twilight zone 
between two cultures -- they have lost the best of 
their Indian culture and have reached out to accept 
only the worst of the white man's culture.
Bruce went on to provide substantial details regarding many
of the apparent "social problems" that he claimed had
festered on the Omaha Reservation during the Collier era,
including alcoholism, peyoteism, juvenile delinquency,
educational and health deficiencies, breakdowns in marital
and family stability, and many others.
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Bruce's comments about the law and order situation on 
the reservation are particularly noteworthy. After first 
acknowledging that state and county courts had been 
exercising jurisdiction over offenses committed by or 
against Indians within the reservation since the allotment 
days, he went on to report that the burden of Indian law 
enforcement had been exceedingly heavy for both Thurston and
(TO . ■ #
Knox Counties. ° Bruce compiled statistics from Thurston 
County jail records showing that, for the years 194 6 through 
1948, Indians were prosecuted for 64 per cent of the
violations of law in a county in which they constituted only
2 0 per cent of the population. He prepared and attached an 
exhibit to the report in which he categorized the Indian 
prosecutions by type of offense. [Figure 2]. Bruce 
suggested that most of the Indian offenses resulted from 
excessive use of alcohol, and noted that bootlegging and the
manufacturing of Indian "home brew" were particularly
prevalent in the area.
In a refrain that would become even more common after 
the passage of PL 280, Bruce reported that county law 
enforcement authorities were "seriously handicapped" in 
dealing with the Indian situation by a shortage of funds. 
Thurston County officials contended that from 75 to 80 per 
cent of all funds spent on law enforcement were devoted to 
Indian cases. In light of those numbers, Bruce suggested
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FIGURE 2
Prosecution of Indians, Thurston County, Nebraska, 1946-48
SOURCE: Report of H. E. Bruce to John R. Nichols,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Exhibit E, May 16, 1949,
Records of BIA. Winnebago Agency. Record Group 075, Box 349 
[ 9 2M007 ] , File "Programs, Jurisdiction, 1949-52,'* National 
Archives - Central Plains Region, Kansas City; Missouri.
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that the county needed and deserved more federal assistance 
than the single Indian policeman who was then stationed at 
the reservation could provide.69 Bruce recommended that two 
additional positions of Indian Police be established, and 
urged "close cooperation with county officers in a more 
effective enforcement of law among Indians."70 Instead of 
providing more assistance, however, the federal government 
chose the opposite approach —  proceeding to abandon the 
Thurston County law enforcement situation via the passage of 
PL 280. A bad situation soon became significantly worse.
NOTES
1 U.S., Statutes at Large 67 (August 1, 1953): B132.
- It has been accurately noted that "practically every 
commentary on Public Law 280 begins with a sentence or 
paragraph which refers to the pendulum swing in federal 
policy between Indian 'self-determination' and Indian 
'termination.'" Final Report to the American Indian Policy 
Review Commission. Task Force Four: Federal. State, and 
Tribal Jurisdiction (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1976), 4. This paper obviously follows the same 
pattern, but will not expand that discussion other than to 
note that general treatments of the ebb and flow of federal 
Indian policy are available in numerous sources, including 
Rennard Strickland and Charles F. Wilkinson, eds., Felix S. 
Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law. Revised Ed., 
(Charlottesville, Virginia: Michie Bobbs-Merrill, 1982);
John R. Wunder, Retained Bv The People. A History of 
American Indians and the Bill of Rights. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994); William C. Canby Jr., American 
Indian Law. Nutshell Series (St. Paul: West Publishing 
Company, 1988), 9-31; and Justice and the American Indian: 
The Impact of Public Law 280 Upon the Administration of 
Justice on Indian Reservations. Chap. 1, "A Short History of 
Federal Policy Vacillation Toward Indians." (Washington,
D.C.: National American Indian Court Judges Association, 
1974), 18-34.
3 U.S. Congress, House, Representative William H. Harrison 
speaking in support of House Concurrent Resolution 108, 83rd 
Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record (20 July 1953), vol. 
99, 9363.
4 For details regarding the impact of John Collier's tenure 
as Commissioner of Indian Affairs, see Kenneth R. Philp,
John Collier's Crusade for Indian Reform. 1920-1954.
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1977).
5 Dillon S. Myer to All Tribal Council Members, October 10, 
1952; Box 2, File "Government Agencies," folder 1, Dillon S. 
Myer Papers. Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, 
Independence, Missouri. [References to documents in this 
collection will hereinafter be cited as Mver Papers, with 
Box and Folder designations as appropriate].
38
j tor example, in a speech presented to the Western 
Governor's Conference at Phoenix, Arizona on December 9, 
1952, Myer stated, "While I am encouraged by the progress 
that has been made to date in the transfer of service 
reponsibilities, I believe strongly that we have not moved 
far enough or fast enough in this direction. During the 
past two years we have been placing increased emphasis on 
speeding up progress toward these objectives." Mver Papers. 
Box 2, folder 1.
7 Frank George, Executive Director, National Congress of 
American Indians to All Tribal Council Chairmen, September 
26, 1952, Myer Papers. Box 2, folder 1.
O , , , , ,
Resolution on Indian Affairs, Adopted by Biennial 
Convention of National Farmers Union, March, 1954, Box 77, 
File "Association on American Indians, correspondence 1953- 
54," Philleo Nash Papers. Harry S. Truman Presidential 
Library, Independence, Missouri.
Q . . . .Dorothy Bohn, "'Liberating' the Indian, Euphemism for a 
Land Grab," The Nation 178 (February 10, 1954): 150-151.
in • . . .x John Collier, "Back to Dishonor," Christian Century 71
(May 12, 1954): 578-80.
11 John Collier, "Press Release, December 15, 1952," Mver 
Papers. Box 2, folder 3. The animosity between Collier and 
Myer was personal and chronic, dating back to at least 1942. 
See Philp, John Collier's Crusade. 225-228; and Oral History 
Interview with Dillon S. Mver. May 1974, Vol. 2, 255, Harry 
S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, Missouri.
12 Sandra A. Cadwalader and Vine Deloria, Jr., eds., The 
Aggressions of Civilization (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1984), xiv. For additional analysis of the impetus 
for termination, see Donald L. Fixico, Termination and 
Relocation: Federal Indian Policy. 1945-1960 (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1986), 111-113.
13 Dillon S. Myer, Memorandum to Secretary of the Interior, 
March 20, 1953, Mver Papers, folder 2.
14 Ibid.
The two most extensive terminations were those of the 
Klamaths of Oregon and Menominees of Wisconsin in 1954.
Both tribes' lands were quickly dissipated, and they were 
plunged into even deeper economic problems than they had 
previously suffered. Comprehensive discussions of these 
cases include Stephen Herzberg, "The Menominee Indians:
39
Termination to Restoration," American Indian Law Review 6, 
no. 1 (1978): 143-186; and Susan Hood, "Termination of the 
Klamath Tribe of Oregon," Ethnohistorv 19 (Fall 1972): 372- 
392. By the early 1960s, the termination policy was almost 
universally recognized as a failure.
16 U.S., Statutes at Large 67 (August 15, 1953): 588. The 
criminal jurisdiction provisions of PL 280 are now codified 
at 18 U.S. Code sec. 1162, while civil jurisdiction is 
codified at 28 U.S. Code sec. 1360.
17 . •For an excellent comprehensive analysis of this and other
aspects of the passage and operation of PL 280, see Carole
E. Goldberg, "Public Law 280: State Jurisdiction Over 
Reservation Indians," UCLA Law Review 22 (February 1975): 
535-594.
1 R U.S. Congress, Senate, S. Rep. No. 699. 83rd Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1953), 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2409, 2411.
1 Q U.S. Congress, House, Statement of Rep. Wesley A. D'Ewert 
in Hearings on H.R. 459. H.R. 3235. and H.R. 3624 Before the 
Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the Interior and Insular 
Affairs Comm.. 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. ser. 11 (February 28, 
1952), p. 16 (Y4. In 8/14: 82/11). [These hearings will 
hereinafter be cited as 1952 Hearings ser. Ill.
20 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Statement upon signing of Public 
Law 280, August 15, 1953, reprinted in Congressional Record 
(12 January 1956), vol. 102, 399.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 New York Times. August 12, 1953, 30.
24 Ibid.
25 John Collier to Milton Eisenhower, August 6, 1953, quoted 
in Philp, John Collier's Crusade. 229.
26 Collier, "Back to Dishonor," 579. Eisenhower's call for 
amendments to the Act went unheeded, as Collier expected. 
Seven attempts were made during the Eisenhower 
administration to rectify this "unfortunate omission," but 
all failed passage. Fixico, Termination and Relocation.
112. Ultimately, consent requirements were incorporated 
into the provisions of the Indian Bill of Rights in 1968, 
but by that time PL 280 was all but dead anyway.
40
U.S. Congress, House, H. Rep. No. 848. 83rd Cong., 1st 
Sess. (July 16, 1953). The precise nature of Nebraska's 
indication of consent to PL 280 remains rather murky. In 
light of the disastrous effects of the bill, a good deal of 
post hoc finger-pointing on that issue occurred among state 
officials. It appears that the only actual expression of 
the state's acquiescence took the form of a letter from 
State Attorney General Clarence S. Beck dated July 26, 1951 
to Winnebago Agency Superintendant H. E. Bruce, in which 
Beck indicated that the then-pending bill for transfer of 
jurisdiction "seems to be in proper order and this office 
has no objection to [its passage]." See "Indian Affairs 
Bureau Informs Nebraska It Has Responsibility," Lincoln 
Star. September 20, 1956, p. 20. While that letter predated 
the passage of PL 280 by more than two years, no further 
indication of the state's willingness to assume jurisdiction 
is apparent in the historical record.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
3 0 •Statement of Commissioner of Indian Affairs Dillon S.
Myer, 1952 Hearings ser. 11. 25.
31 Ibid., 26.
32 Minutes of the Meeting of Agency Superintendents and Area 
Personnel with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, August 
29, 1952, Sherman Hotel, Aberdeen, S. D., Records of BIA. 
Winnebago Agency. Record Group 075, Box 349 [92M0007], File 
"Programs, Jurisdiction 1949-52," National Archives - 
Central Plains Region, Kansas City, Missouri. [References to 
documents in these records will hereinafter be cited as 
Winnebago Agency Records. National Archives, with Box and 
File designations as appropriate].
3 3 •Program and Proceedings. Third Annual Conference on
Indian Affairs. "Indian Problems of Law and Order".
Institute of Indian Studies, State University of South
Dakota, June 16-17, 1957, p. 74.
34 H. E. Bruce to Frank Beaver, Amos Lamson, David Frazier, 
and Joseph LeRoy, February 23, 1951, Winnebago Agency 
Records. National Archives. File "Programs, Jurisdiction 
1949-52."
35 Resolution of Omaha, Santee Sioux, and Winnebago Tribes, 
March 9, 1951; Ibid.
36 Ibid.
41
o 7 . .H. E. Bruce to John R. Nichols, Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, May 16, 1949, p. 51; Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
d n .H. E. Bruce to Aberdeen Area Director, March 1, 1951,
p. 2; Ibid.
4  ^U.S. Congress, House, H. Res. 698. 82nd Cong., 2nd sess. 
(July 1, 1952).
43 U.S. Congress, House, H. Rep. No. 2503, 82nd Cong., 2nd 
sess., Report With Respect to The House Resolution 
Authorizing the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs to 
Conduct an Investigation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(1953), Table XII, pp. 104-109.
43 Robinson v. Sigler. 187 Neb. 144, 187 N.W.2d 756 (1971), 
Brief of Petitioner and Appellant. 22. The Court rejected 
this and other constitutional arguments raised by the 
Appellant, and upheld the jurisdiction of the state courts 
under PL 2 80.
44 Program and Proceedings. "Indian Problems of Law and 
Order," 76-77.
45 In a brief article published just a week before the 
passage of PL 280, the Lincoln Sunday Journal and Star noted 
the uncertainty among state officials regarding the bill's 
impact. In a passage that would prove to be a considerable 
understatement, the paper suggested that "Some legal matters 
will undoubtedly be affected in the new bills. Presumably 
this would mean more work for the peace officials in 
counties containing the reservations." "Indian Affairs 
Bills Leave Officials Uncertain of Effect." Lincoln Sunday 
Journal and Star. August 9, 1953, p. 2-A.
46 The Omaha World-Herald. Walthill Citizen, and Pender 
Times, among others, have been examined for the period from 
1950 to 1953. None appear to have addressed the issue of PL 
280 prior to its passage, although articles discussing 
jurisdictional problems did begin to appear on a sporadic 
basis in the years following enactment of the law.
47 PL 280 vested jurisdiction in the state for even those 
crimes which had previously been specifically reserved to 
the federal government pursuant to the 1885 Federal Major 
Crimes Act. U.S., Statutes at Large 23 (March 3, 1885):
42
3 85. The seven "major crimes" were murder, manslaughter, 
rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and 
larceny. Cjurisdiction over crimes not so designated was 
ostensibly vested in the tribes themselves. In Nebraska, 
however, the state courts had stepped in and exercised 
jurisdiction over all "non-major" crimes, for reasons 
discussed herein.
48 Robinson v. Sigler. 187 Neb. 144, 187 N.W.2d 756 (1971).
A Q . . ,
The prosecution of Robinson m  state court for the crime 
of murder illustrates the way in which PL 280 superceded the 
Federal Major Crimes Act in the mandatory states. Prior to 
1953, jurisdiction over murder cases involving Indians would 
have clearly remained in the federal courts.
The allotment statute relied upon by the state is found 
at U.S., Statutes at Large 22 (Aug. 7, 1882): 341. See 
Robinson. Brief of Appellee. 9-11.
51 Ibid.
52 Robinson v. Sialer. 187 Neb. 144, 148, 187 N.W.2d 756,
759.
53 Ibid., Brief of Appellee. 11.
U. S. Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Subcommittee 
on Indian Affairs of the Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs. United States Senate. 471, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 





58 Omaha Tribe of Nebraska v. Village of Walthill. 334 F. 
Supp. 823 (D. Neb. 1971).
59 Omaha Tribe. 334 F. Supp. 823, 837.
fin . . .For example, see Robert N. Clinton, "Criminal
Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey through a
Jurisdictional Maze," Arizona Law Review 18 (1976): 503; and
Robert N. Clinton, "Development of Criminal Jurisdiction
Over Indian Lands: The Historical Perspective," Arizona Law
Review 17 (1975): 951.
43
61 Clinton, "The Historical Perspective," 991.
For an extended discussion of these issues, see Clinton, 
"The Historical Perspective," 965-969.
63 Decisions of the Department of Interior. M-36184, 
(February 15, 1954), 61 I.D. 298, 304.
64 Kitto v. State. 98 Neb. 164, 170-171 (1915).
65 Nebraska Legislative Council, Report of the Legislative 
Council Interim Study Committee on Judiciary - Indian 
Retrocession. Committee Report No. 226, Vol. Ill, (January, 
1976).
66 Published decisions from the pre-1953 era in which the 
Nebraska courts exercised jurisdiction over Indians on the 
reservations include Kitto v. State. 98 Neb. 164, 152 N.W. 
380 (1915); Marion v. State. 16 Neb. 349, 20 N.W. 289 
(1884); and Painter v. Ives. 4 Neb. 122 (1875). As noted 
previously, of course, the state and county courts were also 
routinely prosecuting Indians in hundreds of unpublished 
proceedings.
fi7 . . .° H. E. Bruce to John R. Nichols, Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, May 16, 1949, Winnebago Agency Records. National 
Archives. File "Programs, Jurisdiction 1949-52."
68 Ibid., 26.
69 Ibid., 29. Former Thurston County Attorney A1 Raun 
echoed Bruce's comments in 1953, and lamented the county's 
"unjust load." He stated that, of 300 criminal cases 
handled in the county's courts in 1952, about 90% had 
involved Indians. "Indian Law Enforcing Load Heavy,
Thurston Co. Bearing Burden," Lincoln Sunday Journal and 
Star, August 30, 1953, p. 5-A.
70 Ibid., 41.
CHAPTER TWO
"HOW THIS SITUATION CAN EXIST 
IN THE UNITED STATES IS BEYOND ME"
* * * *
PUBLIC LAW 280 IN OPERATION ON THE OMAHA RESERVATION 
AND THE BATTLE OVER RETROCESSION, 1953 - 1970
However bad the law enforcement situation may have been 
on the Omaha Reservation prior to 1953, passage of Public 
Law 280 in that year only exacerbated the problem. The 
disastrous effects of PL 280 would include not only a 
further deterioration of law and order conditions on the 
reservation, but also an increase in racial tension and 
animosity between the Omahas and non-Indians living in the 
area: Not surprisingly, a fundamental dichotomy exists
between the Omahas' perception of the reasons for these 
problems and the perceptions held by non-Indian residents of 
the reservation.
From the non-Indian perspective, the root cause of the 
difficulties that followed the invocation of PL 280 lay in 
the lack of funding for the local governments that were 
required to assume criminal enforcement operations on the 
reservations. After August, 1953, all federal law
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enforcement personnel, few though that may have been, were 
withdrawn from the Omaha Reservation. Prior to the act, 
Thurston County was already prosecuting Indians on a routine 
basis for all "non-major" crimes, that is, those crimes not 
falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal 
courts under the Federal Major Crimes Act.^ According to 
Winnebago Agency Superintendent H. E. Bruce's May, 1949 
Report to the Commissioner, there was only one BIA policeman 
serving the reservation in the years immediately preceding 
passage of PL 280. This federal "force" was not increased 
between 1949 and 1953, despite Bruce's repeated 
recommendations for more law enforcement manpower. Several 
other sources likewise indicate that only one federal Indian 
officer had served the reservation before 1953.
Despite this apparently minimal pre-1953 BIA presence, 
some records seem to imply that the "complete" and 
"immediate" withdrawal of federal law enforcement personnel 
from the reservation was the primary cause of the ensuing 
lawlessness in the area.4 It is hard to understand how the 
removal of a lone BIA officer could have become the basis 
for all the problems that ensued. It is probably more 
accurate to state that Thurston County found itself 
significantly overburdened by the sudden unfunded increase 
in its law enforcement responsibilities on the reservation, 
since PL 280 had expressly repealed the Major Crimes Act in
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the mandatory states, and the county would now have to 
prosecute Indians for both "major” crimes and misdemeanors. 
Whatever the precise effect of the removal of that single 
federal officer, it is clear that the county soon found 
itself unable to adequately police the reservation due to 
financial constraints and manpower limitations. Law and 
order conditions in the area quickly deteriorated.
Thurston county officials maintained that they were 
doing their best to police the reservation, despite extreme 
financial hardship and the federal government's complete 
abandonment of the problem. The county petitioned the state 
for assistance, complaining that it "was short on money, had 
only one sheriff, and there had been a dramatic increase in 
crime among the Indian population.”5 The state provided 
little immediate assistance. Attorney General C. S. Beck 
noted that Thurston County had been handling Indian offenses 
in its courts since 1875, and offered only the vacuous 
platitude that "the problem in Thurston County is not one of 
jurisdiction. The problem is to help the Indians, and by so 
doing to help Thurston County."0
By 1957, however, the state had at least recognized the 
existence of the funding problem. Governor Victor Anderson 
met with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in Washington to 
seek federal financing for increased law enforcement on the 
reservation. Given the passage of PL 280 and Nebraska's
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status as a mandatory state, the BIA could not agree to 
Anderson's request. The Commissioner did, however, commit 
to bolstering the federal programs relating to juvenile 
delinquency on the reservation.7
Upon his return to Nebraska, the governor asked the
state legislature to address the problem. Anderson advised
the Nebraska Unicameral that, because some Indian lands in
Thurston County were exempt from taxation, "it is apparent
that the Indian population of Thurston County assumes a very
small portion of the tax burden of that County, although
constituting about 1/3 of the population."8 The governor
went on to report that for the year 1956, Indians
constituted over 84% of the total jail population in
Thurston County (236 out of 280 individual incarcerations),
and that the total annual cost to the county for the housing
of all prisoners had been $10,549. To remedy the problem,
Anderson introduced legislation designed to "equitably
distribute the added burden of law enforcement imposed upon
certain counties by reason of the passage of Public Law
280."9 The bill, which passed into law on June 21, 1957,
provided that the state would reimburse the county for
expenses in excess of $500 per month incurred in the feeding
of Indian prisoners, with the state commitment limited to a
i omaximum of $500 each month.
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Within several years, it became apparent that the 
state's $500 monthly contribution would not suffice. On May 
18, 1961 the Government and Military Affairs Committee of 
the Nebraska Legislature conducted a hearing to consider 
Legislative Bill 713, a bill that would amend the 1957 
legislation so as to provide funding for up to three 
additional deputy state sheriffs in the counties affected by 
PL 280 jurisdiction. The transcript of that hearing, which 
includes testimony from state and local officials as well as 
both white and Indian residents of Thurston County, provides 
a wealth of insight into the law enforcement conditions on 
the reservation in the early years of PL 280 jurisdiction.11
Norman Otto, appearing as the representative of then- 
Governor Frank Morrison, expressed the administration's 
frustration with the PL 280 scheme. Responding to a state 
legislator who asked "why [is] this a state concern rather 
than a national concern?" (a question which in itself 
reflects the lack of awareness among state officials of the 
impact of PL 280 even eight years after its passage!), Otto 
replied:
Well, it is only a State concern because the State 
accepted the responsibility. It used to be a national 
concern and they asked the State, would you like this 
problem, would you like to accept it, and the State 
said yes. . . . Maybe the people made a mistake in
1953 but this was their decision. I think you're 
right. It should have stayed a federal problem.
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W. Earl Dyer Jr., executive editor of the Lincoln Star, 
testified at the hearing "as a private citizen interested in 
a problem on which the state must act." He appeared to have 
studied the Thurston County situation extensively, and 
offered compelling statistics in support of the proposed 
legislation. Dyer reported that from 1954 to 1958, criminal 
cases involving Indians in Thurston County increased from 
249 to 353. Likewise, expenses for the county jail 
increased over 178% from 1950 to 1959. In 1949, the 
Thurston County jail had lodged 93 Indians at some time 
during the year; by 1958, that number had risen to 334. In 
light of these numbers, Dyer contended that the state had 
"the moral and legal responsibility to see to it that law 
and order is established in Thurston County — and that this 
blemish is removed from the political face of the state."13
Omaha tribal representatives presented similar appeals 
for state action. Chairman of the Omaha Tribal Council 
Alfred W. Gilpin first rebutted the prevalent notion that 
the tribe was not paying its fair share of the financial 
burden in the county, contending that the Omahas had in fact 
been paying taxes on their allotted lands since 1910. He 
went on to urge the Committee to consider the proposed 
legislation so as to end the lawlessness "that has caused us 
to even lose some of our members by death."14
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Tribal member Edward Cline likewise urged the Committee 
members to take action, contending that the reservation was 
not safe for women or children at any hour of the day.15 
Rev. Reuben H. Ten Haken, a tribal member and clergyman from 
Macy, offered a particularly eloquent plea for state 
attention to the problem:
The Omaha Reservation is desperately in need of 
the kind of law enforcement that this bill makes 
possible. . . .  We can testify to experience after 
experience that cries out for justice. . . .  I visit 
people in the hospital monthly and sometimes weekly who 
have been knifed [or] beaten . . . Violence and
brutality are often left unreported. . . . Our community
[has become] a haven for the lawless to ply their 
trades at the expense of ruined lives.16
LB 713 passed into law on July 1, 1961. As ultimately
enacted, the bill authorized the governor to appoint up to
three deputy state sheriffs for each county in which 60% or
more of the persons convicted for violation of state
criminal laws were Indians. The "60% rule11 was a last-
minute insertion in the bill, designed to accommodate
legislators from northern Nebraska counties bordering on the
Sioux Reservations in South Dakota, who claimed that their
counties were experiencing Indian problems comparable to
those in Thurston County. The unanticipated result of that
hasty amendment, however, was to turn what had been a well-
1 7intentloned measure into an "Indian Bounty Act."-1- Indians 
and their supporters contended that county officials now 
believed that the most expedient method to obtain increased
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state funding was to arrest more and more Indians. The 
resulting deluge of Indian arrests created great resentment 
among the Omahas, many of whom had originally supported the
« • i ft • • • •legislation. The tribe became increasingly anxious to
find some mechanism to escape from state jurisdiction.
Many observers believed that the lawlessness on the
reservation in the years after passage of PL 280 was
exacerbated by the enactment of federal legislation in 1955
which permitted the sale of alcoholic beverages to Indians.
Thurston County Sheriff John Elliott and other non-Indian
officials repeatedly cited alcohol consumption as a major
factor in the escalation of crime on the reservation. In a
July, 1956 interview with the Omaha World-Herald. Elliott
asserted that rising costs for the transport and housing of
Indian prisoners had depleted county resources, and that no
funds were available for the the maintenance of a deputy at
Macy or Winnebago. He went on to note that four murders had
occurred on the reservation in a six month period, and
claimed that in each case "the cause was drunkenness
followed by assault and battery."19 Walthill Mayor Dale
French echoed Elliott's comments, stating that the crime
problem on the reservation "has been increased since Indians
2 0were allowed to buy and drink liquor.'1
At least a few Omahas shared Elliott and French's 
opinion on the alcohol issue. An article in the July 1,
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1956 Omaha World-Herald Magazine quoted an unidentified
member of the Omaha Tribal Council as asserting that the
lifting of the prohibition on the sale of alcohol to the
Indians had been the "worst mistake the Government and State 
o 1ever made."^A
In the minds of most Omahas, however, the problems in
the implementation of PL 280 jurisdiction were not caused
primarily by the increased availability of alcohol on the
reservation or by a lack of funding. Rather, the general
perception of the Omahas was that local government officials
lacked the fundamental will to fairly and efficiently police
the reservation, due to inherent racism and discrimination.
Council Chairman Edward Cline voiced that tribal impression
in Congressional testimony delivered years later:
[During the PL 2 80 years] the tribe experienced 
harassment and unfair treatment at the hands of county 
law enforcement officials. . . . [We] were subject to
physical abuse and discriminatory prosecution. 
Rehabilitation was nonexistent. Indians would be 
placed in jail upon arrest for minor offenses for which 
non-Indians would merely be told to appear in court.
The county sheriff would refuse to set bail for an 
Indian, making him sit in jail until he could appear 
before the judge for arraignment.22
Cline went on to relate an incident in which a pregnant 
Indian girl had pleaded with her Thurston County jailers 
that she was about to have her baby. The baby was born in 
the jail, and the girl was given only an aspirin. Cline 
stated that "as a result of this treatment, the baby 
died."23 Thurston County Sheriff Clyde Storie strongly
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rebutted Cline's version of the story, contending that the 
woman had been found drunk in the street and was initially 
taken to a hospital. She left the hospital voluntarily, and 
was later found again on the streets of Walthill. She was 
then jailed at Pender where she could be monitored by a jail 
matron. A doctor was called, and was present at the birth. 
The baby was born with the umbilical cord twisted around its 
neck and could not be saved.24 Whatever the truth in this 
specific case, it is easy to envision the heightened tension 
and animosity associated with the incident.
The Omahas' frustration and resentment toward the 
state's exercise of jurisdiction under PL 280 was also 
evidenced in the poignant statements of Tribal Chairman 
Alfred Gilpin at the University of South Dakota's Conference 
on Indian Affairs in 1957:
Public Law 28 0 has actually left our Omaha and 
Winnebago Reservations lost since 1953. . . . Ever
since then we have had no law protection. . . The
Omahas and the Winnebagos pay tax on their trust land. 
It seems as though we should enjoy the same services as 
other communities . . . The county should be able to
give us a deputy on the reservation, which it hasn't 
done.
We had some killings going on there, one right on 
Main Street, which could have been prevented if we had 
law and order. This is not exaggerating. It's exactly 
the truth . . . How this situation can exist in the
United States is beyond me.
In an interview conducted twenty years later, Gilpin 
still lamented the tragic consequences of PL 280 on the 
reservation. He recalled his persistent but largely futile
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efforts to convince, state officials to meet their newly-
accepted responsibilities to the tribe:
In Macy, we had murder, we had rape, we had 
bootlegging, we had gunfights, right on the streets.
. . . I asked them, 'Why did you accept [PL 280
responsibilities] if you're not going to give us these 
services? . . . You're talking about money —  we're
talking about lives.'26
As the situation deteriorated, tribal leaders, county
officials, and concerned non-Indian residents took steps to
address the area's problems. Realizing that it could no
longer rely on the federal government for any substantive
assistance, the tribe announced a long-range cooperative
program for community development. The plan was designed
first to identify the tribe's aspirations for its future,
and then to move toward those objectives with the assistance
of state, local, and private institutions.27 As a corollary
to its long-range plan, the tribe took part in a program
administered by the national Association on American Indian
Affairs called "We Shake Hands." The program was publicized
as an effort to "end the social and spiritual isolation of
the tribal community by encouraging friendly relations
between them and the white communities around them."28
On December 3-4, 1958, a conference was convened in
which state, county, and tribal representatives sought to
2 9solve the law enforcement problems on the reservation. 
Although the tone of the meeting was apparently cordial and 
constructive, little substantive progress was made.
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Governor Anderson's representative at the conference was 
particularly passive, suggesting that the state would get 
actively involved in the problem only after the tribal 
councils and local officials had made "an honest effort" to 
solve the difficulties on their own.30
Despite the good intentions evidenced by these 
conferences and programs, they could not resolve the day-to- 
day problems of law enforcement on the reservation. By 
1961, the Omaha Reservation had gained a national reputation 
as a glaringly bad example of the inherent folly of the 
terminationist ideology in general, and of PL 280 in 
particular. Representative Arnold Olsen of Montana called 
specific attention to the Nebraska debacle, declaring on the 
floor of the House of Representatives that PL 280 had 
created a "lawless area" in which "murdered men have lain in 
the street within the Omaha Reservation for over 24 hours
 ^ibefore police have investigated."
As the PL 280 years dragged on, the community-action 
programs and cooperative ventures ground to a standstill due 
to suspicions and resentment among both the Omahas and the 
non-Indian residents of Thurston County. In the late 1960s, 
tensions that had reached the boiling point were ignited by 
an incident in which a 2 0-year-old white woman was abducted 
and raped by seven Indian men after attending the Winnebago 
Pow-Wow on the reservation. Although the suspects were
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arrested and charged almost immediately, many non-Indian
area residents claimed that the Indian suspects had been
given preferential treatment. A letter signed by 67 persons
identified only as "concerned citizens of Thurston County"
was mailed to local newspapers, alleging that the crime had
been "hushed up" by local authorities. The letter, printed
in its entirety on the front page of the Pender Times,
starkly reveals the simmering racial tension and hostility
that had festered in the area throughout the PL 280 years:
We have watched the newspapers and listened to the 
newscasts since [the abduction and rape] happened and 
have seen or heard no mention of this crime. Why? A 
similar incident happened a few weeks earlier where two 
couples were beaten . . . and no mention of this was
ever made public. And I would guess that the criminals 
were gently reprimanded and reminded that this was a 
'no-no' and that the Great White Father who doles out 
the monthly checks and commodities for this 'poor' 
misguided minority group was unhappy with them. But 
they received their checks the next month so they could 
stay drunk and continue their drunkedness and criminal 
acts.
We who live in this community are getting just 
about all we can take of this favoritism; it is time we 
whites demand our equal rights. If seven white men had 
committed this horrendous crime . . .  it would be in 
the headlines the following morning and swift legal 
action would be taken.32
County officials denied the allegations of preferential 
treatment for the Indian suspects, pointing out that the 
crime had been reported in several area newspapers and on 
local television broadcasts even before the letter was 
published. J Thurston County Attorney Mark Fuhrman did 
acknowledge, however, that some areas around Macy and
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Winnebago were a "jungle," where it was not safe for persons 
to go out at night.34 Once again, Fuhrman and other county 
officials pointed to the lack of state and federal financial 
support as the fundamental impediment to improved law 
enforcement.
The letter outraged the Omahas and Winnebagos, who 
called it a "slur on their race."35 In protest, the tribes 
initiated an economic boycott of white businesses in 
Walthill. The boycott resulted in a statement released by 
Walthill Mayor Blair Richendifer, in which most of the 67 
signers of the original letter apologized for any 
"misinterpretation" of the letter's meaning, and contended 
that it had not been intended to condemn "the whole Indian 
nation." The Indians, however, refused to accept the 
proffered apology, noting that "it was addressed to no one 
[and] signed by no one," and contained "more of the same 
type of bigotry, racism and implications toward Indian 
people."37
Quickly, a county "human relations board" comprised of 
both Indian and white representatives was formed to address
O O
the issue, and the boycott ended shortly thereafter. As 
the seven Indian men accused of the crime were brought to 
trial in Thurston County District Court, however, racial 
animosity continued to simmer. In January, 1970, editor 
Anne Flicker of the Walthill Citizen reported that she had
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received a threatening phone call in which the caller 
invoked the name of the Omaha Tribal Council and warned her 
"not to come to Macy but to stay in Walthill like the other
TO . ,
Walthill garbage." The following month, Indian inmates m
the Thurston County jail revolted against the overcrowded
conditions there, threatening to burn the jail down.40
Sheriff Clyde Storie called for assistance from neighboring
law enforcement agencies, and reported that force was used
on at least one prisoner in quelling the disturbance.
Several days later, three fires were set in Macy by
arsonists, and Indian residents went to the streets to
patrol the area.41
Ultimately, all seven of the Indian men accused of the
kidnapping and rape were convicted. Two were sentenced to
life imprisonment, thereby producing more claims of racial
discrimination. Wayne Tyndall, Secretary of the Omaha Tribe
and brother of one of the men sentenced to life, claimed "No
Indian can receive a fair trial in Thurston County."42
Tribal Chairman Ed Cline was even more vehement in echoing
Tyndall's allegations of discrimination:
What we see is what we've seen from the beginning, the 
white man's intent to keep the Indian prisoner in his 
own land. . . . We know damn good and well our people
don't get fair and humane treatment . . .White law
enforcement leans on the Indian. . . . We'll always
mistrust the white man. We're not prejudiced against 
him. We're simply telling the truth. White people 
have to be watched. The white man has no logical 
reason for telling his children to watch us. But we 
have to tell our children to watch them.
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The non-Indian response to such comments was again 
voiced by Anne Flicker. The Walthill Citizen editor argued 
that the Indians' claims of inequitable treatment were 
"overexaggerated," stating "it's been blown past the point 
where it's believable. I know they have been taken in the 
past. Now that is over and done with. Don't forget, a few 
whites lost their scalps, too."44
While incidents like the 1969 rape case served to 
escalate the racial tensions on and around the Omaha 
Reservation, a more fundamental dispute between the Omahas 
and non-Indian residents centered on the question of how 
best to resolve the problem of lawlessness on the 
reservation —  a problem that both sides readily 
acknowledged. This battle would focus on the concept of 
"retrocession," and it became a struggle that the Omahas 
would eventually win.
By the mid-1960s, the terminationist ideology of 
immediate post-WW II era was on the wane. Dissatisfaction 
with the effects of PL 28 0 in several states, coupled with 
the well-publicized failures of the Menominee and Klamath 
reservation terminations, combined to bring about yet 
another federal re-examination of the Indian jurisdictional 
problem. The new federal posture on Indian matters 
eventually manifested itself in Titles II through VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1968. Those statutes would
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substantially amend the provisions of PL 280, bringing 
dramatic changes to the Omaha Reservation.
The process that would lead to the 1968 amendments 
beqan in 1961, when the Senate Judiciary Committee 
commissioned its Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights to 
conduct an extensive analysis of the legal status and 
constitutional rights of Native Americans. Led by its 
chairman, Senator Sam Ervin, the subcommittee gathered 
testimony and evidence over a four year period. In June
1965, a delegation of Omahas led by Tribal Chairman Edward 
Cline testified before the subcommittee, expressing a strong 
desire for amendments to PL 2 80 that would allow the federal
A  R
government to resume jurisdictional control. The 
investigation culminated in a comprehensive report issued in
1966, in which the subcommittee concluded that PL 280 had 
"resulted in a breakdown in the administration of justice to 
such a degree that Indians are being denied due process and
A  (Z
equal protection of the law."HO The report recommended 
extensive amendments to PL 280, including provisions 
requiring Indian consent to any further transfers of 
jurisdiction and, most importantly for the Omahas, 
provisions for the retrocession of jurisdiction back to the 
federal government.
The Ervin Committee's Indian rights provisions remained 
stalled in Congress for two more years. On March 6, 1968,
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President Lyndon Johnson sent to Congress a message entitled 
"The Forgotten American."47 That message marked the Johnson 
administration's formal repudiation of the termination 
policy, as Johnson called for a new policy of "self- 
determination" for American Indians. The President 
specifically asked Congress to amend PL 280 along the lines 
recommended by the Ervin Committee two years earlier.
Ultimately, the amendments to PL 280 came to fruition 
as Titles II through VII of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 
1968. For the Omahas, by far the most significant change 
was contained in Title IV, Sec. 403(a). That section 
provided:
The United States is authorized to accept a 
retrocession by any State of all or any measure of the 
criminal or civil jurisdiction, or both, acquired by 
such State pursuant to [PL 2 80]. (emphasis added; the 
underlined language would prove to be crucial in later 
judicial interpretations of the statute vis a vis the 
Omaha situation.)48
With this statutory language, Congress cracked open the door
for Indians in all the PL 280 states to escape the perceived
inequities inflicted upon them during the 15 years of PL 280
jurisdiction. The Omahas would become the first tribe in
the nation to push through that door.
Just as PL 28 0 had not provided for Indian consent to
the transfer of jurisdiction to the state, the 1968
legislation did not give Indians the power to initiate
retrocession. The federal government was authorized only to
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accept retrocession "by any state." Thus, it was up to the 
state of Nebraska to determine whether it wished to return 
jurisdiction to the federal government. The debate on this 
issue would turn into a bitter contest, once again pitting 
the Omahas against county officials and their other non- 
Indian neighbors.
The Omahas, of course, had been seeking an escape from 
state jurisdiction almost from the moment PL 280 went into 
effect. With passage of the 1968 amendments, the tribe 
moved quickly to position itself for that long-desired 
release. Chairman Cline traveled to Washington to meet with 
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs on the retrocession 
issue. He was advised to file a formal request with the 
BIA, after which a representative would be sent to the
. . .  4 , 0reservation to assist the tribe m  its efforts. At those 
subsequent meetings in January, 1969, Cline informed the BIA 
representatives that the tribe wanted its own jail and court 
facilities, and that the Omahas would expect the BIA to 
provide law enforcement coverage on the reservation until 
the tribe could establish its own police force.50 On that 
same day, the Omaha Tribal Council adopted Resolution No. 
69-33, asserting the tribe's strong desire for the return of 
federal jurisdiction, and requesting "urgent action" in 
furtherance of that goal.51 [Appendix III].
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In sharp contrast to the Omahas' perception of 
retrocession as the long-awaited deliverance from their 
problems, Thurston County officials and non-Indian residents 
viewed it as yet another impending blunder on the part of 
the federal government. They described it as a policy 
fraught with danger and destined to make a bad situation 
infinitely worse. Once again, the local non-Indian 
perception was that if only adequate financial resources 
could be obtained, the state and county could quite 
adequately and fairly police the reservation.
Sheriff Clyde Storie was so distressed by the 
possibility of retrocession that he wrote a letter to 
President Richard Nixon arguing against the return of 
jurisdiction to the federal government. Storie contended 
that retrocession would be a major step backward for the 
Omahas and could only lead to grievous consequences for the 
entire community. He warned against the "creation of 
special agencies for any one group of people," and proposed 
a "simple solution to the whole problem." Storie's 
solution, not surprisingly, was for the federal government 
to provide the county with sufficient funds to adequately 
police the reservation. With additional financial support, 
the sheriff claimed, h i s office "can do the job and will do 
the job."52
64
As Storie's letter indicates, local non-Indian 
opposition centered on the potential danger and inequity 
inherent in the re-creation of a "state within a state," 
complete with its own police force and tribal courts.
County officials argued that the "checkerboard pattern" of 
Indian and non-Indian owned land on the reservation.would 
make day-to-day jurisdictional determinations a practical 
impossibility for both county and tribal police forces.53 
Moreover, local residents believed that retrocession would 
entitle Indians to take advantage of all the benefits of 
state citizenship with none of the concurrent 
responsibilities.54
With these strong competing viewpoints before it, the 
Nebraska Legislature stepped into the retrocession debate. 
Attorney General Clarence A. H. Meyer recommended that the 
Legislative Council appoint a special committee to address 
the issue.55 That committee held hearings on July 31 and 
August 1, 1968, which produced the expected differences of 
opinion between the Omahas and county officials. The 
committee also visited the Pine Ridge and Rosebud 
reservations in South Dakota, which were then under federal 
jurisdiction, to determine how those systems were operating. 
Finding that federal/tribal jurisdiction on the South Dakota 
reservations generally "worked well," the committee 
ultimately concluded that jurisdiction should be returned to
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the federal government, provided that the BIA agreed to 
assume immediate responsibility for day-to-day law 
enforcement operations on the reservation.56
The Council's recommendation, combined with the lure of 
the potential cost savings inherent in the abandonment of 
Indian jurisdiction, proved too much for the state to 
resist. On April 16, 19 69, the Nebraska Legislature 
unanimously adopted Legislative Resolution 37, in which the 
state retroceded to the federal government "all jurisdiction 
over offenses committed by or against Indians in the areas 
of Indian country located in Thurston County, Nebraska, 
acquired by the State of Nebraska pursuant to Public Law 280 
of 1953."57 [Appendix IV]. The preamble to the resolution 
clearly indicates the cost-cutting motivation for its 
adoption, declaring that the assumption of jurisdiction by 
the state in 1953 had led to "steadily increasing costs" 
which Thurston County did not have a sufficient tax base to 
pay for, and noting that the state's financial assistance 
to the county had "increased each biennium."58 Plainly, the 
state saw retrocession as an opportunity to rid itself of a 
messy and expensive problem, despite the strong misgivings 
of local non-Indian residents.
With the issuance of the state's offer of retrocession, 
the burden shifted to the federal government to act on the 
proposal. Executive Order No. 114 3 5 vested the Secretary of
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the Interior with the unilateral power to accept or reject
offers of retrocession on behalf the federal government.^9
When the state of Nebraska tendered its offer, Secretary
Walter Hickel responded by ordering yet another
investigation of conditions in Thurston County. The BIA
investigators who had been sent to Nebraska quickly
confirmed that which had been apparent for years —  that law
enforcement conditions in the county were indeed abysmal.
The BIA reports and memoranda stemming from those
. investigations are replete with the now-familiar litany of
claims and counterclaims among the Omahas and local
officials. For example, in an August 1, 1969 memorandum,
Area Special Officer William F. Walker reported that, in his
meeting with Omaha tribal officials, he had been inundated
with details of discriminatory prosecution, inadequate and
inhumane jail facilities, and generalized mistreatment of
fi nthe Omahas by county law enforcement officers. County 
officials, on the other hand, renewed their argument that 
they were willing to deliver adequate policing of the
• • • • • • fi 1reservation, if sufficient funding could be provided.
In keeping with the new federal policy of "self- 
determination" for Indians, and based upon the BIA reports 
confirming the poor law enforcement conditions on the 
reservation, Secretary Hickel ultimately decided to accept 
Nebraska's offer of retrocession. Yet a complication still
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lingered. The Winnebago Tribe, occupying the northern 
portion of Thurston County, did not wish to undergo 
retrocession, and it issued a tribal resolution to that 
effect on April 17, 1969.62 [See Map 1]. Hickel attempted 
to meet the desires of both the Omahas and the Winnebagos by 
issuing a "Notice of Acceptance of Retrocession of 
Jurisdiction" dated October 16, 197 0 in which he accepted 
jurisdiction over only a part of the area tendered by the 
state of Nebraska, i.e.. he accepted jurisdiction over only 
the area "located within the boundaries of the Omaha 
Reservation in Thurston County, Nebraska."63 [Appendix V]. 
With that notice, the Omaha Tribe became the first Indian 
nation in the country to undergo retrocession.
Yet even before the federal "acceptance," state 
officials had begun to express second thoughts about the 
wisdom of retrocession. Nebraska Senator Roman Hruska and 
state Attorney General Clarence Meyer asked the Department 
of Interior to "take no hasty action" on retrocession until 
all aspects of the jurisdictional problems on the 
reservation had been thoroughly examined.64 In the minds of 
state and county officials, the Secretary's "partial" 
acceptance clouded an already chaotic situation. Meyer 
contended that the state still retained jurisdiction to 
prosecute Indians, because the federal "acceptance" of 
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c. e
offer. 3 Thurston County Attorney Mark Fuhrman indicated 
his complete uncertainty over the jurisdictional status of 
the reservation, stating to a reporter, "You tell me what's 
going to happen. I don't know."66
Despite the confusion among state and county officials, 
the Omahas were elated with the Secretary's acceptance, and 
proceeded with plans for their own tribal police force, 
jail, and court system. Congress appropriated $100,000 in 
interim funding to establish a BIA law enforcement presence
f. 7
on the reservation. By late November, 1970, a tribal 
judge, police captain, and five patrolmen were stationed on 
the reservation, awaiting construction of the tribe's new 
courthouse, jail, and police station.68 Construction of 
that multipurpose building was completed in 1971, and the 
Omahas looked forward to a new era of self-determination and 
economic advancement. ^
In the meantime, however, the federal government's 
"partial" acceptance of the Nebraska Legislature's 1969 
offer of retrocession provided the state with a viable legal 
theory upon which to attempt to rectify what it now deemed 
to have been a mistake. Relying on the basic principle of 
contract law that, in order to be effective, the acceptance 
of an offer must be the "mirror image" of the original 
offer, the Nebraska Legislature, on February 1, 1971,
, , . 7 0
purported to "rescind" its offer of retrocession.
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[Appendix VI]. The ensuing litigation over the efficacy of 
the federal "acceptance" and the state's "rescission" would 
once again lead to conflicting decisions by the state and 
f edera1 courts.
In State v. Goham (1971), the Nebraska Supreme Court 
sided with state and county officials and held that the 
Secretary of Interior's action had not constituted a legally
, *7 -i
valid "acceptance” of the state's offer. Rather, the
court viewed the Secretary's "notice of acceptance" as
merely a "counteroffer, which the state was then free to
accept or reject. The Court stated:
The measure of the jurisdiction to be retroceded was a 
matter for the state to determine, and is not dictated 
in any way by the federal act. The attempted 
acceptance was not in accordance with the terms of the 
offer, and was therefore of no force and effect.
It is intriguing to note that, at least initially, even
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Louis R. Bruce shared the
state's belief that the Secretary could not accept only part
of the state's offer of retrocession. In an October 30,
1969 letter to Winnebago Chairman Gordon Beaver, Bruce
attempted to elicit a clarification of the Winnebagos'
position, indicating that their refusal to accede to
retrocession was a serious obstacle to the Omahas' request.
Bruce told Beaver that Nebraska's offer could only be
accepted or rejected in its entirety, writing "we cannot
accept more or less than the specific area . . . offered for
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retrocession by the state."73 By the time of the
Secretary's "Notice of Acceptance" one year later, the
Department of Interior had either changed its opinion on
this issue, or decided to proceed with the Omaha
retrocession despite it.
Notwithstanding the apparent strength of the state's
legal argument (as impliedly acknowledged in Bruce's
letter), the federal courts made short work of the Goham
decision. In Omaha Tribe v. Village of Walthill (1971), the
federal district court held that the language of the 1968
amendments to PL 280 was sufficiently flexible so as to
allow the Secretary to accept "piecemeal retrocession."74
The federal court specifically rebutted the state‘court's
reasoning in Goham, stating:
The problem I have in accepting the interpretation 
reached by the High Court of Nebraska is that here we 
are not considering a contract that was entered into 
between Nebraska and the United States Government, but 
rather a legislative Act. . . . The words 'The United
States is authorized to accept a retrocession . . . of
all or any measure of criminal . . . jurisdiction
acquired by a State' refutes [Nebraska's] contention 
and gives the United States Government the right to 
accept 'any measure' of the jurisdiction offered back 
to it by a State, (emphasis added).
The district court's decision validating the Omaha
retrocession was upheld by the U. S. Circuit Court of
Appeals for the 8th Circuit in 1972.76 When the U. S.
Supreme Court declined to review the case in 1973, the
7  7Omahas' battle for retrocession was over. For better or
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worse, the tribe was now permanently in control of its own 
law enforcement operations.
As might be expected, relations between the new tribal 
police force and Thurston County law enforcement officials 
were strained from the beginning. In it's offer of 
retrocession, the state had retained jurisdiction over 
traffic offenses committed on public highways within the 
reservation. That "loophole" in the system became a 
particularly troublesome point of conflict between the two 
forces. County officials claimed they were often forced to 
stand idly by and watch violators commit crimes due to the 
vagaries of the jurisdictional issues. Likewise, tribal 
officials complained that the county officers often acted 
outside their authority by making sham arrests for purported 
"traffic offenses."78
An added practical problem for both police forces lay 
in the determination of the ethnic identity of criminal 
offenders or suspects. The newly-created Omaha Tribal Court 
did not possess criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, nor 
could it prosecute Winnebagos or other non-Omaha Indians who
7 Qcommitted crimes on the reservation. 3 Just as many 
observers had predicted, this anomaly led to substantial 
uncertainty in the investigation and prosecution of crimes. 
Until the specific ethnic identity of a criminal offender or
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suspect was determined, it was impossible for county or 
tribal police to know which force had jurisdiction.80
On March 14, 197 5, the BIA convened a meeting with 
tribal and county officials to resolve the lingering 
jurisdictional conflicts between the two police forces. The 
meeting seemed to swing toward the Omahas' view of the 
situation, with the issuance of a report by Agency Special 
Officer Eugene Trottier in which he "confirmed" that various 
county police officers had made arrests of Indians for other 
than traffic offenses within the Thurston County portion of 
the reservation.81 Trottier's report further indicated that 
county officials were warned that the failure to coordinate 
their efforts with tribal police "might expose county 
officials to undesirable litigation."82
Several weeks after that meeting, Trottier wrote to 
Thurston County Sheriff Clyde Storie, offering to "cross- 
deputize" county officers so as to allow them clearer 
authority in dealing with reservation crimes. He asked that 
Storie, in return, offer cross-commissions as deputy county 
sheriffs for the tribal police officers.83 Storie refused 
the offer, contending that the Indian police did not meet 
state qualifications for deputization. County Attorney 
Mark Fuhrman did agree, however, to "suggest" that the 
Sheriff and his officers make a stronger effort to cooperate 
with the federal and tribal enforcement personnel.
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Fuhrman's "suggestion11 notwithstanding, the decades 
since the Omaha retrocession have seen continuing tension 
between the Omahas and their non-Indian neighbors regarding 
law enforcement and jurisdictional issues. By 1975, when 
the Winnebago Tribe decided that it too wished to undergo 
retrocession, the state of Nebraska had concluded that the
• . ftOmaha retrocession had been "a monumental mistake.11 
Numerous state and county officials journeyed to Washington 
to testify before the Senate's Committee on Interior and 
Insular Affairs, which was considering a bill that would 
allow Indian tribes such as the Winnebagos to unilaterally 
initiate retrocession. There they related a litany of 
complaints regarding the adverse effects of retrocession, 
and lobbied strongly against its extension to the 
Winnebagos.
The full story of the debate over the Winnebago 
retrocession is beyond the scope of this paper. It may be 
noted, however, that the primary thrust of the state and 
county objections to the Winnebago initiative related to the 
perceived problems caused by the Omaha retrocession six 
years earlier. Among those testifying in opposition to 
Winnebago retrocession were Thurston County Attorney Mark 
Fuhrman, Sheriff Clyde Storie, and the ubiquitous Anne 
Flicker, who contended that the Omaha retrocession had been 
a grievous constitutional error, inasmuch -as it had the
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effect of "recognizing a sovereign Nation within the
confines.of the Continental United States."87 In a less
dramatic prepared statement, a staff member of the Nebraska
Legislature's Judiciary Committee testified:
The 1969 criminal retrocession of the Omaha Tribe was 
initiated for the sole reason of relieving the State of 
Nebraska of $90,000 of law enforcement costs. Since 
that time it has become very clear that the financial 
savings was of little compensation for the confusion 
and jurisdictional questions which have resulted. . .
This lack of clarity breeds confusion to the extent 
that oftentimes jurisdictional authorities will ignore 
or avoid areas of unclear jurisdiction. When this 
happens, problem areas which otherwise may be resolved 
are simply not dealt with and the problem continues to 
exist or worsen.
The non-Indian frustration with the "lack of clarity" 
created by the Omaha retrocession evidenced in this 197 6 
testimony would linger for many years. Even nine years 
later, Sheriff Clyde Storie continued to insist that the 
Omahas "should be assimilated into the white man's culture," 
and that retrocession had been a "step backward" for the 
tribe.89 A local group of non-Indians calling themselves 
the "Concerned Citizen's Council" continued to complain of a 
"law enforcement void" on the reservation.90 The gap
between that view of the situation and the Omahas'
• 91perception seemed as wide m  1985 as it had ever been.
Captain Thomas Janis of the Omaha Tribal Police Force
claimed that retrocession was "working real well," and that
crime had dropped on the reservation since 197 0, with a
92corresponding rise in tribal self-esteem and satisfaction.
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Janis' 1985 comments echoed the sentiments expressed by
Tribal Chairman Edward Cline some ten years earlier. Cline
had also testified in the 1975-76 Senate hearings, and his
view of the situation contrasted sharply with those of the
non-Indian witnesses. He asserted that retrocession had
been a godsend for the tribe, allowing its members to escape
"physical abuse and discriminatory prosecution" at the hands
of county law enforcement officials. Cline concluded his
Senate testimony by stating:
Although problems do exist, the Omaha Tribe has been 
very content with its law and order system since 
retrocession of criminal jurisdiction. Located in a 
Public Law 280 state, retrocession of criminal 
jurisdiction and the maintenance of the law and order 
system has been the first step to self-determination 
for the Omaha Tribe, (emphasis added).93
That tentative and troublesome "first step" would be
followed by more confident Omaha strides on different legal
fronts in the ensuing years.
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CHAPTER THREE
"THIS IS A TURNING POINT OF MY PEOPLE 
AND WE DEMAND JUSTICE"
* * * *
THE OMAHA EXPERIENCE IN THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION
CASE 225
1.9 51 - 1964
At the same time the Omahas were attempting to cope
with the consequences of Public Law 280 in Thurston County,
the tribe was waging an equally consequential legal struggle
1,2 00 miles away in Washington, D.C. The forum for that
battle was the Indian Claims Commission (ICC). Created in
1946 at the outset of the terminationist offensive, the ICC
began its life as a curious eddy in the current of postwar
federal Indian policy. The ICC's creators envisioned an
objective, non-judicial forum in which the nation's Indian
tribes could obtain a swift and permanent adjudication of
long-held grievances against the government. This new
tribunal was designed to be largely free of the constrictive
legal and political obstacles that had always delayed, and
often prevented, the resolution of Indian claims in previous
decades.1 On its surface, the legislation creating the ICC
• 2seemed to produce just such an entity.
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As many commentators have observed, however, the ICC in
practice did not live up to the lofty goals upon which it
was founded. The Commission that had been designed to be
streamlined and "nonjudicial” quickly assumed a decidedly
court-like sluggishness, bogging down in many of the same
adversarial and legalistic swamps that had plagued the
judicial handling of Indian claims in earlier years.3 Given
the volume of claims filed and the historical complexities
of the issues involved, the delays were at least
understandable, if not always entirely justifiable.4
More disappointingly, however, the high-minded
principles upon which the ICC was ostensibly founded were
undermined almost from the outset by the burgeoning
terminationist ideology, as tribal claims became enmeshed
with and co-opted by the assimilationist aims of the Truman
and Eisenhower administrations. In his message accompanying
the signing of the Act, President Truman hinted at this
dilution of the motives driving the ICC's creation:
It would be a miracle if in the course of [our dealings 
with the Indians] —  the largest real estate 
transaction in history —  we had not made some mistakes 
and occasionally failed to live up to the precise terms 
of our treaties and agreements . . . But we stand ready
to submit all such controversies to the judgment of 
impartial tribunals. . . With the final settlement of
all outstanding claims which this measure insures, 
Indians can take their place without special handicaps 
or special advantages in the economic life of our 
nation and share fully in its progress.
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Truman's suggestion that the ICC's resolution of Indian 
claims would allow the tribes to "take their place" in 
society presages the evolution of the ICC into an instrument 
of termination. In practice, the Commission became simply a 
liquidating agent —  a necessary condition precedent to the 
federal government's getting out of the Indian business.6
The creation, operation, and legacy of the ICC have 
been thoroughly explored and evaluated at the "macro level" 
by many knowledgeable commentators, including Harvey 
Rosenthal, John Wunder, Francis Paul Prucha, Vine Deloria,
n
Jr., Wilcomb Washburn, and others. These observers have 
generally concluded that the ICC turned out to be, at best, 
a well-intentioned but flawed and incomplete resolution of
q . . .the Indian claims problem. At worst, it is viewed as a 
bastardized travesty of justice and another tragic
. . . , Qgovernmental debacle in the field of Indian policy.
While the generalized impact of the ICC has thus 
received ample scholarly attention, a relatively neglected 
area of inquiry is the localized or "micro level" effect of 
particular ICC adjudications on the tribes which prosecuted 
those claims.10 The story of that grassroots experience, 
from the initial filing of the Omaha's claim in 1951 until 
its ultimate resolution in 1964, provides an instructive 
illustration of the complexities involved in the ICC 
process, and the impact of its awards on a specific tribe.
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Just as the relatively small and overlooked Omaha Tribe 
gained modest notoriety as the first Indian group in the 
nation to undergo retrocession (see Chapter 2 infra), so too 
did their ICC claims produce a "first" in the Commission's 
history — the "Omaha Rule" for processing proposed 
compromise settlements. The result is an Omaha imprint on 
the annals of the institution that makes its claim 
particularly worthy of examination. Moreover, the Omaha 
case study offers the opportunity to examine several other 
seldom-explored aspects of the ICC's micro-level impact —  
the divisive intra-tribal controversies over the 
distribution and use of the funds awarded, and the way in 
which those funds were ultimately utilized for the tribe's 
benefit. For the Omahas, these "aftermath" issues were as 
much a part of the ICC story as the claims themselves.
An evaluation of the specific impact of the ICC on the 
Omaha Nation requires a brief review of the Commission's 
enabling legislation and its statutory mandate. The broad 
language of the Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946 seemed 
to provide all that Indian claimants and their supporters 
could have hoped for. The legislation created a three- 
person panel (later expanded to five members), which was 
authorized to hear and resolve virtually every conceivable 
type of grievance that any "identifiable Indian group" might 
wish to prosecute against the United States. Specifically,
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the Commission's jurisdiction extended to five separately- 
categorized causes of action, including claims based upon 
fraudulent or unconscionable treaty provisions, and claims 
based upon land confiscations without compensation. In 
addition, an extraordinarily open-ended "catch-all" 
provision allowed the filing of claims based upon "fair and 
honorable dealings that are not recognized by any existing 
rule of law or equity."11
The Act specifically extinguished any statute of 
limitations defense that might otherwise have applied to 
such claims and allowed Indian claimants to hire attorneys 
of their own choosing to prosecute their claims. In a 
provision that reflected the desired "once and for all" 
nature of the Commission's mandate, the Act required that 
all Indian groups be formally advised of the creation of the 
Commission, and it actively solicited the submission of 
claims.12
The Act's liberal jurisdictional provisions were 
significantly tempered, however, by the limitations of the 
actual remedial powers exercised by the ICC. The Commission 
awarded only monetary judgments; it did not restore land to 
claimants. For many Indians, cash awards, no matter how 
substantial, were not a satisfactory recompense for lands 
wrongfully taken.13 Likewise, very early in its proceedings 
the Commission determined that it would not award interest
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on the amounts found to be owed to claimants. Its ruling on 
that issue was subsequently upheld by both the Court of 
Claims and the Supreme Court, and became a source of 
considerable discontent among claimants and their 
supporters.14
An equally significant restrictive element was 
introduced by the ICC's method of determining land claims' 
valuation. The Commission took the position that it would 
award monetary judgments based upon the value of the land in 
question at the time of taking, i.e.. at its eighteenth or 
nineteenth century value, rather than its current market 
value.3,5 Coupled with the refusal to grant prejudgment 
interest, this limitation meant that the final judgments 
awarded most claimants would fall far short of restoring 
them to the position they would have reached had they 
retained the land in question.
While each of these limitations on the Commission's 
power was essentially self-imposed, the 1946 Act 
specifically provided an additional "reducing element" in 
the computation of final awards. The government was 
statutorily authorized to "offset" from the Commission's 
awards the value of certain payments made to the tribes in 
the past.16 The establishment of the appropriate amounts of 
these offsets generated considerable controversy and delay 
in the processing of claims, as attorneys sparred endlessly
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over the details of government payments and annuities made 
generations before.17
The determination of land ownership and valuation some 
100 years in the past necessarily turned the ICC litigation 
process into an interminable "battle of the experts," and 
spawned a symbiotic cottage industry in anthropological 
research, ethnography, and real estate appraisal. While the 
resulting documentation would provide a rich source of data 
for modern researchers, the laborious process of collecting 
and analyzing that material became a significant additional 
impediment to the rapid resolution of claims.
Operationally, the Commission's consideration of 
claims evolved into a three-stage process. The threshold 
determination, generally labeled the "title phase," involved 
the establishment of Indian ownership of the land in 
question. If that issue was decided in the Indians' favor, 
the case proceeded to a second stage, the 
"liability/valuation phase." Those proceedings involved 
exhaustive investigation and voluminous testimony regarding 
the facts of the claimants' allegations and the value of the 
land in question. If and when the liability issue was 
established in the Indians' favor and the value of the 
property was determined, the Commission proceeded to the 
third step, called the "offset phase." There the parties 
contested the appropriate amount by which the judgment would
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be reduced for payments made to the claimants since the time 
of the taking. Each of these stages in the process 
typically involved extensive evidentiary hearings, 
accompanied by the preparation and filing of countless 
motions, briefs, and proposed findings on behalf of the 
parties, and generally concluded with the Commission's 
rendering of an interlocutory order resolving the central 
issue in that phase, i.e., title, valuation, or offset.
Each of those interlocutory orders, in turn, was often 
subject to motions for reconsideration or rehearing, 
creating further delay and expense for the parties.18
The fourteen-year history of the Omahas' ICC litigation 
provides a classic illustration of the bureaucratic delays 
and legalistic wrangling that became ingrained in the 
Commission's operations. The Omaha saga began with the 
filing of their original complaint with the Commission on 
August 8, 1951.19 Assigned Docket Number 225, the complaint 
initially asserted a number of grievances related to the 
government's negotiation of various treaties with the Omahas 
prior to 1 8 5 4 . Specifically, the Omahas alleged that they 
had been induced to enter into those unspecified treaties 
and agreements through fraud and misrepresentation on the 
part of government agents. The tribe's attorneys couched 
their claims in language that the Commission would later 
describe as "typical" of many ICC complaints:
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(a) By failing to disclose and explain the true 
meaning of the language used in the treaties to those 
executing the same on behalf of the Indians . . . [who 
were] unlettered and unfamiliar with the use of the. 
English language and not comprehending the full meaning 
of the language used.
(b) By secret instructions given to the 
Commissioner sent to negotiate treaties.
(c) By special inducements of lands and goods.
(d) By promises given to the Indians that
they would be permitted to remain in possession of the 
lands described in the treaty.
(e) By promises to permit them to continue to hunt 
and fish in ceded territory.
(f) By making consideration payable at the will 
and pleasure of the President and Congress.
(9) [By negotiating and executing the treaties 
with Indians who] were without authority of the tribe 
and acted contrary to the wishes and intentions of the 
authorized leaders and members of the tribe.21
In addition to those specific allegations of fraud, the
Omahas claimed that the payments made to the tribe for the
lands ceded pursuant to the pre-1854 agreements had
"amounted to a small fraction of the value of the land and
were an "unconscionable consideration." Leaving no
portion of the 194 6 Act unused, the tribe also attacked the
treaties by way of a generalized invocation of the Act's
"fair and honorable dealings" language.23
Having set out their grievances with respect to the
pre-1854 treaties in the preliminary paragraphs of their
complaint, the Omahas then presented five separately-stated
counts in which they attacked the provisions of their
landmark 1854 treaty with the government, and their
treatment pursuant to several subsequent agreements. The
1854 treaty was the major land cession in Omaha history and
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the defining moment in their future relations with the 
federal government.24 By the terms of the treaty, the 
Omahas ceded to the government all of their traditional 
homelands west of the Missouri River, reserving to 
themselves only a 300,000 acre tract which would become the 
Omaha Reservation. In return, the government agreed to pay 
the tribe $975,739.54, and to protect the Omahas from the 
Sioux and other hostile neighboring tribes.
In Count I, the tribe alleged that it had not been 
properly compensated for all the lands conveyed pursuant to 
the 1854 treaty, due to errors in the surveying of their 
traditional homelands.25 count I further alleged that the 
government had failed to prevent white encroachment onto 
Omaha land prior to the 1854 treaty in disregard of the
p g
promises made m  prior treaties. Count II alleged that 
the amount paid to the Omahas for a portion of their 
reservation that was set aside for the Winnebago Tribe in 
18 65 was unconscionably low. The tribe asserted that it had 
been paid $50,000 for 103,000 acres, amounting to 50 cents 
per acre for land that they now deemed to have been worth
7 7"in excess of $5.00 per acre."6'
In Count III, the Omahas claimed that the government 
had failed to protect them from the Sioux and other hostile 
tribes as agreed in the 1854 treaty, resulting in the death 
of 22 men and the theft of at least 152 horses and other
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property.28 Count IV again invoked the catch-all language 
of the 1946 enabling legislation, claiming that the Omahas 
had not been dealt with "fairly and honorably."29 Finally, 
in Count V the tribe sought an accounting from the 
government with respect to its performance as guardian and 
trustee of the tribe's funds, property, and other assets.30 
In their prayer for relief, the Omahas asked the Commission 
to revise all of their treaties and agreements with the 
government so as to provide them "the reasonable and fair 
- value of the lands so ceded," and to compensate them for the 
depredations of the Sioux.31
The filing of the original Omaha complaint in August, 
1951 initiated a two-year period of tactical skirmishing in 
which the attorneys for the tribe and the government 
exchanged numerous motions, replies, and other procedural 
documents. On October 6, 1953, that "paper war" culminated 
in a Commission Order requiring the Omahas to sever the 
allegations of their original complaint into three
“JO
separately-docketed claims. In compliance with that 
order, the tribe filed amended complaints, entered as 
Commission Docket numbers 225-A, 225-B, and 225-C.
Case 225-B became the "Winnebago cession" claim, 
essentially reiterating the allegations of inadequate 
compensation for the 103,000 acres ceded to the Winnebagos, 
as set out in Count II of the original complaint.33 Case
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225-C was filed more than five years later, asserting the 
tribe's claims for trespass and losses from Sioux raids, and 
repeating the request for an accounting as previously 
alleged in Counts III and V of the original complaint.34 
Those proceedings meandered through the ICC machinery for 
years, but both took a back seat to the much weightier 
allegations of Case 225-A.
Filed on October 6, 1953, the Omahas' amended complaint 
in Case 22 5-A refined and greatly expanded the tribe's 
original allegations relating to the 1854 Treaty. It would 
become the centerpiece of the Omaha litigation, engaging the 
services of dozens of lawyers, anthropologists, historians, 
geographers, and appraisers over the next seven years. The 
complex mixture of ownership issues, boundary 
determinations, and valuation questions presented in Case 
2 2 5-A illustrates the complexity of the ICC's burden and 
offers a compelling explanation for the glacial pace of its 
progress.
In order to understandably convey the ICC's handling of 
the issues presented in Case 225-A, it is necessary to 
examine both the convoluted provisions of the 1854 Treaty 
itself and the prior interpretations of that treaty by the 
Court of Claims and Supreme Court. Pursuant to Article I of 
the 1854 Treaty, the Omahas ceded to the federal government 
all of their ancestral homelands located west of the
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Missouri River and "south of a line drawn due west" from the 
confluence of the Ayoway and Missouri Rivers.35 [See Map 
2]. The "Ayoway River" referred to in the treaty is the 
stream now identified as Iowa Creek, which empties into the 
Missouri River near present-day Ponca, Nebraska. The 
artificial boundary running west from its confluence with 
the Missouri became known as the "Ayoway" or "due west" 
line. The ceded territory was bounded on the west by the 
so-called "Shell Creek line," on the south by Shell Creek 
and the Platte River, and on the east by the Missouri River. 
The conveyed land totaled 4.5 million acres, for which the 
Omahas were paid $881,000, or 19.6 cents per acre.
By the terms of the treaty, the Omahas retained all of 
their traditional lands located to the north of the Ayoway 
line, unless they found those lands unsuitable. In the 
event the Omahas deemed those "remainder lands" north of the 
Ayoway line to be unsatisfactory for their permanent home, 
they were authorized to exchange the northern acreage for a 
portion of the ceded territory south of the Ayoway line.
The new location in the southern territory was to be no 
larger than 300,000 acres. If the Omahas opted to accept 
the southern acreage, they thereby ceded to the government 
all of their lands north of the Ayoway line, and were to be 
compensated for that land at the same rate the government 
agreed to pay for the southern cession, with an offset for
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The 1854 "Omaha Cession," with boundaries outlined in green,
and "Ayoway Line" in red.
Source: Omaha World-Herald. May 4, 1958. Despite its
"unofficial" nature, this map is far more useful in 
identifying the land at issue in Case No. 225 than any of 
the maps formally introduced before the ICC.
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the 300,000 acres chosen in the south. Finding the country 
north of the Ayoway line to be too close to the home range 
of their eternal tormentors, the Sioux, the Omahas chose to 
take instead a 300,000 acre tract in the Blackbird Hills 
area of present-day northeastern Nebraska. That property 
(less the portion ceded to the Winnebagos in 1865) became 
the present Omaha Reservation in Thurston County,
Nebraska.36
More than fifty years after the 1854 treaty, the Omahas 
had still not been paid for the additional acreage north of 
the Ayoway line that they had ceded by virtue of their 
acceptance of the 300,000 acres south of the line. In 1910, 
they sought and received from Congress a special 
jurisdictional act conferring authority on the Court of 
Claims to hear and determine their claim for compensation 
pursuant to the 1854 treaty.37 The Court of Claims 
ultimately held that the Omahas' land north of the Ayoway 
line had totalled 783,356 acres.38 Upon subtracting the 
300,000 acres in the south that the tribe accepted for its 
reservation, this left a balance of 483,365 acres for which 
the government was obligated to pay the Omahas the same 19.6 
cents per acre it had paid for the rest of the ceded land. 
The Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the Court of Claims' 
decision, with some minor modifications, and the government
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ultimately paid the Omahas an additional $117,655.31 for 
this "excess acreage" north of the Ayoway line.39
Based upon that tortuous history, the Omahas' petition 
to the ICC in Case 225-A ultimately centered on two 
fundamental assertions: 1.) that the 19.6 cents per acre 
originally paid for their 4.5 million acres south of the 
Ayoway line was "grossly inadequate" and "unconscionable"; 
and 2.) that the Court of Claims' judgment in 1918 awarding 
the Omahas that same 19.6 cents per acre for their "excess 
acreage" north of the Ayoway line was likewise 
unconscionably inadequate. With that framing of the issues 
in place, the case moved forward into the first stage of the 
ICC process—  the "title phase."
The title proceedings began with an exchange of motions 
and briefs in which the parties debated the res judicata 
effect of the prior Court of Claims and Supreme Court 
opinions on the ICC's consideration of the Omahas' ownership 
of the land in question. In an interlocutory order entered 
October 19, 1954, the Commission held that the Court of 
Claims' decision in 1918 was controlling as to the 
boundaries, the acreage, and the price paid to the Omahas 
for lands ceded pursuant to the 1854 treaty.48 It further 
held that the Court of Claims litigation had conclusively 
established the Omahas' "Indian title" to the ceded property 
north of the Ayoway line and the government was barred from
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attempting to relitigate that issue before the Commission.
As to the much larger cession south of the Ayoway line, 
however, the Commission held that the Court of Claims' 
decision had not conclusively established the Omahas' title 
to the land conveyed. Thus the Omahas were placed in the 
rather novel position of having to prove to the ICC's 
satisfaction that they had in fact "owned” 4.5 million acres 
of land that they had already formally conveyed to the 
federal government by treaty more than 100 years before.
Only after "proving” that which the federal government had 
already implicitly acknowledged would the tribe be allowed 
to address the issue of the appropriate valuation of the 
property.
On September 27-29, 1955, an evidentiary hearing was 
convened before the ICC to address the ownership question. 
University of Nebraska anthropologist Dr. Frederick Champe 
testified on behalf of the Omahas, while the government 
relied on the opinions of Smithsonian archaeologist G.
Hubert Smith.41 Both experts conducted admirably extensive 
research into the history of the Omaha Tribe in the disputed 
territory, and they reached similar conclusions regarding 
the facts of the Omahas' presence there. On the legal issue 
of "title” to the land, however, they came to diametrically 
opposed conclusions. Smith concluded that "At no time after 
their arrival on the west side of the Missouri did [the
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Omahas] have exclusive control or possession of the area 
involved.”42 (emphasis added —  "exclusive” control was the 
ICC standard for determination of Indian title). Champe, in 
contrast, took the position that the Omahas had indeed 
established exclusive possession of the area in question 
since at least the 1750s, and that they therefore had 
established compensable "Indian title" to the 4.5 million 
acres. He testified:
[The Omahas] were free to move about anywhere 
within the area, except to stand off these raids from 
the Dakota, and perhaps the Pawnee, or whoever; but 
they had their farms near the various villages we have 
indicated. . . . they hunted from the village locations 
out along the southern side of the Niobrara into west 
and north central Nebraska, and the intervening rivers 
out along the Elkhorn.
At no time that I am aware, has [sic] any of the 
surrounding tribes made any attempt to settle within 
the [4.5 million acres in question] and I can only 
conclude that the Omaha used and occupied that area as 
they chose during that entire time, (emphasis added).43
Also appearing on behalf of the Omahas were Tribal
Council Chairman Gustavus White and Secretary George Grant.
Their testimony is a poignant reminder of the bleak
conditions on the reservation at that time, and the tribe's
aspirations for a better future. White told the Commission:
I come here to represent my people in their 
thinking, and what they have in their hearts. . . . We 
hired these lawyers to fight for what we think is 
rightfully ours. And my people have prayed that they 
will be given . . . what we think is rightfully ours. 
And if we are awarded what is rightfully ours, my 
people want to use this to better themselves, educate 
our young ones, . . . and rehabilitate ourselves some
way. . . . This is a turning point of my people, and we
demand justice.4
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Ultimately, the ICC agreed with Dr. Champe on the issue 
of Omaha title. In an opinion rendered January 18, 1957, 
Chief Commissioner Edgar Witt noted that "under cross 
examination, Dr. Smith agreed almost in toto to the facts 
and conclusions as testified to bv Dr. Champe.” (emphasis in 
original).45 Accordingly, he ruled that the Omahas had 
established, by use and occupancy, their title to the 4.5 
million acres south of the Ayoway line.46 The case then 
proceeded to the valuation phase.
Just as the title proceedings had turned into an 
ethnographic and anthropological debate between the parties' 
experts, the question of the appropriate valuation of the 
Omahas' territory ultimately centered on the competing 
opinions of the parties' real estate appraisers. On 
February 24, 1958, an evidentiary hearing commenced before 
Commissioner Louis J. O'Marr to determine the fair value, as 
of 1854, of the 4,982,097 acres of Nebraska real estate once 
"owned" by the Omahas.47 As was the case at the title 
hearing more than two years before, the parties' experts 
presented starkly contrasting opinions.48 The government's 
appraiser, William G. Murray, divided the Omaha tract into 
five Classifications according to the quality and 
desirability of the land in question.49 He then assigned a 
sliding scale of values to the various classes, ranging from 
$2.00 per acre for "choice sites along the Missouri and
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Platte River" to 10 cents per acre for "very poor land . . . 
not suited for settlement."50 [See Figure 3]. Averaging 
his figures across the total acreage, he arrived at a value 
of 55 cents per acre, for a total value of $2,725,000.51
Naturally, the Omahas' expert disagreed with Murray's 
conclusions. During almost three full days of testimony 
that would create 2 00 pages of transcript, appraiser W. D. 
Davis vigorously advocated a substantially higher value for 
the Omahas' cession.52 Arguing that the Omaha territory had 
been considerably more attractive than Murray suggested, and 
taking into consideration comparable sales figures for a 
period extending some twenty years after 1854, Davis 
ultimately arrived at a value of $1.50 per acre, for a total 
recommended award of $7,437,100.53 Thus the ICC found 
itself confronted with two widely divergent expert opinions 
on valuation, with almost $5 million hanging in the balance. 
Not surprisingly, it chose a middle course between the two 
extremes.
In a decision delivered on November 28, 1958, the 
Commission criticized the opinions offered by both Murray 
and Davis and reached its own conclusion on the valuation 
issue.54 Writing for the ICC, Commissioner O'Marr held that 
Murray's work had been too limited in terms of the evidence 
considered. Davis, in turn, was chastised for considering 
comparable sales and other valuation evidence that O'Marr
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1. Choice sites along the Missouri and Platte rivers, especially at 
the southern end.
300.000 acres @ $2.00 an acre - $600,000
2. High quality land, near Choice sites, near timber and water and 
water transportation.
700.000 acres @ $1.25 an acre - $875,000
3. Medium quality land, near streams and some timber, but not close
to water transportation.
800.000 acres @ 70 cents an acre - $560,000
4. Poor quality land in 1854 period, Tittle or no timber, soil good 
but not suited to settlement.
2.500.000 acres @ 25 cents an acre - $625,000
5. Very poor land, no timber, hilly, soil poor, not suited to
settlement and remote in distance from settlement and
access to water transportation.
650.000 acres @ 10 cents an acre - $65,000
Total 4,950,000 acres <§ 55 cents an acre $2,725,000
I conclude that the value of the Omaha tract on the basis of the 
evidence analyzed and presented was 55 cents an acre on March 16, 1854
or a total value of $2,725,000.
FIGURE 3
Government-hired appraiser William G. Murray's 
"sliding scale" and final conclusion regarding the 
valuation of the 1854 Omaha cession. Offered in ■ 
evidence before the ICC in Case No. 225, February 
25, 1958.
Source: William G. Murray, Appraisal of the Omaha
Tract in Nebraska, 1854 (New York: Clearwater 
Publishing Co., 1957) p. 131.
107
deemed too remote in time to be relevant to the 18 54 value 
of the Omaha cession. Notwithstanding its criticism of both 
experts' opinions, the Commission arrived at a figure that
i
was much closer to the government's position. O'Marr held 
that the appropriate valuation of the Omaha cession would be 
75 cents per acre, for a total payment of $3,736,573.40. 
Subtracting the previously-paid "unconscionable" 
consideration of $975,739.54, the Commission ruled that the 
Omahas were entitled to an award of $2,760,833.86, minus 
whatever offsets were found to be appropriate.55
With the issuance of that order, the Omahas' ICC saga 
moved significantly closer to a conclusion. Although the 
troublesome question of offsets remained to be decided, and 
the separately-docketed claims in Cases 225-B and 225-C 
remained pending, the general framework of a final 
resolution was in place. During the six months following 
the Commission's November 28 Order, the parties exchanged 
motions and proposed findings relating to the issue of 
offsets. The Omahas stipulated to a small offset of $25,000 
for unspecified prior payments, but the parties clashed over 
the government's claim for an offset based upon the payment 
of $374,465 to the Omahas in 1926. That payment had been 
specifically authorized by special acts of Congress as 
interest on the Court of Claims' 1918 judgment relating to 
the lands north of the Ayoway line. The government argued
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that the payment of that sum had been a "gratuitous" 
offering to the Omahas, for which it was now entitled to a 
credit against the ICC award. The Commission disagreed. On 
May 6, 1959, the Commission held that the 1926 payment to 
the Omahas, having been mandated by Congress, was not 
"gratuitous" within the meaning of the ICC Act of 1946, and 
therefore would not be allowed as an offset against the 
$2,760,833 award. That decision became the final 
dispositive order in Case 225-A. The amount of the award to 
the Omahas was established at $2,735,833.86 and a final 
order was issued to that effect.56
In the weeks following the Commission's May 6 final 
order, the government filed the usual complement of motions 
to vacate or reconsider, all of which were denied. On July 
31, the government routinely filed its notice of appeal to 
the Court of Claims. If followed to its normal conclusion, 
that appeal, combined with the pending claims in Cases 225-B 
and 225-C (which had by this time evolved into Case 225-D), 
might well have extended the Omaha litigation another 
several years. Fortunately for both sides, that dismal 
prospect was averted. During the late months of 1959, the 
government and the Omahas took innovative steps to 
consolidate and resolve all of the tribe's claims in one 
final compromise settlement
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On December 22, 1959, the government and the tribe 
filed a joint "Stipulation of Settlement," in which they 
agreed to a final compromise of all of the remaining 
litigation between them. The proposal encompassed the 
tribe's still-pending claims in Dockets 225-B, 225-C, and 
225-D, and the government's recently-filed appeal to the 
Court of Claims in Case 225-A. By the terms of the 
stipulation, the Omahas agreed to accept $2.9 million in 
full settlement of all claims set forth in Dockets 225-A 
through 2 2 5-D, and the government agreed to dismiss its 
appeal to the Court of Claims in 225-A.57
The filing of that proposed compromise settlement 
presented the Commission with a situation it had not 
previously faced in almost thirteen years of operation. Its 
handling of the proposal resulted in the enunciation of a 
new set of operational guidelines for the approval of such 
settlements in the future —  a procedure that would become 
known as the "Omaha Rule."
In a landmark opinion delivered by Commissioner Arthur 
Watkins on February 11, 1960, the ICC approved the proposed 
compromise settlement and praised the Omahas and the 
government attorneys for their efforts to bring the 
litigation to a conclusion.58 Watkins noted that the 
Commission's operations had become intolerably slow and he 
urged other parties to enter into compromise agreements as
110
"the best hope for the early settlement of hundreds of 
claims still pending before the Commission.1,59 While 
encouraging the use of compromise agreements like the Omaha 
settlement, Watkins also professed concern over possible 
abuses in the processing of such settlements which might 
later lead to renewed Indian charges of bad faith or 
dishonorable dealings. To avoid such a result, the 
Commission enunciated a set of procedural guidelines for the 
negotiation and approval of proposed settlements, designed 
to ensure "that the agreements are fair, understood, and 
approved by a majority of the Indian tribe members, [so] ^
that the Indians will accept the final judgments in good 
faith."60
Specifically, the Commission's new "Omaha Rule" 
required parties wishing to enter into a compromise 
settlement to comply with the following steps:
1. On behalf of the Indian claimants, the original 
compromise agreement was to be signed by the Tribal Council 
Chairman, as well as all the individually-named petitioners 
and their respective counsel. On behalf of the government, 
the agreement was to be signed by the Attorney General or 
his designated representative.
2. The parties were to file a joint motion with the 
Commission, setting forth the terms of the proposed 
compromise and requesting a hearing on the matter.
Ill
3. An open evidentiary hearing would be held before the 
Commission.
4. At the hearing, the Indian claimants were directed 
to present as witnesses the Tribal Chairman, Secretary, and
any other individual tribal members who wished to appear.
%
Those witnesses were to testify as to "what has been done by 
them or the attorneys . . . to acquaint tribal members with
the provisions of the agreement." In addition, the 
Commission would require the parties to offer documentary 
- evidence in the form of Tribal Council resolutions approving 
the compromise settlement and authorizing the Chairman to 
sign it on the tribe's behalf. The government was required 
to provide a letter from the Secretary of the Interior 
approving the compromise.61
Finding that these procedures had been substantially 
followed in the Omaha case, the Commission entered a "Final 
Judgment" contemporaneously with its February 11, 19 60 
opinion, in which it approved the compromise agreement and 
directed the government to pay the Omaha Nation the net sum 
of $2.9 million in full and final settlement of all claims 
it had asserted m  Case 225. * On that same day, the 
Commission issued a separate order authorizing the payment 
of $217,900.25 to the Omahas' attorneys and $17,313.96 to 
their appraiser, W. D. Davis, with both bills to be paid 
from the $2.9 million judgment fund.63 The issuance of
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those orders brought the Omaha litigation in Case 225 to a 
close. A few procedural obstacles still remained, however, 
before the Omahas would collect their judgment.
The 194 6 Act provided that final ICC awards were to be 
submitted to Congress for the appropriation of funds for
64 •payment. * Prior to 1960, this had been largely a rubber 
stamp process, with the judgment amounts routinely approved 
by Congress and deposited into the Federal Treasury for 
distribution to the tribes under the direction of the 
Secretary of Interior. Beginning in 1960, however, 
Congress took steps to increase its oversight of ICC awards, 
requiring special legislation for the payment of each 
judgment, specifying the use and distribution of the 
funds.66 The Omahas' award became ensnared in this 
heightened Congressional scrutiny, creating another 
significant delay before the tribe could reap the benefits 
of its hard-won legal victory.
The ICC formally "reported" its judgment to Congress on 
February 23, 1960. Bills providing for the appropriation 
and disposition of the Omaha award were then introduced in 
both the House and Senate, followed by a period of over a 
year and a half during which the bills were considered by 
the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and the 
House Indian Affairs Subcommittee. During their 
investigations, the Congressional committees sought input
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from the Interior Department and, more importantly, from the 
Omahas themselves with respect to the anticipated uses of 
the judgment fund. As with most other tribes awaiting ICC 
awards, the central issue facing the Omahas was how best to 
distribute the ICC award —  through individual per capita 
payments, or by "communal" investments in tribal programs
67and resources. The heated intratribal debate on that 
issue would have far-ranging consequences for the Omahas, 
including intense factionalization between on and off- 
reservation tribal members, a redefinition of tribal 
membership qualifications, and a dramatic turnover in the 
membership of the governing tribal council.
The Omahas' decision regarding the distribution of 
their ICC award came on March 8, 1961, when the Tribal 
Council unanimously adopted a Resolution in which it 
approved the provisions of the two bills then pending in 
Congress for the dispersal of the Omaha fund. Those 
companion bills, House Resolution 5971 and Senate Bill 1518, 
called for per capita payments of $750 to each enrolled 
tribal member possessing "Omaha blood of the degree of one- 
fourth or more," and provided that the balance of the 
judgment fund should be used "as appropriate for the future 
economic security and stability of the Omaha Tribe of 
Nebraska."68 Upon Congress' receipt of the tribal 
Resolution and a similarly favorable report from the
114
Department of the Interior, the appropriation bills were 
consolidated and passed into law on September 14, 1961.69 
The statute established a four-month period for the filing 
of new petitions for tribal membership, after which the 
applications would be examined by the tribe over a three 
month period for approval or rejection. By January 14,
1962, Tribal Chairman Alfred Gilpin was predicting that 
almost three thousand members would receive individual 
shares of the judgment.70 Adult members would receive cash 
payments of $7 50, while the shares owed to children would be 
held in trust until each child reached age 21. [See Figure 
4]. The balance of the judgment fund was targeted for 
economic and social improvement projects, to be determined 
by the tribe and approved by the Secretary of Interior.71
In June, 1962, almost eleven years after the filing of
their original ICC complaint, the per capita payments were
finally distributed to each of the adult members of the
Omaha tribe. For most of the Omahas, this tangible reward
from the long ICC fight was a welcome, but short-lived,
benefit. Ed Zendejas, a tribal member who was a young child
at the time of the distribution, recalls the general
euphoria on the reservation as the checks were received:
"My grandmother was practically throwing dollar bills out
7  2the window. The general feeling was 'We're rich!'" The 
Walthill Citizen newspaper reported a "considerable increase
115
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.- Louis  A. Snur.scci (in headdress),  
c h a irm a n  of the Omaha Indian 7 ribai 
C o u n c i l ,  is h a n d i n g  a check for 
S I . 133,515 to R. W . Hunt,  Sioux C ity .
Heap Big Transact ion
la. , bank executive, for  deposit . V a le n ­
tine Parker,  council  vicC'Chairman. is 
:it right.  T h e  m oney  represents the 
tribe- 'ch i ldren 's  share of S2.900.QC0
— A P  Wlrephoto.
a--va.-dad in a G o v e rn m e n t  s e t t le m e n t  > 
for 2 .500 .000  acres Of N o r t h e a s t  u V e -  
braska land acquired from  the In d ia n s  
in t rea t ies  of 1354 and 1365.
FIGURE 4
Photo and caption from Omaha World-Herald, January 18, 1964
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in business activity" as many tribal members used the cash
to buy clothes, furniture, or appliances.73 Others paid off
old bills or made improvements to their homes, and many 
parents indulged their children with new bicycles.74 [See 
Figure 5]. Not all the recipients used their shares so 
benignly, and one tribal member noted sadly that the 
distribution had resulted in "too many drunks."75
While the impact of the per capita payments faded
quickly, the communal portion of the Omahas' ICC award was
earmarked for significant, and largely successful, long-term
social and economic development programs on the reservation.
Among the initial projects utilizing the ICC fund were the
construction of three new family housing units and a new
multi-purpose community building designed to house
administrative offices, adult education classrooms,
conference rooms, and a large tribal meeting 
• 7  6room/gymnasium. [See Figure 6], In subsequent years, 
funds from the ICC judgment were used, in whole or part, for 
several other reservation projects, including a new water 
and sewage system for the village of Macy, a factory for the 
manufacture of hydraulic tractor parts, a tribal hog 
production facility, and the development of recreational
7  7facilities designed to boost tourism on the reservation.
The U.S. Department of Interior would note several years 
later that it was "most gratified with the effects of the
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Artist's rendering of the proposed Omaha Tribal Community 
Building, constructed with funds from the ICC judgment fund 
in Case No. 225.
Phouo depicting one of the new tribal housing units, located 
to the rear of an existing adobe structure. Three such 
units were constructed with the initial proceeds of the ICC 
judgment fund in Case No. 225.
FIGURE 6
Source: Omaha World-Herald. September 29, 1962.
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programming by the tribe for the use of the balance 
remaining after the per capita distribution."78
Shortly after the ICC funds were received, Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs Phileo Nash appeared at the Omahas' annual 
pow-wow, and complimented the tribe on its handling of the
7 Q . . .  ,ICC fund. Nash specifically praised the tribe's 
limitations on per capita distributions and the fact that 
$40,000 had been set aside for educational scholarships. He 
urged the tribe to safeguard the childrens' portions of the 
award and warned that those funds should not be disbursed 
"in the child's early years before the full educational 
requirements are known."80 Even as the majority of the 
tribe basked in the good feelings generated by the influx of 
long-awaited cash, however, rumblings of discontent were 
heard from other quarters.
Although the Tribal Council's decision to approve the 
distribution plan established by the Congressional 
appropriation statute was unanimous, and had been reached at 
an open meeting attended by approximately 200 adult members 
of the tribe, not all the Omahas were pleased with the 
dispersal program. Tribal members who lived off the 
reservation were particularly concerned, feeling that their 
needs and desires would not be taken into account in making 
final decisions regarding the use of the "communal" balance 
of the judgment fund. As early as October, 1961, an off-
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reservation faction led by tribal member Clarence White 
expressed misgivings about the distribution plan, demanding 
that the Council "recognize their problems," and prepare "a 
joint program . . .  to coordinate the off-reservation 
Indian's development with his reservation brothers."81 Many 
of these off-reservation members argued that the entire fund 
should have been distributed per capita, believing that they 
would realize little benefit from the on-reservation
•  .  • • Q Oimprovements paid for by the undistributed balance. *
The tension and divisiveness escalated over the ensuing 
months. By October, 1962, the off-reservation faction had 
become a unified and potent political force, which flexed 
its muscle in the tribal elections held on November 5.
Voters ousted longtime Tribal Chairman Alfred Gilpin, along
Q  O
with four other incumbent members of the Council. J 
Ironically, the new Council and its Chairman Louis Saunsoci 
had no better success in appeasing some of the off- 
reservation members. One year after the election, a small 
group of Omahas living off the reservation was still 
complaining that they were being treated like "outcastes" by 
the Council, and threatening lawsuits because "you have
84[our] money and are using it without [our] permission."
In addition to the acrimony created by the tribe's 
distribution of the ICC funds, the "one quarter blood" 
provision incorporated into the distribution statute became
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a source of great consternation for some Omahas. As of 
1961, approximately 2 00 persons with less than one-fourth 
Indian blood were enrolled as members of the Omaha Tribe 
pursuant to the provisions of the tribal Constitution
p C
adopted in 1936. Moreover, Congressional investigators 
determined that an unknown number of descendents of the 
aboriginal Omaha Tribe were not formally enrolled as members 
of the tribe, but were nevertheless entitled to share in the 
j udgment.
To bring closure to the issue, the Omaha legislation 
called for the Secretary of Interior to create a new 
membership roll comprised only of those persons meeting the 
one-fourth Indian blood requirement. The one-quarter blood 
rule would then become the new standard for tribal 
membership, and would be incorporated into the Constitution 
by amendment. By endorsing this procedure through its March 
8, 1961 Resolution, the tribal council unilaterally revoked 
the membership of some 200 individuals. The ousted members 
were not only eliminated from participation in the $750 per 
capita distribution, but also were deprived of the various 
other services and benefits available to tribal members.
Some of those 200 did not go quietly.
In August, 1962, one of the former tribal members who 
had not been allowed to share in the ICC distribution 
initiated a protest movement among disenrolled Omahas,
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culminating in a threat to seek an injunction prohibiting 
further distributions of ICC funds.86 Although no 
litigation actually ensued and the protest quieted rather 
quickly, the ousted members' lingering resentment coincided 
with that of the off-reservation faction to create an air of 
intra-tribal tension and division that would remain for
07 . , ,
years. That lingering tension would be re-ignited several 




A complete examination of the insufficiencies in the pre- 
ICC Indian claims process is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Generally speaking, however, the creation of the U.S. Court 
of Claims in 1855 initially opened the door for the 
prosecution of certain types of claims against the federal 
government, which previously had been barred by the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity. In 1863, however, Congress closed 
even this limited avenue of relief to Indians by amending 
the Court of Claims Act to exclude from its jurisdiction 
claims based on violation of Indian treaties. Thereafter, 
the only way that Indian tribes could pursue claims against 
the government was by the passage of a special congressional 
act specifically allowing that particular litigation. For 
obvious reasons, such a system proved inequitable and 
ultimately unsatisfactory. Comprehensive analysis of these 
problems is available in numerous sources, including the 
seminal 1928 Meriam Report, and several modern commentaries. 
See, for example, Lewis Meriam, The Problem of Indian 
Administration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1928) pp. 805-811; John R. Wunder, Retained Bv The People. A 
History of American Indians and the Bill of Rights (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 89-91; and William C. 
Canby, Jr., American Indian Law. Nutshell Series (St. Paul: 
West Publishing Company, 1988), 264-268.
2 Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946; U.S., Statutes at 
Large 60 (August 13, 1946): 1049-56. (hereafter ICC Act of 
1946).
3 The Commission was originally designed to remain in 
operation for only ten years, with all claims to be filed 
within the first five years. ICC Act of 1946. sections 12 
and 23. In light of the large volume of claims filed and 
the extraordinary demands of the Commission's work, its life 
was repeatedly extended by Congress, until it finally 
expired in 1978.
 ^ Despite its amply-documented failings, even the most 
bitter of the ICC's critics must concede that the Commission 
did provide a viable, albeit imperfect, mechanism for 
Indians to prosecute a wide variety of claims against the 
government. Virtually every recognized Indian group in the 
country took advantage of the opportunity. By the time of 
its extinction in 1978, the Commission had heard and decided 
almost 500 separately-docketed claims, with the Indian 
claimants winning awards in 58 percent of them. Harvey
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Rosenthal, "Indian Claims and the American Conscience," in 
Irredeemable America: The Indians' Estate and Land Claims, 
ed. Imre Sutton (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico 
Press, 1985), p. 67. The total amount awarded by the 
Commission during its lifetime is a matter of some dispute 
among the ICC commentators. For example, Donald Fixico 
asserts that the awards totaled $669 million, Rosenthal 
estimates the figure to be "some $800 million," while 
Francis Paul Prucha sets the amount at "more than $818 
million." Whatever the precise figure, Prucha's observation 
that the ICC awards did at least provide "a sizable 
injection of money into the tribal economies, even though 
the lasting effects of the sum were not great," seems to be 
a reasonable and objective view. Francis Paul Prucha, The 
Great Father: The United States Government and the American 
Indians, 2 vols. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1984), vol. 2, p. 1022. See also Donald L. Fixico, 
Termination and Relocation: Federal Indian Policy. 1945-1960 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1986), p. 186, 
and
5 Harry S. Truman, Statement upon signing of The Indian 
Claims Commission Act of 1946, August 13, 1946, Public 
Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. 
Truman. 194 6 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1962), p. 414.
6 This conclusion is almost universal among the ICC 
analysts. See, for example, Prucha, The Great Father, vol. 
2, pp. 1022-23; and Wunder, Retained Bv The People, pp. 91- 
93. Whatever doubt may have existed about the shift in the 
ICC's philosophical underpinnings evaporated in 1960, when 
Arthur Watkins was appointed to the Commission. Wunder 
accurately refers to Watkins as the "godfather of the 
termination policy." Ibid, p. 112. In some instances, ICC 
awards were used virtually to extort tribal acceptance of 
termination. See Robert C. Carriker, "The Kalispel Tribe 
and the Indian Claims Commission," Western Historical 
Quarterly 9 (January 1978): 19-31, describing Senator Frank 
Church's attempts to have the ICC's award to the Kalispels 
withheld until the tribe agreed on a plan of termination.
7 Rosenthal's work is by far the most comprehensive 
examination of the legislative history and operation of the 
ICC. See Harvey D. Rosenthal, "Their Day in Court: A 
History of the Indian Claims Commission" (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Kent State University, 1976). An abridged and 
updated version of his findings may be found in chapter one 
of Sutton, Irredeemable America. In addition to Rosenthal's 
work and that of Prucha, Wunder, and Fixico, generalized 
examinations of the ICC may be found in many other sources,
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including Wilcomb Washburn, Red Man's Land/White Man's Law:
A Study of the Past and Present Status of the American 
Indian (New York: Scribner, 1971) pp. 101-153; and Vine 
Deloria, Jr., "'Congress in Its Wisdom': The Course of 
Indian Legislation," in The Aggressions of civilization: 
Federal Indian Policy Since the 1880s. ed. Sandra L. 
Cadwalader and Vine Deloria , Jr. (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1984), pp. 105-130. Representative 
journal articles include Sandra Danforth, "Repaying 
Historical Debts: The Indian Claims Commission," North 
Dakota Law Review. 49 (Winter 1973): 359-403; John T. Vance, 
"The Congressional Mandate and the Indian Claims 
Commission," North Dakota Law Review. 45 (Spring 1969): 325- 
336; Thomas Le Due, "The Work of the Indian Claims 
Commission Under the Act of 194 6," Pacific Historical 
Review. 26 (February, 1957): 1-16; and Nancy 0. Lurie, "The 
Indian Claims Commission," Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science. 436 (March, 1978): 97-110.
8 For example, Prucha concludes that "The work of the Indian 
Claims Commission was a mixture of positive results and 
substantial failure." Prucha, The Great Father, vol. 2, p. 
1022.
9 Wunder is representative of these latter sentiments, 
calling the ICC a "self-defeating" institution and "a 
miserable failure for Native Americans." Wunder, Retained Bv 
The People, p. 114.
10 Although "localized" examinations of the ICC's impact are 
relatively rare, a few are available, including Herbert 
Hoover, "Yankton Sioux Tribal Claims Against the United 
States, 1917-1975," Western Historical Quarterly 7 (April 
1976): 125-142; Robert C. Carriker, "The Kalispel Tribe and 
the Indian Claims Commission Experience," Western Historical 
Quarterly 9 (January 1978): 19-31; and David J. Wishart, 
"The Pawnee Claims Case, 1947-64," chapter 7 of Sutton, 
Irredeemable America.
11 ICC Act of 1946. sec. 2.
12 Ibid., sec. 13(a).
13 The Act is silent on this point. The Commission itself 
chose to limit its remedial powers to monetary awards. This 
aspect of the Commission's limitations is considered in 
virtually all of the ICC commentaries. See also Richard A. 
Nielsen, "American Indian Land Claims: Land versus Money as 
a Remedy," University of Florida Law Review 2 5 (Winter, 
1973): 308-26. •
126
The Commission's determination that it could not award 
interest on its awards to Indians has been the subject of 
substantial scholarly attention. Most commentators suggest 
that simple political expediency was behind the decision, 
concluding that the ICC was "trying to avoid paying large, 
politically unacceptable claims." See Leonard A. Carlson, 
"What Was It Worth? Economic and Historical Aspects of 
Determining Awards in Indian Land Claims Cases," chapter 4 
of Sutton, Irredeemable America, p. 98; and Howard M. 
Friedman, "Interest on Indian Claims: Judicial Protection of 
the Fisc," Valparaiso University Law Review. 5 (Fall, 1970): 
26-47. Others have pointed to the impact of the Court of 
Claims' decision in Loval Band or Group of Creek Indians v. 
United States, 97 F. Supp 426 (Ct. Cl. 1951) and the Supreme 
Court's decisions in United States v. Alcea Band of 
Tillamooks. 341 U.S. 48 (1951) and Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. 
United States. 348 U.S. 273 (1955), where the Court held
that, in the absence of statutory direction, the taking of 
Indian land was not compensable under the Fifth Amendment, 
and thus no interest was due. See Le Due, "The Work of the 
Indian Claims Commission," p. 14; and Wunder, Retained Bv 
the People, pp. 113-114.
15 . •For analysis of the Commission's position on this
question of valuation, see Carlson, "What Was it Worth?", 
chapter 4 in Sutton, Irredeemable America.
16 ICC Act of 1946. sec. 2.
17 .  .  .A The "offset problem" is noted and discussed in virtually 
all of the ICC treatments previously cited, including 
Rosenthal, Prucha, Wunder, and DeLoria. For a specific 
examination of certain aspects of the offset issue, see John 
R. White, "Barmecide Revisited: The Gratuitous Offset in 
Indian Claims Cases," Ethnohistorv 25 (Spring 1978): 179.
18 As with other elements of the ICC story, the Commission's 
procedural operations have been thoroughly examined in the 
secondary literature. A particularly concise description of 
the Commission's processing of claims may be found in 
Rosenthal, "Their Day in Court," pp. 157-158.
19 The records of the ICC have been compiled on microfiche 
by the Clearwater Publishing Company, with the documents 
segmented into six "parts" and organized by docket number. 
Part A is comprised of Commission decisions; Parts B and C 
are transcripts of testimony; Part D is titled "Briefs," and 
includes the pleadings, motions, and proposed findings filed 
by the parties; Part E contains GSA materials relating to 
the claims, such as the texts of relevant treaties; and Part 
F, labeled "Journal," contains the Commission's dockets and
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interlocutory orders entered in each claim. Subsequent 
citations to those records will be to ICC. with appropriate 
references to the "part" of the fiche collection, the title 
of the document, the date, the page or paragraph, and the 
particular microfiche card or cards upon which the document 
may be found.
2<^ ICC. Docket 225, Briefs, Complaint, August 8, 1951, par. 
12, Card 1. Although this portion of the complaint 
specifies only the July 20, 1815 Portage Des Sioux and 
October 6, 182 5 Fort Atkinson treaties, those agreements did 
not actually result in the cession of any Omaha lands. It 
may be presumed therefore that these allegations were 
primarily directed toward the July 15, 1830 Prairie du Chien 
Treaty and the October 15, 183 6 "Platte Purchase" agreement 
between the Omahas and the federal government. For a 
comprehensive examination of the execution and impact of 
these treaties, see Judy Boughter, "Betraying Their Trust: 
The Dispossession of the Omaha Nation, 1790-1916," (Master's 
thesis, University of Nebraska at Omaha, 1995) Chapter 1, 
pp. 25-28 and Chapter 2, pp. 1-10.
21 ICC. Docket 225, Briefs, Complaint, August 8, 1951, 
paragraph 14, Card 1.
22 Ibid., paragraph 16.
23 Ibid., paragraph 15.
2  ^ For an excellent discussion of the circumstances
surrounding the 18 54 treaty and its impact on the Omahas, 
see Boughter, "Betraying Their Trust," Chapter 3.
25 ICC, Docket 225, Briefs, Complaint, August 8, 1951, 
paragraph 2 2, Card 1.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., paragraph 2 6
28 Ibid., paragraph 28. One of the tribal members killed by
the Sioux in the period immediately following the 1854
treaty was the noted leader Logan Fontanelle. See Boughter, 
"Betraying Their Trust," Chapter 3, p. 15.
29 ICC. Docket 225, Briefs, Complaint, August 8, 1951, 
paragraph 29, Card 1.
30 Ibid., paragraph 36.
31 Ibid.
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3 2 ICC. Docket 225, Journal, Commission Interlocutory Order, 
October 6, 1953, Card 7.
33 ICC, Docket 225-B, Briefs, Amended Complaint, October 6, 
1953, Card 1.
34 ICC, Docket 225-C, Briefs, Amended Complaint, October 30, 
1958, Card 1. The allegations of Case 225-C were later 
amended again, becoming Docket 225-D.
35 The full text of the 1854 treaty may be found at U.S., 
Statutes at Large. 10 (March 16, 1854): 1043, and in Charles 
J. Kappler, comp, and ed., Indian Affairs: Laws and 
Treaties, vol. 2, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1904), p. 611. Relevant portions of the treaty are 
quoted in the Omahas' Amended Complaint in Docket 2 25-A.
J The circumstances surrounding the Omahas' rejection of 
the northern lands and their choice of the territory in the 
Blackbird Hills is an interesting story in itself. The 
tribe apparently had little, if any, intention of ever 
accepting the land north of the Ayoway line. See Boughter, 
"Betraying Their Trust," pp. 93-99.
37 U.S., Statutes at Large 36 (June 22, 1910): 580.
38 Omaha Tribe of Indians v. United States. 53 Ct. Cl. 549 
(1918), rev'd in part and aff'd in part. 253 U.S. 275 
(1920).
39 United States v. Omaha Tribe of Indians. 253 U.S. 275 
(192 0). The Supreme Court denied the Omahas' request for 
interest on this award, holding that interest could be 
awarded only if the special jurisdictional act allowing the 
lawsuit specifically provided for it. Five years later, 
however, Congress passed special legislation providing for 
the payment of interest at 5% on the award, totaling 
$374,465.02. See U.S., Statutes at Large 43 (February 9, 
1925): 820, and U.S., Statutes at Large 44 (March 3, 1926): 
174.
40 ICC. Docket 225-A, Journal, Interlocutory Order, October 
19/ 1954, Card 8.
41 Although he was subjected to brief cross-examination by 
counsel for the Omahas, Smith's "testimony" before the 
Commission, took the form of a written report, entered as 
Defendant's Exhibit 100 in Docket 225-A. The microfiche 
copy of his report is of very poor quality, and is virtually 
unreadable. Perhaps for that reason, it has been separately
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published in hardback form as G. Hubert Smith, Omaha 
Indians: Ethnohistorical Report on the Omaha People (New 
York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1974). Champe's testimony 
on both direct and cross examination stretched over two days 
of hearings before the Commission. His research and 
opinions are available only through examination of the
official ICC transcripts. See ICC. Docket 225-A,
Transcript, September 27-28, 1955, Cards 1-3.
42 Smith, Omaha Indians, p. 131.
43 ICC. Transcript, Docket 225-A, Card 2, pp. 139-140.
44 ICC. Transcript, Docket 225-A, Card 1, p. 26.
4  ^ ICC. Journal, Docket 225-A, Opinion, January 18, 1957, 
Card 8. The Commission's Opinion may also be found in
Smith, Omaha Indians, pp. 280-286.
46 The Omahas had argued that their title was established 
not only by their use and occupancy of the property in 
question, but also by the actions of the government in 
acknowledging their ownership at the time the 1854 treaty 
was executed. Having been persuaded by Dr. Champe's 
testimony regarding the Omahas' use and occupancy of the 
territory, the Commission noted that it was unnecessary to 
rule on that alternative basis for establishing title.
Ibid., p . 285.
47 The increase from 4.5 to more than 4.9 million acres 
reflected the Commission's determination of the correct 
total of the land ceded by the Omahas, including the 
territory north of the Ayoway line.
A  Q
The transcript of the February 24 - 27, 1958 valuation 
hearing is found at ICC. Transcript, Docket 225-A, Cards 4- 
8. Future researchers should note that several of the 225-A 
"Transcript" microfiche cards have been mistitled by the 
publisher. Each of the 8 cards is labeled "Title" and dated 
"9/27/55," indicating that all 8 relate to the September, 
1955 hearing on the issue of ownership. Actually, only 
cards 1-3 contain the 1955 title hearing. Cards 4-8 are the 
transcript of the 1958 valuation hearing.
49 Murray's oral testimony before the Commission is at ICC. 
Transcript, Docket 225-A, Cards 7-8. His written report is 
a part of the ICC records at ICC. Testimony, Docket 225-A, 
W.G. Murray Appraisal, Cards 1-2. It has also been 
separately published in hardback form as William G. Murray, 
Appraisal of Omaha Tract in Nebraska. 1854 (New York: 
Clearwater Publishing Co., 1957) .
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50 Murray, Appraisal of Omaha Tract, p. 131.
51 Ibid.
52 Davis' oral testimony before the Commission is at ICC. 
Transcript, Docket 225-A, Card 4, p. 294 to Card 6, p. 494. 
His 600-page written report comprises 3 0 microfiche cards, 
and is found at ICC. Testimony, Docket 225-A, Appraisal 
Associates, Cards 1-30.
53 ICC. Testimony, Docket 225-A, Appraisal Associates, Card 
1.
ca .
ICC. Decisions, Docket 225-A, Interlocutory Order, 
November 28, 1958; 6 Ind. Cl. Com. 73 0.
55 Ibid.
56 ICC. Journal, Docket 225-A, "Conclusions of Law and Final 
Award," May 6, 1959, Card 11. See also ICC. Journal, Docket 
225-A, "Opinion on Orders Disallowing a Claim of Defendant 
as to Credit or Offset For $374,465.02," May 13, 1959, Card
11. This opinion "explains" the Commission's decision 
regarding the claimed offset.
57 Inexplicably, the microfiche records of the pleadings, 
motions, and other filings by the parties in Case 225 
conclude with documents filed on October 29, 1958, more than 
one year before the filing of the joint "Stipulation of 
Settlement." Thus, the precise wording of the parties' 
original agreement is unavailable. The terms of the 
compromise may, however, be gleaned from the Commission's 
subsequent opinion, in which it accepted the compromise and 
incorporated the parties' agreement into its final judgment. 
ICC. Decisions, Docket 225 Consolidated, Opinion, February 
11, 1960; 8 Ind. Cl. Com. 392.
58 Ibid.
59 8 Ind. Cl. Com. 392, at 414.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., at 416-418.
62 ICC. Docket 225 Consolidated, Journal, Final Judgement of 
Final Determination, February 11, 1960, Card 12.
63 ICC. Docket 225 Consolidated, Journal, Order Allowing 
Attorney Fees and Expenses, February 11, 1960, Card 12. The
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attorneys' fees were based on a contract with the Omahas 
calling for an 8% fee on the Commission's final award.
64 ICC Act of 1946. sections 21 and 22.
Rosenthal, "Their Day in Court," p. 297.
66 Ibid.
67 For discussion of this larger issue, see Rosenthal,
"Their Day in Court," pp. 297-299.
68 Resolution of Omaha Tribal Council, March 8, 1961, full 
text contained in U.S. Congress, Senate, Providing for the 
Disposition of Judgment Funds of the Omaha Tribe of Indians.
S. Report 598, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961 [ser. set 12324].
69 Public Law 87-235; U.S., Statutes at Large 75 (September 
14, 1961): 508.
78 "3,000 Share Tribe Award," Omaha World-Herald. January 
14, 1962, p. 6-B.
71 Ibid.
72 Interview with Ed Zendejas, Omaha tribal member and 
former Omaha Tribal Judge, September 14, 1995.
73 "Omaha Indians Receive Tribal Claims Money," Walthill 
Citizen. June 14, 1962, p. 1.
74 Harold Cowan, "Omahas Use $750 shares to Pay Off Debts, 
Buy Bikes," Omaha World-Herald. June 17, 1962, p. 1-B.
75 Ibid.
76 Tom Allan, "Indians at Macy Build and Plan," Omaha World- 
Herald. September 29, 1962, p. 4. See also Tom Allan, 
"Indians' Progress Pleases 'Big White Father'," Omaha World- 
Herald . June 26, 1964, p. 6-B.
77 The Omahas' use of their ICC judgment fund is described 
and favorably evaluated in U.S. Congress, Senate, Providing 
For the Disposition of Funds Appropriated to Pav a. Judgment 
in Favor of the Omaha Tribe of Nebraska, and For Other 
Purposes," S. Report 1683, 89th Congress, 2d sess., 1966 
[ser. set 12710-5]. [Hereafter cited as S. Report 1683].
See also "Reservation Gets Factory; Indians at Walthill Use 
Federal Money," Omaha World-Herald. October 15, 1967,
p. 12-A.
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78 S. Report 1683, p. 3.
79 "Omaha Tribe Given Praise, Nash Lauds Efforts to Boost 
Economy," Omaha World-Herald. August 20, 1962, p. 2.
80 Ibid.
81 "Indians Plan a Delegation, Want to Give View of Off- 
Reservation,11 Omaha World-Herald. October 21, 1961, p. 2.
82 Ibid.
83 See Tom Allan, "Omaha Tribe's Crucial Day Nov. 5," Omaha 
World-Herald. October 4, 1962, p. 6, describing the results 
of the primary election as "a tough blow to the incumbent 
council," and assessing the import of the November 5 general 
election; and Tom Allan, "Old Council is Voted Out," Omaha 
World-Herald. November 6, 1962, p. 6, discussing the results 
of the general election.
Q A
James Ivey, "Indians Declare Macy Council Discriminates," 
Omaha World-Herald. September 21, 1963, p. 2.
8  ^At the time of the ICC distribution, Article II of the 
Omaha Constitution merely provided that all persons "of 
Indian blood" whose names appeared on tribal rolls were 
entitled to membership. See "Constitution and By-Laws of 
the Omaha Tribe of Nebraska," March 30, 1936, Article II, 
section 1; reprinted in George E. Fay, comp. Charters. 
Constitutions and Bv-Laws of the Indian Tribes of North 
America: Part 13: Midwestern Tribes. Occasional Publications 
in Anthropology, Ethnology Series, No. 14 (Greeley,
Colorado: Museum of Anthropology, University of Northern 
Colorado, 1972): pp. 49-58.
86 See "Indians Schedule Walthill Meeting," Omaha World- 
Herald . August 9, 1962, p. 19; and "Indians Not on Rolls 
Seek Fund Injunction," Omaha World-Herald. August 20, 1962, 
p. 2 .
87 The fragmentation within the Omaha Tribe caused by the 
decisions regarding the use of the ICC fund was not uncommon 
among tribes receiving ICC awards. See Carriker, "The 
Kalispel Tribe and The Indian Claims Commission Experience," 
pp. 29-31, describing the Kalispels' similar problems.
CHAPTER FOUR
"THIS MAY BE ONE OF THE MOST NERVE-WEARING, DIFFICULT 
SITUATIONS TO EVER COME BEFORE THE COMMISSION"
ROUND TWO BEFORE THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION —  CASE 138
1951 - 1966
The Omaha experience before the Indian Claims
Commission did not conclude with the tribe's receipt and
distribution of the funds produced by the settlement of Case 
22 5. As that case wound its tedious way through the ICC's 
procedural machinery, the Omahas also maintained an active 
interest in another cause pending before the Commission.
That parallel proceeding, ICC Docket 138, would eventually 
be resolved in favor of the Omahas in a manner similar to 
that of Case 225. It would also produce many of the same
consequences, both good and bad, for the tribe and its
individual members.
As the docket number indicates, Case 138 actually 
commenced several months before the tribe initiated its 
claim in Case 225. On July 20, 1951, the Omahas joined with 
the Iowa Tribe and the Confederated Sac and Fox Tribes 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Three
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Nations") to file a petition seeking recovery of the fair 
market value of each of the tribes' respective interests in 
almost 10 million acres in what is now western Iowa and 
northwestern Missouri. While the Three Nations were co­
petitioners before the Commission, their interests in the 
case were largely separate and adversarial. Indeed, the 
tribes would ultimately expend nearly as much time and 
effort in arguing cross-claims among themselves as they 
would in establishing liability against the federal 
government. Taken together, the myriad claims and cross­
claims in Case 138 presented the ICC with a bewildering set 
of historical circumstances, such that one of the parties' 
attorneys would describe it as "one of the most nerve- 
wealing, difficult situations to ever come before the 
Commission.1,1
Despite the complexity of the legal issues and the 
"shared" nature of the claims involved in Docket 138, the 
case would ultimately produce a judgment of $1.75 million in 
the Omahas' favor —  funds that would both benefit the tribe 
and resurrect many of the same intratribal tensions created 
by the award in Case 225. Case 138 therefore represents a 
significant and noteworthy chapter in the Omahas' modern 
legal history, one that again illustrates the "mixed 
blessing" nature of the ICC experience for individual 
tribes.
In addition, an examination of Docket 138 is useful as 
a classic example of the laborious tasks often faced by the 
ICC. In this proceeding, just as in many others addressed 
by the tribunal in its 32 years of existence, the Commission 
was asked to resolve a labyrinthine series of disputes 
involving the interpretation of treaties and agreements 
executed more than a century earlier, most of which were 
impenetrably vague and contradictory even at the time of 
their execution. Notwithstanding the many legitimate 
criticisms of the ICC and its operations,2 the Commission's 
efforts to interpret those anomalies and to produce some 
measure of justice for the long-suffering Native Americans 
are certainly worthy of recognition. Case 138 provides a 
particularly useful example of that "expository role" played 
by the ICC.
Omaha claims in Case 138 centered on the convoluted 
provisions of treaties that the tribe executed with the 
federal government in 1830, 1836, and 1854, as well as 
treaties negotiated with other Midwestern tribes regarding 
the same territory.** The procession of events began in 
1825, when the federal government intervened in the bloody 
warfare that was then raging among a number of tribes in the 
upper Midwest, primarily the Sac and Fox tribes of the Upper 
Mississippi basin and the Yankton Sioux of southern 
Minnesota. Greatly oversimplified, the warfare involved
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incursions from the east by the Sac and Fox, and from the 
north by the Yankton Sioux, into the traditional hunting 
grounds of the less-aggressive Iowa, Otoe, and Omaha tribes 
in the area of what is now western Iowa.
Seeking to avoid future difficulties between the 
warring tribes, the federal government sought to construct 
an agreement that would "promote peace among the tribes, and 
establish boundaries among them and other tribes who live in 
their vicinity, and thereby remove all causes of future 
difficulty."4 The resulting treaty, concluded on August 19, 
1825 at Prairies des Chiens in Michigan Territory, 
established a southern boundary on Sioux territory, which 
would become known as the "Article 2 line," and acknowledged 
the respective interests of numerous other tribes in the 
lands south of that line.
The Omahas were not parties to the 1825 Prairie des 
Chiens treaty, although their interests in the area involved 
in those negotiations would be expressly acknowledged by the 
federal government and by most of the other tribes in the 
ensuing years.6 By implication, the treaty also recognized 
a Sac and Fox interest in the area south of the Article 2 
line, although the Omahas would later argue before the ICC 
that the Sac and Fox had "no proper claim to the area," 
since whatever interest they purported to have acquired was 
based on conquest rather than aboriginal use as a
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traditional hunting ground.7 In addition, the 1825 treaty 
committed the government to convene additional councils in 
subsequent years to establish specific boundaries for the 
various tribes' respective hunting grounds in the lands 
south of the Article 2 line.8 Those future councils would 
also obtain the assent of other tribes with interests in the 
area, such as the Otoe and Omaha, who were not parties to 
the treaty.9
The federal government took no immediate steps to 
convene the promised additional councils and, predictably, 
new tensions arose between the various tribes in the area.
By August, 1828, a bitter dispute had arisen between the Sac 
and Fox tribes on the one hand, and the Omaha and Otoe 
tribes on the other. The Sac and Fox claimed that any 
interests that the Omahas might have had in the Iowa lands 
had been ceded to the former via the 182 5 treaty, and the 
Sac and Fox threatened war against the Omahas and Otoes if 
they continued to hunt in the area.10 The Omahas naturally 
claimed that their historic interests in this land could not 
have been extinguished at Prairie des Chiens since they were 
not even a party to that agreement. Hostilities also loomed 
between the Sac and Fox and the Yankton Sioux, who also had 
not assented to the 1825 treaty.
In July, 1830, the federal government finally made good 
on the commitment it had made five years earlier by
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compelling representatives of the Omaha, Iowa, Otoe, Sac and 
Fox, and various bands of Sioux to gather once again at 
Prairie du Chien. The ostensible purpose of that council 
was to resolve the lingering boundary problems among the 
tribes in the area, and thereby "remove all causes which may 
hereafter create any unfriendly feelings between them."11 
That benign intention notwithstanding, the treaty executed 
at the 1830 Prairie du Chien council did far more than 
simply resolve intertribal boundary disputes. It resulted 
in the tribes' unknowing "cession" of the entire area in 
question in exchange for small government payments and 
annuities. This area would later earn the title of "Cession 
151" among government policy makers. [See Maps 3 - 6 ] .
The negotiation and execution of the 1830 Prairie du 
Chien Treaty, and the events that followed its execution, 
would become the linchpin of the Three Nations' claims in 
the Docket 138 ICC litigation. In their Petition to the 
ICC, filed July 20, 1951, the tribes alleged that they had 
been intentionally misled from the outset as to the true 
purpose of the Prairie du Chien council. While government 
representatives purported to seek only peace among the 
tribes, their actual goal had been to obtain the complete 
extinguishment of all Indian claims to western Iowa in order 
to open the area to unrestricted white settlement. This 
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MAP 3
Depicting portion of Cession 151 territory located in 
present-day Iowa, with "Article 2 line" shown in red.
Source: Charles C. Royce, comp., Indian Land Cessions in
the United States. Eighteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of 
American Ethnology, Part 2 (Washington, D.C., Governmnent 
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MAP 4
Depicting small portion of Cession 151 territory located in 
present-day Minnesota.
Source: Charles C. Royce, comp., Indian Land Cessions in
the United States. Eighteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of 
American Ethnology, Part 2 (Washington, D.C., Governmnent 
Printing Office, 1899), Plate CXL, "Minnesota 1."
MAP 5
Depicting the southernmost portion of Cession 151, located 
in present-day Missouri, which would later become known as 
the "Platte Purchase.”
Source: Charles C. Royce, comp., Indian Land Cessions in
the United States. Eighteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of 
American Ethnology, Part 2 (Washington, D.C., Governmnent 













A "combination" of the preceeding Royce maps, depicting the 
entire Cession 151 territory.
Source: ICC. Docket 138, "Petition Relating to Lands in
Western Iowa and Northwestern Missouri (The Trust Lands)," 
Briefs, Card 1 of 7.
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President Andrew Jackson's aggressive implementation of the 
recently-enacted Indian Removal Act of 183 0, which 
explicitly announced the government's intent to remove all 
Indians from eastern lands and force them onto unsettled 
western territory.12
Unaware of those underlying political motivations, the 
Omahas and other tribes which gathered at Prairie du Chien 
in July, 18 3 0 believed that the meeting represented merely 
the government's "initial step . . .  in discharging its 
obligations under the Treaty of 1825 to fix and establish 
boundary lines," and that "a cession of lands would not be
1 3required by [the government]."XJ Interpreters were provided 
for the tribes, but the Three Nations would later allege 
that those translators were neither willing to nor capable 
of providing the tribes with the assistance necessary to 
negotiate on an equal basis with the government.14
The "plan" presented by government representatives, 
ostensibly designed to settle tribal boundary disputes, was 
in reality a masterful combination of strong-arm 
intimidation and diplomatic obfuscation. After first 
compelling all the gathered tribes to sign a peace agreement 
among themselves under threat of U.S. armed intervention, 
the treaty commissioners "proposed" that the tribes 
relinquish to the government "that portion of the country 
between the Demoine [Des Moines] and Missouri [Rivers],
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which you all assert a right to hunt upon; to be allotted as
a common hunting ground."15 This proposal would give rise
to the fundamental misunderstanding upon which all the later
grievances arising out of the 1830 treaty would be based.
The Omahas and other tribes at Prairie du Chien believed
that they were ceding the land only for the limited purpose
of having it subsequently allotted and assigned back to them
based upon fixed and specific boundaries. The government,
in contrast, viewed the cession as an outright
relinquishment of Indian title in exchange for agreed-upon
cash payments and annuities, with the land to be
subsequently used and distributed in whatever manner the
government might deem appropriate.
Specific language in the treaty can be utilized to
support both viewpoints. The first sentence in Article One
provided that the tribes "cede[d] and relinquish[ed] to the
United States all their right and title to the lands
[described]." A subsequent passage in the same Article,
however, seemed to place significant limitations on the
government's future use of the land:
But it is understood that the lands ceded and 
relinquished by this Treaty, are to be assigned and 
allotted under the direction of the President of the 
United States, to the Tribes now living thereon, or to 
such other Tribes as the President may locate thereon 
for hunting, or other purposes.1^
While the first portion of the underlined language was
consistent with the Three Nations' understanding of the
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purpose of the treaty, they would later allege that they 
were completely unaware of the final clause in that passage, 
purporting to give the President the right to settle other 
tribes on the land in question.17
Laboring under these crucial misunderstandings, twelve 
representatives of the Omaha Tribe affixed their marks to a 
treaty that would ultimately lead to the loss of more than 3 
million acres of the tribe's traditional hunting grounds 
east of the Missouri River. The consideration paid to the 
tribe for this massive land cession amounted to $2500 
annually for ten years, along with the government's promise 
to provide the tribe with one blacksmith and $500 worth of
. I Q
agricultural implements. ° The Iowas and Sac and Fox 
received identical payments.
It took only three years for the confusion surrounding 
the meaning and intent of the 183 0 treaty to manifest 
itself. In a treaty executed September 26, 1833, the 
government granted to the Chippewa, Ottawa and Potawatomi 
Indians a five million acre tract which was entirely
, . 1 9encompassed within the Cession 151 territory. That treaty 
was concluded without the consent or knowledge of the Omahas 
or the other tribes involved in the 183 0 agreement, and 
without the payment of any additional consideration to those 
groups.
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Although that unilateral action by the government 
appeared to indicate that the United States considered the 
land in question to have already been entirely ceded by the 
Three Nations, the government contradicted that impression 
by taking steps in the ensuing years that partially 
acknowledged the continuing title of the Omaha, Iowa, and 
Sac and Fox Tribes. For example, in 183 6 the government 
concluded a series of treaties with each of the tribes that 
had been a party to the 18 3 0 agreement, whereby the Indian 
groups relinquished their respective interests in the 
southernmost portion of the Cession 151 territory —  an area 
that would become known as the Platte Purchase.20 [See Map 
5]. The Omahas' share of the payment for this cession 
amounted to just $1,270.21
In subsequent years, the government continued to 
acknowledge the title of the Prairie du Chien tribes to the 
Cession 151 territory. In 1837, the United States concluded 
a series of treaties with the Sac and Fox and the Iowa to 
relinquish their respective interests in the remaining area 
of Cession 151.22 Likewise, in April, 1838 the government 
acknowledged the Omahas' continuing interest in the Cession 
151 territory by negotiating a treaty in which they too 
would have expressly ceded their title to the area, but that 
treaty was never ratified by Congress. Finally, m  the 
seminal 1854 Treaty with the Omahas, which established their
147
reservation on the Nebraska side of the Missouri River, the 
tribe formally relinquished its interest in the remaining 
area of Cession 151 on the Iowa side of the river.24 The 
total compensation paid to the tribe over the previous two 
decades for the more than three million acres in question 
amounted to $2 6,27 0, or less than 1 cent per acre.25 More 
than 100 years would pass before that "purchase price" would 
be adjusted upward.
The ICC petition jointly filed by the Omaha, Iowa, and
Sac and Fox Nations in Docket 138 on July 20, 1951 took full
advantage of all the potential theories of recovery provided
by the broad language of Section 2 of the 194 6 ICC Act.26
In their First Cause of Action, the petitioners sought
revision of the 1830 treaty on several alternate grounds:
1.) that the treaty had been executed by the Three Nations
under duress; 2.) that the tribes had been induced to sign
the treaty with the promise that the lands thereby ceded
would be allotted back to the tribes with precisely defined
boundaries; 3.) that the provision in the treaty purporting
to allow the President to settle other tribes on the land
was directly contrary to representations made to the tribes
at the Council and to the tribes' understanding of the
agreement; and 4 .) that the consideration paid to the tribes
2 7was "nominal in amount and unconscionably small."
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The tribes' Second Cause of Action alleged that the 
government's acquisition of the Cession 151 area constituted 
a wrongful "taking" without just compensation in violation 
of the Fifth Amendment, for which the tribes were entitled 
to recover under Clause (4) of Section 2 of the Act.28 In 
their Third and Fourth Causes of Action, the Three Nations 
employed similar language to seek recovery under Clauses 1 
and 2 of the Act, generally providing relief for all claims 
in law or equity against the United States.
Finally, the petitioners' Fifth Cause of Action invoked 
the broad "fair and honorable dealings" language contained 
in Clause (5) of Section 2 of the Act to attack a litany of 
governmental transgressions surrounding the 1830 Treaty. 
Among these were the failure to provide competent 
interpreters and advisers, and the failure to inform the 
Three Nations of the treaty provision which purported to 
give the President the right to locate other tribes on the 
Cession 151 lands.
After seeking and obtaining three separate extensions 
of time, and being denied a fourth, the United States 
finally filed its answer to the Three Nations' allegations 
on June 2, 1952 —  almost one full year after the petition 
had been filed. The answer asserted the government's usual 
panoply of standard defenses, including the assertion that 
the government's dealing with the tribes "were at all times
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fair and honorable," and that the Three Nations had 
"received a fair, just and reasonable compensation for their 
purported claimed interest in and to said lands."29 More 
specifically, but no less predictably, the government 
asserted that the Omahas and the other tribes involved in 
the 1830 negotiations had not maintained the necessary 
"exclusive possession" of the Cession 151 area in the years 
prior to the treaty. Rather, the government argued that the 
land had been "used by numerous groups or bands of Indians 
as a common hunting ground and that no one group or band 
used or occupied the land to the exclusion of other groups 
or bands."30
In addition, the government took the unique position 
that the "cessions" of land made by the various tribes in 
the 183 0 treaty were in fact superfluous, inasmuch as the 
United States had already acquired full title to the area by 
way of earlier cessions by these tribes. Thus, argued the 
government, it had "acquired no additional right, title or 
interest in and to said lands which it did not already 
possess."31 Just as in Case 22 5, the Omahas and their co­
petitioners would therefore be required to "prove" that 
which the government had already explicitly acknowledged 
through its course of dealings with the tribes over several 
decades in the nineteenth century —  namely, that the Three
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Nations had possessed both a de facto and de jure 
compensable interest in the Cession 151 territory.
With the issues thus framed by the parties' initial 
pleadings, the case moved sluggishly forward through the 
"title phase" of the Indian Claims Commission's 
procedures. After more than two years of reciprocal 
discovery among the litigants, the "title hearing" commenced 
before Acting Chief Commissioner Louis J. O'Marr and 
Associate Commissioner William M. Holt on December 7, 1954. 
Consistent with the typically glacial pace of the 
Commission's proceedings, the witness testimony and 
arguments of counsel would ultimately extend over three 
separate sessions, spanning more than three years. The 
initial hearing in December, 1954 began with the opening 
statements of the parties' respective counsel. The 
attorneys, including I. S. Weissbrodt on behalf of the 
Omahas, struggled to summarize the series of treaties 
involved in the case and the complicated web of claims and 
cross-claims. Just as in Case 225 and most other ICC 
proceedings, the "battle of the experts" then ensued.
To establish their title to the Cession 151 area, the 
petitioners presented the testimony of Dr. Anthony F. C. 
Wallace, an anthropologist from the University of 
Pennsylvania. Wallace testified that the Three Nations had 
each maintained exclusive occupancy of a distinct portion of
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the tract, and that a reasonable interpretation of the 
provisions of the 1830 treaty necessarily recognized those 
respective interests.33 The government countered Wallace's 
opinions with those of anthropologist and "ethno-historian" 
Mildred Mott Wedel. Predictably, Wedel testified that the 
tribes in question had not established exclusive occupancy 
of the disputed area, and that the Treaty of 1830 did not 
give rise to compensable continuing interests in the land.34 
Following the December 10, 1954 session, the hearing was 
adjourned until February 23 of the following year, at which 
time Wedel concluded her testimony. The hearing adjourned 
the following day, and the "paper war" commenced anew.
For almost two years after the hearing, the litigants 
filed volumes of findings, objections, motions, replies and
other procedural documents with the Commission. The
countless papers exchanged between the parties during this
period reflected both the emotionalism and the legal
complexity of the case, not only between the government and 
the Indian claimants, but also between the claimants 
themselves. The written cross-attacks among the petitioners 
were, in some instances, even more bitter than the sparring 
with the government's attorneys, as illustrated by a set of 
"Objections" filed by the Sac and Fox on December 26, 1956. 
In that memorandum, the Sac and Fox attempted to completely 
exterminate the claim asserted by their Omaha co-petitioners
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by raising the same argument they had used against the 
Omahas in the years leading up to the 1830 Prairie du Chien 
council. They argued that the 1825 Prairie des Chiens 
Treaty had established the Sac and Fox and the Iowa tribes 
as the only owners of the Cession 151 territory. Omaha 
claims to the land, therefore, could only be legitimitized 
by "ignoring" the Treaty or blatantly mischaracterizing its 
terms. By such misrepresentation, the Sac and Fox claimed, 
the Omahas thrust upon the Commission a "basic and material 
error" of such magnitude that it "raise[d] a serious 
question as to the adequacy and reliability of any or all of 
the Omaha's [proposed] findings."35
Notwithstanding such internecine disputes and cross­
claims, the case was finally submitted to the Commission for
decision on February 15, 1957, following oral arguments of
counsel. Six months later, on July 31, 1957, the ICC
rendered its decision on the title issue. It was an
unqualified victory for the Omahas and their co-petitioners.
In its "Findings of Fact," the Commission expressly 
held that title to the Cession 151 area was in fact vested 
in the Three Nations, as well as the Otoe-Missouri, at the 
time of the signing of the 1830 Treaty. It found that, by 
the pronouncements and actions of the officials conducting 
the 1830 Prairie du Chien negotiations, and by its actions 
following the execution of the treaty, the United States had
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acknowledged the use and occupancy of each of the tribes in
• 3 ftthe area in question.
The ICC also agreed with the petitioners' arguments 
regarding the interpretation of the crucially troublesome 
treaty language which purported to give the government the 
right to settle other tribes on the Cession 151 lands. The 
Commission held that the government's subsequent grant of 
land to the Potawatomi in 183 3 was contrary to the plan 
under which the tribes had been enticed to execute the 
Treaty. The area was being ceded to the government solely 
to allot it back only to those tribes whose interests were 
being acknowledged therein.
With the question of general Indian title thus 
resolved, the Commission was faced with the more difficult 
task of establishing the specific interests of each of the 
tribes in the Cession 151 area. Writing for the unanimous 
Commission, Chief Commissioner Edgar E. Witt noted, with 
justifiable regret, that the tribes' conflicting claims and 
the government's failure to abide by its promise to fix 
their respective boundaries made the problem "even more 
difficult now than it would have been at the time of the 
Treaties of 1825 or 1830."37
Witt ultimately held, however, that the evidence had 
established "with reasonable certainty" the parts of the 
Cession 151 area that had been used and occupied by each of
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the claimant tribes. The Commission therefore proceeded to 
divide Cession 151 among the claimants as follows: the Iowa
Tribe was awarded an undivided interest in that portion of 
Cession 151 "lying easterly and southerly of the watershed 
which separates the Nodaway and Nishnabotony Rivers in said 
cession and extends from the Missouri River to the easterly 
line of the cession about midway between the sources of the 
Nodaway and Nishnabotony Rivers." As to the remainder of 
the cession area, the Commission determined that the 
evidence was "not sufficient to make a division between the 
areas used by the Otoe-Missouria, Omaha, and the Sac and Fox 
tribes."38 Accordingly, it held that each of those 
claimants was entitled to "an undivided one-third interest 
thereof."39 [See Map 7].
After the usual motions for rehearing on the title 
issue had been filed and rejected, Docket 13 8 (now 
permanently consolidated with the Otoe-Missouri's claim in 
Docket 11-A) proceeded into the valuation phase. Almost 
four years later, on May 22, 19 61, a hearing commenced 
before Chief Commissioner Arthur Watkins and Associate 
Commissioners William M. Holt and T. Harold Scott to hear 
evidence on the valuation question. The evidence presented 
in this phase of the case differed significantly from the 
"battle of the appraisers" in Case 225. While the 
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MAP 7
Depicting the approximate location of the boundary line 
between the portion of the Cession 151 area assigned by the 
ICC to the Iowa Tribe, and the portion assigned to the 
Omaha, the Otoe-Missouri, and the Sac and Fox.
Source: Charles C. Royce, comp., Indian Land Cessions in
the United States. Eighteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of 
American Ethnology, Part 2 (Washington, D.C., Governmnent 
Printing Office, 1899), Plate CXXXI, "Iowa 1."
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regarding land settlement patterns, topography, climate, 
soil quality, and crop productivity in the Cession 151 area, 
none of those witnesses affixed a firm valuation to the 
land.40
The government, in contrast, again presented the 
meticulously-detailed work of appraiser William G. Murray. 
Murray presented a 374-page report in which he analyzed the 
value of the land at three different dates.41 For the 
Platte Purchase area in northwest Missouri, comprising 
2,041,000 acres, Murray assigned a value of 50 cents per 
acre as of the date of the tribes' respective cessions in 
September and October, 1836, for a total valuation of 
$1,020,500. For the western Iowa tract, comprising 
8,338,260 acres, he assigned a value of 25 cents per acre as 
of February, 1838, the date of the Iowa and Sac and Fox 
cessions of that territory. For the Omahas and Otoes, he 
used a valuation date of April 17, 1854, and assigned a 
value of 70 cents per acre. [See Figure 7].
Unlike Case 225, the Commission was never required to 
render a final decision on the question of value in Docket 
13 8. Led by the Omahas, whose pathbreaking settlement in 
Case 225 had produced the "Omaha Rule" for consideration and 
approval of compromise agreements, each of the claimant 
tribes in Dockets 138 and 11-A ultimately negotiated an 
individual settlement of their Cession 151 claims.
V A L U A T I O N
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T h i s  i s  t o  c e r t i f y  t h a t  I h . a v e  b e e n  a p p r a i s i n g  a n d  s t u d y i n g  l a n d  
v a l u e  i n  t h e  M i d - W e s t  f o r  m o r e  t h a n  t h i r t y  y e a r s ;  t h a t  I a m  f a m i l i a r  
w i t h  t h e  a r e a s  a p p r a i s e d  i n  t h i s  r e p o r t ;  t h a t  I h a v e  i n s p e c t e d  t h e  R o y c e  
1 5 1  t r a c t s  i n  M i s s o u r i  a n d  I o w a  d e s c r i b e d  i n  t h i s  a p p r a i s a l ;  t h a t  I h a v e  
s e a r c h e d  C o r  a l l  p e r t i n e n t  e v i d e n c e  b e a r i n g  o n  t h e  v  u e  o f  t h *  t r a c t s  
i n  q u e s t i o n ;  t h a t  I h a v e  c a r e f u l l y  c o n s i d e r e d ,  w e i g h  d  a n d  j u d g e d  t h e  
f a c t u a l  m a t e r i a l ;  a n d  t h a t  a s  a  r e s u l t  I a p p r a i s e  t h e  f a i r  m a r k e t  v a l u e  
o f  t h e  R o y c e  1 5 1  t r a c t s  i n  M i s s o u r i  a n d  I o w a  i n  D o c k e t s  I I - A  a n d  1 3 8  
b e f o r e  t h e  I n d i a n  C l a i m s  C o m m i s s i o n  a s  f o l l o w s :
1 .  N o r t h w e s t  M i s s o u r i , .  R o y c e  1 5 1  t r a c t  -  Z ,  0 4 1 ,  0 0 0  a c r e s
D o c k e t s ;  l l - A  a n d  1 3 8 .  T r i b e s :  I o w a >  a n d  S a c  a n d  F o x  
O m a h a ,  a n d  O t o e  a n d  M i s s o u r i a  
D a t e  o f  v a l u a t i o n :  S e p t .  1 7  a n d  2 7 ,  1 8 3 6 ,  a n d  O c t .  1 5 ,  1 3 3 6  
V a l u e ;  S i ,  0 2 0 ,  5 0 0  o r  5 0  4 a n  a c r e .
2 .  W e s t e r n  I o w a ,  R o y c e  1 5 1  t r a c t  - 8 , 3 3 8 , 2 6 0  a c r e s
D o c k e t  1 3 8 .  T r i b e s * .  l o v / a ,  a n d  S a c  a n d  F o x  
D a t e  o f  v a l u a t i o n :  F e b r u a r y  1 6 ,  1 8 3 8  
V a l u e :  $ 2 , 0 8 4 , 6 0 0  o r  2 5  4 a r * a c r e .
O n e - h a l f  i n t e r e s t  : $  1, 0 4 2 .  3 0 0
3 .  W e s t e r n  I o w a ,  R o y c e  1 5 1  t r a c t  -  8 ,  3 3 8 ,  2 6 0  a c r e s
D o c k e t s :  1 1 - A  a n d  1 3 8 .  T r i b e s :  O m a h a  a n d  O t o e  a n d
M i s s o u r i a  
D a t e  o f  v a l u a t i o n :  A p r i l  1 7 ,  1 8 5 4  
V a l u e :  $ 5 , 8 3 6 , 8 0 0  o r  7 0  4  a n  a c r e
O n e - h a l f  i n t  e  r e  s c  : $ 2 , 9 1 8 , 4 0 0
I f u r t h e r  c e r t i f y  t h a t  I h a v e  n o  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e s e  t r a c t s ;  t h a t  I 
h a v e  n o  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  o u t c o m e  o f  t h e s e  c a s e s ;  a n d  t h a t  I h a v e  
p r e s e n t e d  t o  t h e  b e s t  o f  m y  k n o w l e d g e  a n d  a b i l i t y  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  f a c t s ,  
c o n c l u s i o n s  a n d  j u d g m e n t s  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  t r a c t s  d e s c r i b e d .
W i l l i a m  G  . M u r  r a y ,  M . A . I . *
+  A  n o t e  o n  a p p r a i s a l  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  a p p r a i s e r  a p p e a r s  a t  t h e  
e n d  o f  t h e  r e p o r t .
A m e  s , I o w a  
F  e b r u a r y  1, 1 9 6 1
FIGURE 7
Summary page from William G. Murray's appraisal of the 
Cession 151 territory, admitted into evidence in ICC Dockets 
138 and 11-A
Source: ICC. Docket 11-A, "Appraisal, W. G. Murray," Card 1
of 4 .
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It is not surprising that the Omahas would have been 
the first of the Docket 138 litigants to seek and obtain a 
settlement. The tribe had received its long-awaited payment 
in Case 225 in June, 1962, just one year after the valuation 
hearing in Docket 138.42 As the 138 litigation meandered 
along with no end in sight and the Omahas realized the 
tangible benefits of their settlement in Case 225, the 
possibility of terminating their involvement in Case 138 in 
a similar manner no doubt took on increasing appeal. In the 
months following the May, 1961 valuation hearing, the 
Omahas' attorneys negotiated with government counsel in an 
effort to reach a compromise regarding the tribe's claims. 
The negotiations reached fruition in early 1964, when the 
Omahas' claims were severed from those of the other tribes, 
and the government agreed to pay the tribe $1.75 million in 
full satisfaction of its claims in Docket 138.43
With that stipulated agreement in place, the stage was
set for application of the Commission's recently-enunciated
"Omaha Rule." This provision established procedural
requirements for the approval of such compromises by both
the ICC and the tribal membership involved.44 The parties'
efforts to comply with those requirements are reflected most
vividly in the transcript of the ICC hearing conducted on
March 13, 1964, at which the Commission was asked to approve
4 5the terms of the proposed settlement.
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Appearing on behalf of the Omahas were Assistant Tribal 
Business Manager Francis Freemont, Jr. and Wilson Wolf, 
Secretary of the Council. Both men were asked to relate the 
manner in which the tribal membership had been notified of 
the proposed settlement, and the methods by which tribal 
approval had been debated and ultimately obtained. Freemont 
testified that a meeting of the Tribal Council had been 
convened on February 14, 1964, at which the tribe's attorney 
had explained the terms of the settlement in detail, to the 
unanimous satisfaction of the Council. That acceptance was 
formalized with the adoption of a Council Resolution 
approving the settlement, a copy of which was offered into 
evidence before the ICC.
Freemont further testified that the Council meeting was 
followed on the same day by a meeting of the general tribal 
membership, at which the terms of the proposed settlement 
were again explained in both English and the Omaha language. 
Freemont related the steps that had been taken to give 
notice of the meeting to the tribal members, through 
mailings, newspaper notices, and radio and television 
announcements. Minutes of that meeting were offered into 
evidence, reflecting a vote of 228 to 2 in favor of the 
settlement. Both Freemont and Wolf were repeatedly asked 
whether they felt that the tribal membership understood the 
terms of the agreement, and whether the members felt the
160
settlement was "fair and equitable." Both witnesses 
consistently answered "yes" to those questions.4^
In addition to its value as a demonstration of the 
"Omaha Rule" in operation, the settlement hearing in Docket 
138 is intriguing as an illustration of the hoped-for 
"finality" of ICC decisions, and the evolution of the 
Commission into an instrument of termination.47 The Omaha 
representatives were pointedly asked, both by counsel for 
the government and by Chief Commissioner Arthur Watkins 
himself, whether they understood that the proposed 
settlement would preclude the tribe from making "any further 
claims of any kind or purpose or nature against the United
A  Q  . . . .States." When Freemont equivocated slightly in answering 
that question, Watkins and the government's attorney took 
pains to elicit an acknowledgement from him that the time 
for filing claims under the ICC Act had expired, and that 
the tribe had no further pending claims before the 
Commission.49 A similar acknowledgement of the "finality" 
of the settlement was elicited from Wolf.50
The terminationist flavor of the settlement hearing was 
even more directly revealed in the comments of Associate 
Commissioner Scott at the conclusion of Wilson Wolf's 
testimony. After being told by the Omahas' counsel that the 
tribe intended to distribute only a portion of the
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settlement proceeds on a per capita basis, reserving the 
rest for tribal programs, Scott remarked:
That is mighty good news. It isn't our objective 
here, but there was a hope in Congress that the 
settlement [of these] claims might have some influence 
in bringing the Indians into the normal cultural 
economic pursuits of life. I mean, they are mighty 
fine people, and [we need] any program that . . .
gives them an opportunity to become assimilated in the 
formal pursuits of life.
We hope that eventually the Federal Government 
will be relieved of the present and continuing 
paternalistic burden, really I am not talking about 
finances now, but upon the approach, the Indians 
coming on out to normal life, standing on their own 
feet, and becoming leaders and members of the various 
communities throughout the country.
Wolf and Freemont did not respond to Scott's encouragement
of their future "normality."
Satisfied with the evidence of tribal consent presented 
at the hearing, the Commission entered a "Final Judgment" on 
April 14, 1964. It approved the compromise agreement and 
awarded the Omahas the sum of $1.75 million in final 
settlement for its ancestral hunting grounds east of the 
Missouri River.52 Though pleased with the result, the 
Omahas' experience in Case 22 5 made them well aware that it 
would still be some time before the money found its way to
C -J
the tribe's bank account.
Just as had been the case with the $2.9 million 
settlement in Case 225, the Omahas were forced to wait more 
than two years for the receipt of this new award. By an Act 
of June 9, 1964., Congress appropriated the $1.75 million
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necessary to cover the Omaha judgment.54 Those funds were
deposited into the U. S. Treasury to the credit of the
tribe, to be held in escrow with interest at 4% per annum,
pending the preparation and approval of a plan for their
distribution and use. On April 19, 1965, the Tribal Council
approved a plan which, like the 1962 design, called for per
capita payments of a portion of the judgment fund, reserving
the balance for tribal economic development programs.55
On August 25, 1966, Assistant Secretary of the Interior
Harry R. Anderson submitted a report on the Omaha situation
to the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
which was considering a pending bill for disposition of the
Omaha judgment fund.56 Anderson's report provides an
evaluation of the tribe's proposed distribution of the award
in Case 138, and a revealing assessment of the Omahas' use
of the funds awarded four years earlier in Case 22 5:
In general, the membership of the Omaha Tribal Council 
has shown considerable sophistication in the 
management of tribal affairs during recent years. The 
experiences of the Council in the handling of programs 
established for the use of the previous judgment award 
has proven a valuable one and a number of tribal 
leaders show excellent leadership qualities. . . . The
Omaha Tribe has made excellent use of most of the 
judgment funds awarded in 1960. . . .  In general, it is
our feeling that the Omaha tribal members have gained 
much valuable experience in the handling of their 
previous award which will benefit the program 
development of the present award.
Anderson's report detailed many of the social,
educational, and economic development programs funded by the
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award in Case 225, and concluded that the similarly proposed 
distribution plan for the Case 138 fund should be
CO
approved. ° [See Figure 8]. Despite the generally
favorable tone of Anderson's evaluation, he stopped well
short of recommending that the Omahas be given total
autonomy in the use of their new judgment fund, and he made
it clear that the Omahas' success in the management of the
1962 ICC award did not mean the tribe was ready for
termination from its federal connection:
Despite the local activities stimulated by the use of 
the past judgment fund a great deal remains to be 
accomplished in terms of economic opportunities for the 
Omaha people. As was pointed out previously, the 
unemployment level and resultant welfare caseloads are 
extremely high. . . . Despite the forward strides being
made it is our feeling that there must be additional 
time allowed for the tribe to gain the knowledge and 
experience which is vital and essential in the 
administration of complex tribal affairs. These 
qualities in the tribe must be assured before exclusive 
supervision and control of the tribal estate can be 
transferred to the tribe with confidence. . . 59
On November 2, 1966, President Lyndon Johnson signed
Public Law 89-717, authorizing the distribution of the Omaha
judgment fund, as proposed by the Tribe and approved by
Congress.60 Seven anxious weeks later, on December 23,
611966, each adult tribal member received a check for $270.
As with the 1962 award, payments apportioned to minors were 
placed in a trust account for future educational purposes. 
Shares were paid to 2,660 certified members, 1,279 of whom 
resided on the reservation.62 Not surprisingly, a portion
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FIGURE 8
Schedule of income and expenditures for the Omaha Tribe, 
fiscal year 1965-66, reflecting prior use of 1962 ICC 
judgment distribution and anticipated use of 1966 judgment.
Source: U.S. Congress, "Providing for the Disposition of
Funds Appropriated to Pav a Judgment in Favor of the Omaha 
Tribe, 1 S. Report 1683, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 1966, 
Exhibit D. [ser. set 12710-5].
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of the money was used for Christmas shopping, but most 
Omahas reported that their shares wont toward rent, 
groceries, clothing, and other necessities. One tribal 
official observed to a reporter, "You'll know when the 
checks arrive. The vultures [bill collectors] will be here 
first."63
While this additional ICC award was a gratifying and 
much-needed addition to tribal coffers, it also reignited 
many of the same intratribal controversies that had been 
smoldering since the 1962 ICC distribution. In the months 
leading up to the December, 1966 distribution, an off- 
reservation faction led by Clarence White and Arthur 
Springer organized itself as the "Land and Resources
. . ADevelopment Association." The group leveled a series of 
public charges against the tribal leadership, accusing the 
Council of establishing a "dictatorship" that discriminated 
against off-reservation members and ignored their plight in 
the urban settings of Omaha, Lincoln, and Sioux City.65 The 
Tribal Council, chaired once again by Alfred Gilpin 
responded to the accusations with an ostensibly sympathetic 
ear, but claimed that the tribe's ability to assist the off- 
reservation members was severely limited by BIA
regulations.66 Winnebago Agency Superintendent Alfred
6  7DuBray confirmed Gilpin's assertions.
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The tension between the on and off-reservation factions 
would plague the tribe for years, resulting in sporadic 
intra-tribal political and legal upheavals following the 
final ICC distribution in 1966.68 To a significant extent, 
those differences remain a problem within the tribe to this 
day, as some off-reservation members feel a continuing sense 
of isolation from the decision-making process. Ed Zendejas, 
an attorney and tribal member who lives off the reservation, 
recently voiced that frustration, asserting that "once you 
- leave the reservation, you're ignored with respect to the
CQ
use of tribal revenues." That exclusion is grounded m  
the language of Article V, section 1 of the Omaha Tribal
Constitution, which provides that only members who reside on
• • • 7 nthe reservation may vote in Tribal Council elections.
Zendejas proposes that the tribe issue "ownership share
certificates," comparable to corporate stock, to all
enrolled members, whether they lived on or off the
reservation. Holders of certificates would be entitled to
vote on a "Board of Directors," which would control tribal
revenues in conjunction with the separately-elected
Council.71 It is uncertain when or if such a proposal might
be acted upon by the Council,
While those types of negative repercussions of the ICC
awards should not be minimized, it seems difficult to
dispute the conclusion that the ICC experience was a
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valuable one for the Omaha Tribe. The funds generated by 
the two Commission judgments were, by and large, put to 
beneficial use by both the individual members and the tribe 
at large. The educational, economic, and social improvement 
projects funded by the Commission awards almost certainly 
would not have been possible without the ICC litigation. 
While it is a legal truism that "justice delayed is justice 
denied," it may be argued with equal force in the Omahas' 
case that "justice delayed is better than no justice at 
all."
Perhaps just as significantly, the successful 
resolution of the tribe's ICC litigation may have given it 
valuable insight into the rewards available to it on the 
judicial battleground. Even as it celebrated its 1966 ICC 
award in the new community building paid for by its 1962 
judgment, the tribe was setting its sights on an even more 
ambitious legal fight. This would be a struggle in which 
the Omahas would seek not merely monetary compensation for 
past injustices, but the actual reacquisition of land that 
the tribe felt still belonged to it.72 The Battle of 
Blackbird Bend loomed on the horizon.
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CHAPTER 5
"THE RIVER WILL RUN RED."
* * * *
THE BATTLE OF BLACKBIRD BEND 
1966 - 1995
Buoyed by the success of its claims before the Indian 
Claims Commission, the Omaha Tribe soon turned its attention 
to an even more ambitious legal battle. Beginning in 1966, 
the Omahas sought to regain possession of more than 11,000 
acres situated east of the Missouri River, which the tribe 
claimed had been a part of its reservation before changes in 
the river channel moved the land to the Iowa side. The 
ensuing judicial odyssey would span almost thirty years, and 
would become so emotionally charged and legally complex that 
it would make the tribe's ICC claims seem almost mundane by 
comparison.
The results of the Iowa land claims battle, which became 
known as the "Blackbird Bend litigation," cannot be captured 
in simple terms of a legal "victory" or "defeat." While at 
first glance the twelve published court decisions seem to 
indicate that the Omahas succeeded in their quest fur the 
return of their land, the tribe was, in fact, bitterly 
disappointed with the final outcome of the litigation. The
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Omahas ultimately obtained title to only a small portion of 
the total acreage they claimed, and they felt that they were 
the victims of fraud by the federal judiciary and the 
Department of Justice throughout the proceedings.
Yet the Omahas' opponents could not be wholly satisfied 
with the legal outcome either. For the white farmers in 
Iowa who had asserted title to the land prior to the 
litigation, the loss of even a single acre was a bitter pill 
to swallow. Even those Iowans whose title to the property 
was ultimately upheld by the courts incurrred substantial 
legal expense and endured years of uncertainty as the cases 
made their way through the court system. .
The Blackbird Bend litigation has received substantial 
attention in both the academic and popular press, and it is 
a subject of national import on several levels. In its most 
"technical" aspects, the Blackbird Bend proceedings produced 
significant judicial statements on the arcane subject of 
riparian landowners' rights, as those rights are affected by 
the complex geological actions known as "accretion" and 
"avulsion."1 In addition, the Blackbird Bend cases required 
the courts to interpret and apply a federal statute adopted 
in 1834 which gave a clear judicial preference to Indian 
claimants in any boundary disputes with "white persons."
That statute had never previously been invoked or 
interpreted by the courts, and its constitutionality and
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applicability to the Blackbird Bend dispute became the 
subject of substantial debate, both among the parties and in 
the academic press.
On another level, the Blackbird Bend litigation 
provides valuable insight into the often-overlooked "human" 
dimensions of legal issues relating to land ownership. Both 
the Omahas and the Iowans pursued their claims with a dogged 
determination that occasionally approached violence, 
offering stark evidence of the deep emotional bonds that tie 
persons to the lands of their ancestors. That emotionalism 
grew stronger as the litigation weaved its way through the 
court system, belying the staid legal concepts at issue in 
the cases.
Blackbird Bend also offers another opportunity to 
examine the "localized" impact of federal Indian policy, 
this time in the context of the federal government's 
paternalistic role as the continuing "trustee" of Indian 
lands.4 The court documents, transcripts, and other records 
pertaining to the litigation reveal an extremely 
antagonistic relationship between the Omahas and the 
government attorneys who were bound by law to act on the 
tribe's behalf. Throughout the proceedings, the Omahas 
found themselves "represented" by officials who did not 
share their view of the facts or law, and whose "assistance" 
the tribe would have much preferred to do without. Those
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conflicts are not readily apparent in the published judicial 
decisions rendered in the Dlackbird Bend cases, nor were 
they significantly discussed in the contemporary news 
accounts or academic analysis of the proceedings. For the 
Omahas, however, they were every bit as much a part of the 
Blackbird Bend story as the decisions themselves.
Although actual litigation would not commence until 
1975, the Omahas began giving formal notice of their claims 
to the Blackbird Bend area as early as 1966. In February of 
that year, Tribal Chairman Alfred Gilpin first indicated 
that the Omahas had "staked their claim" to the Iowa land 
with Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) officials, and that 
"action was pending" on the matter.5 The tribe's stated 
objective was to gain "official recognition" of the land as 
a part of the Omaha Reservation. That initial claim 
encompassed three full sections and parts of three others, 
as the area was then platted by the State of Iowa. [See Map 
8 ] .
From the beginning of the dispute, the Omahas' claims 
were grounded in the language of their seminal 1854 Treaty, 
in which they ceded the remainder of their traditional 
hunting grounds on both sides of the Missouri River for a
g
300,000 acre reservation in northeastern Nebraska. The 
precise acreage set aside for the Omaha Reservation was not 
formally established until 1867, when the boundaries were
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MAP 8
Depicting the Blackbird Bend meander lobe and the 
Missouri River channel at various times relevant to the 
Omahas' claims. This is one of the earliest and 
clearest of the published maps showing the area.
Source: Omaha World-Herald. February 11, 1966.
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surveyed for the General Land Office by T. H. Barrett.7 The
"Barrett Survey" established the eastern boundary of the
reservation as the "centre" of the Missouri River's main 
8 •channel. At the time of the survey, the reservation 
acreage included a thumb-like "meander lobe," or peninsula, 
jutting east from Nebraska into Iowa and known as "Blackbird 
Bend." [See Map 9], Over the next seventy years, until the 
river channel was stabilized by the Corps of Engineers in 
the 194 0s, the river would move back and forth over the 
Blackbird Bend lands, ultimately "straightening" itself to 
the west and south and leaving the Blackbird Bend lobe on 
the Iowa side of the river. Because that land was cut off 
from the remainder of the reservation, non-Indians in Iowa 
gradually took control of the property.
In asserting its claim to those Iowa lands, the Omaha 
Tribe was about to be swept up into another judicial 
maelstrom —  one that would weave an incredibly complex 
trail through the federal court system over a period of 
almost twenty years. In addition to the Supreme Court's 
review of the dispute, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
would address the case on seven separate occasions, and the 
Federal District Court for the Northern District of Iowa 
would render four separate published opinions in the cases. 
As with the Omahas' ICC claims, the Blackbird Bend 
litigation would yield only a partial redemption of the
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A later depiction of the Blackbird Bend area
Source: Daniel Henry Ehrlich, "Problems Arising From Shifts 
of the Missouri River on the Eastern Border of Nebraska,1' 
Nebraska History, 54 (Fall 1973): 361.
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tribes' historic claims, but would create far-ranging 
consequences for the tribe's future.
The Omahas' "notice" to the BIA in early 1966 produced 
no immediate results. In December of that year, the tribe 
announced that the matter was "in the hands of their
attorneys" for the possible filing of a lawsuit to reclaim
i n .  . . .the land. u Despite that hint of immediate action, the
issue lingered for several more years, while the tribe
conferred with BIA officials and Interior Department
attorneys regarding the details and merits of their claim.11
In August, 1972, Nebraska Senators Roman Hruska and 
Carl Curtis, and Representative Charles Thone delivered a 
letter to Indian Commissioner Louis Bruce, asking the BIA to 
allocate $50,000 to help settle the simmering boundary 
dispute along the river. Bruce was advised that the Omaha 
and Winnebago Tribes claimed as much as 9,000 acres on the 
Iowa side of the river, which was "being used for private 
gain by Iowa farmers and the state government."13 Before 
the BIA's bureaucratic machinery plodded into action, 
however, the burgeoning spirit of Indian political activism 
that swept the United States in the early 1970s found its 
way to the Omaha Reservation, bringing the Blackbird Bend 
dispute to a potentially dangerous head.
On April 3, 1973, twelve carloads of Omaha Indians 
moved onto a portion of the Blackbird Bend lands in Monona
182
County, Iowa. Led by former (and future) Tribal Chairman 
Edward Cline, the "occupying force" pitched several teepees 
and tents on the site, announcing their intention to remain 
camped on the land indefinitely, and to farm it for tribal 
benefit.14 [See Figures 9 - 12]. Most of the group
identified themselves as members of the American Indian
Movement (AIM), an organization that had achieved nationwide 
notoriety in the preceeding years as an aggressive 
instrument for the advocacy of Indian rights. Indeed, the 
- AIM-backed occupation of Blackbird Bend followed closely on
the heels of the group's most renowned action —  the Indian
occupation and subsequent government siege of the village of 
Wounded Knee on the Pine Ridge Sioux Reservation in South 
Dakota.15
With the violence at Wounded Knee fresh in everyone's 
mind, both Indians and white officials expressed hope that 
Blackbird Bend "would not turn into another Wounded Knee."16 
Tensions ran high, as Cline informed authorities that the 
Omahas, although unarmed, would resist efforts to remove 
them from the land. Two days after the occupation began, 
the Indians met at the site with a group of attorneys 
representing the purported "owners" of the land. The thirty 
minute conference resulted in no appreciable change in the 
parties' positions. The attorneys maintained that their 
clients had obtained title to the land through several
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FIGURE 9
Photo and caption from Sioux City Journal. April 6, 1973.
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Photo and caption from Sioux City Journal, April 6, 1973.
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Indians Near Onaiva
T h i s  is p a r t  of  the g r o u p  o f  2 0  O m a h a  Ind ians  
f r o m  M a c y ,  iNeb.,  w ho  have  o c c u p ie d  a tlract of  
r i v e r f r o n t  f a r m l a n d  across the M i s s o u r i  Riv’er near  
O n a w a ,  I o w a .  A few are y o u n g  peo p le ,  app arent ly  
h e a r i n g  o u t  a r e p o r t  by O m a h a  t r i b a l  counc i l  vice
c h a i r m a n  W a y n e  T y n d a l l ,  who  said he had  hear d  
some  o f  the g ro up  were “ y o u n g  peop le  who should  
he in sc hoo l . ”  T h e  t r i b a l  co unc i l  says it has not  
au t h o r i z e d  the o c c u p a t i o n .  ( P h ot o s  by Por te r ,  staf f  
p h o t o g r a p h e r )
FIGURE 11
Photo and caption from Sioux City Journal, April 6, -9'3.
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Leader Explains
E d w a r d  C l i n e ,  fac ing  ca m e ra ,  e x p l a in s  why  he led a g r o u p  o f  about  2 0  
m e m b e r s  o f  th e  O m a h a  I n d i a n  T r i b e  o f  M a c y ,  Neb. ,  in o c c u p y i n g  a tract  of  
disputed r i v e r f r o n t  l a n d  on the Iow a  s ide o f  the Missour i  R i v e r  n e a r  O n a w a .  He  
said all a re  m e m b e r s  o f  the A m e r i c a n  I n d i a n  M o v e m e n t  who  i n t e n d  to sett le the 
l and because the  O m a h a s  c la im  the la n d  u n d e r  an 1 8 5 4  t reaty.
FIGURE 12
Photo and caption from Sioux City Journal, April 6, 1973
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"quiet title" actions prosecuted in the Iowa state courts in 
previous years.17 Cline and the other Omahas argued that 
those decisions had no effect on the tribe's ownership of 
the land since the Omahas had not been named as an 
interested party in the suit, and the Iowa courts had no 
jurisdiction over an Indian reservation. The occupiers also 
told reporters that they would "defend our land the way you 
would defend your home," and blamed the federal government 
for failing to protect the tribe's interests when the land 
had been slipping into white control.18
Several weeks later, Cline and two other men involved 
in the occupation were arrested on larceny charges by the 
Monona County Sheriff's Department. The arrests stemmed 
from the men's picking corn that was growing on the disputed 
land, and which had been planted by the Iowa "owners."19 
While the other two men were released routinely on bond, 
Cline chose to remain in jail, and was released five days 
later after a preliminary hearing. The charges against the 
men were referred to the Monona County grand jury to
O A
determine whether indictments were warranted. w
While those criminal proceedings were pending, one of 
the white claimants, Harold Jackson, initiated a civil 
action against Cline and the other occupying Indians to try
to regain possession of the land. The matter was heard on
2 1May 7 by Monona County District Judge Donald Pendleton.
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Nine days later, Pendleton issued an order requiring Cline 
and the other Omahas to vacate the land, pending further 
hearings on the question of actual ownership of the 
property.22 This opening skirmish in the Battle of 
Blackbird Bend quickly subsided as Cline and his compatriots 
left the property before Monona County Sheriff Albert Wood 
arrived to formally serve them with Pendleton's order.23
It is apparent that the Omahas were not sufficiently 
funded or unified to sustain this initial 1973 occupation of 
the Blackbird Bend lands. Because the AIM-sponsored action 
was not endorsed by the Omaha Tribal Council, Cline and the 
other AIM members were forced to look elsewhere for 
financial assistance.24 When that effort failed, the 
occupiers retreated, but they remained committed to the goal 
of gaining the disputed lands.
Meanwhile, the BIA, which had been asked to address the 
matter more than seven years earlier, finally lurched into 
limited action. Wyman Babby, Aberdeen Area Director for the 
BIA, requested a formal opinion on the question of title 
from the Solicitor of the Department of Interior.25 With 
the issuance of that opinion in February, 1975, and a change 
in the leadership of the Tribal Council during the interim, 
the stage was set for the Omahas to return to Blackbird 
Bend.
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On April 2, 197 5, members of the tribe re-occupied the 
Blackbird Bend lands. Several key elements distinguished 
this effort from the short-lived 1973 sit-in. First and 
most significantly, the 1975 occupation was fully endorsed 
by the Omaha Tribal Council, which was now chaired by the 
leader of the failed 1973 action, Edward Cline. Whatever 
AIM presence may have remained from 1973 was no longer 
visible in 1975, and the tribe presented a unified and 
cohesive front in asserting its right to the land.26 Signs 
were erected around the property reading "Boundary line 
Omaha Indian Reservation. No trespassing. Federal law 
prohibits damage or removal of this sign. Violators will be
, . 9 7  .prosecuted. Omaha Tribal Council.11^ The occupiers 
constructed a small heated cottage on the property and 
prepared for a long stay. [See Figure 13].
The 1975 occupation was also directly supported by BIA 
officials, buttressed by the long-awaited Interior 
Department opinion in which the federal government formally
O  Q  .
asserted Indian title to the property. That opinion, 
authored by Interior Department Solicitor Kent Frizzell, 
declared that the disputed lands had been a part of the
Omaha Indian Reservation since 1854, and that title should
2 9be vested in the United States as trustee for the tribe. 
Based on that opinion, BIA attorney Herbert Becker publicly 
reiterated the Omahas' original argument that the earlier
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FIGURE 13
Depicting the Omahas' April, 1975 
re-occupation of Blackbird Bend
Photo and caption from Omaha World-Herald. April 8, 1975
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"quiet title" actions in the Iowa state courts had not 
resolved the question of title to the property, since 
neither the Omahas nor the federal government had been named 
as parties in that suit.30 Beyond Frizzell's assertion of 
Indian title to the property, however, there was little 
agreement between the Omahas and the federal government on 
any other issue relating to the Blackbird Bend dispute. 
Indeed, from that point on, the tribe would find itself 
spending nearly as much time battling its purported 
governmental "representatives" as it would in fighting the 
purported Iowa "owners" of the land.
The BIA's initial proposal for solving the Blackbird 
Bend problem was for the Iowa claimants to simply lease the 
land from the federal government as trustee for the tribe, 
and to continue to farm it as they had been doing during the 
previous decades. Not surprisingly, this proposal held 
little appeal for either the Omahas or the Iowa farmers.
The Omahas did not want to lease to the Iowa claimants,
since the tribe's constitution mandated that tribal members
. . .  • 31be given first priority m  the awarding of leases. For
their part, the Iowans expressed little interest in renting
3  2land that they believed they had owned for generations.
Even if the Omahas had been amenable to the BIA's 
leasing proposal, significant disagreements remained over 
the specific mariner in which Omaha title to the property
192
would be formally established. BIA attorneys advised the 
Omahas that court action would be required to fully 
establish the tribe's ownership. They reasoned, with 
substantial logic, that the Iowa claimants would not agree 
to being ousted without first having their day in court.33 
Having waited almost ten years for the government to take 
action on their claims, however, the Omahas were in no mood 
to wait for the courts to grind their way to a decision in 
the case.
In a meeting with BIA Commissioner Morris Thompson and 
Interior Department attorneys shortly after the 1975 
occupation began, Edward Cline and other tribal officials 
resisted the attorneys' efforts to convince them to vacate 
the land while the government prosecuted an action on the 
tribe's behalf. Cline asked, "Why can't we go ahead and 
make like we own it? We're not going to hassle these 
people. But we are prepared to defend ourselves."34 
Acknowleging that the BIA should have resolved the matter 
years earlier, but also believing that violence and 
bloodshed were imminent, Interior Department Solicitor Kent 
Frizzell begged the Omahas to leave the property and give 
him a chance to fight their battle in court "with clean 
hands."35 Cline reluctantly agreed to discuss Frizzell's 
recommendations with the full tribal membership, but the
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Omahas did not move off the property, and even bigger 
disagreements with the government attorneys loomed.
On May 19, 197 5, the U.S. Department of Justice, acting 
in the capacity of trustee for the Omaha Tribe, filed suit 
in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Iowa 
seeking to establish that approximately 2,900 acres within 
the original Barrett Survey of the Blackbird Bend meander 
lobe belonged to the Omaha Tribe.36 In its complaint, 
docketed as Case No. C75-4024, the government also asked for 
immediate injunctive relief allowing the tribe to maintain 
control of the land it had occupied since April 2.
The Omahas were outraged by the unilateral action taken 
by their purported "trustee." The tribe viewed the 
government's claim as precipitous and unduly "constricted," 
asserting Omaha title to only a fraction of the total 
acreage that the tribe felt it owned. More grievously, the 
Omahas believed that the Department of Justice attorneys 
were acting in concert with Iowa state officials and the 
"politically and financially powerful squatters occupying 
the Tribe's lands" to defraud the tribe.37
Kent Frizzell defended the government's action as a 
legitimate attempt to forestall violence and bloodshed at 
Blackbird Bend.38 In a letter to Cline, Frizzell wrote:
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I can appreciate the tribes's justifiable frustration 
after 40 years of trying to secure department support 
for for its title claim. I cannot be responsible for, 
nor can I justify, past inaction. By the same token, I 
cannot rectify the consequences of that action 
overnight. Courts exist so as to settle controversies 
in an orderly fashion. The alternative to such 
settlement is too often bloodshed. 0
On the day after the government filed its "quiet title" 
action in Case 4024, the tribe filed a complaint of its own, 
prepared by private counsel John T. O'Brien of Sioux City, 
Iowa, asking that the Iowa claimants be restrained from 
interfering with the tribe's possession of'the land.40 That 
suit, docketed as Case No. C75-4026, did not seek to "quiet 
title" to any of the disputed land, because the Omahas did 
not feel that all the preparation had yet been completed to 
conclusively establish their ownership of all the land. 
Rather, the tribe sought only to maintain its occupancy of 
the land and, more importantly, to serve notice of the 
Omahas' strong opposition to the "constricted" complaint 
filed on their "behalf" by the federal government on the 
previous day.41
Two weeks later, the Omahas filed a motion to dismiss 
the government's complaint in Case 4 024, arguing that the 
tribe's interests were not being adequately represented in 
that proceeding.42 In a tribal resolution attached to the 
motion, the Omahas contended that they had been "grossly and 
completely abandoned by the Department of Justice," and that 
the Attorney General and Secretary of the Interior had
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breached their trust responsibilities by secretly acting in 
concert with the Iowa claimants.43
The Indians argued that the U.S. attorneys who 
prepared, filed, and prosecuted the complaint in Case 4024 
had limited the tribe's claim to only 2,900 of the total 
6,390 acres within the Blackbird Bend lobe, and had 
completely abandoned the Omahas' claim to approximately 
5,000 additional acres in two areas north of Blackbird Bend, 
known as the Monona Bend and Omaha Mission Bend tracts.44
. The Omahas' anger was exacerbated by the fact that the 
United States Attorney who filed the complaint in Case 4024, 
Evan L. Hultman, had previously served as Attorney General 
for the State of Iowa. In that capacity, Hultman had 
represented the state in earlier disputes with the current 
Iowa claimants of the Blackbird Bend area. That litigation 
had been settled by dividing the Blackbird Bend lobe among 
the non-Indian claimants and the state, with the result that 
the State of Iowa itself now claimed title to about 700
A C
acres of the land sought by the Omahas.
On June 5, 1975, Federal District Judge Edward J. 
McManus consolidated the two cases for hearing on the 
requests for injuctive relief, and granted the Omahas a 
preliminary injuction allowing them to continue their 
occupancy of the land during the pendency of the litigation. 
McManus' order also required, however, that all proceeds
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from the tribe's farming operations on the land be deposited 
with the court and held in escrow until title to the 
property could be determined.46
Several weeks later, Judge McManus denied the Omahas' 
motion to dismiss the government's complaint, holding that 
the tribe's arguments regarding United States Attorney 
Hultman's conflict of interest were "without merit at this 
time."47 The Omahas viewed this as simply another example 
of the governmental conspiracy against them, inasmuch as 
McManus had been the Lieutenant Governor of Iowa at the time 
of the earlier intra-state litigation regarding the 
Blackbird Bend lands, and was thus well aware of Hultman's 
prior connection to the case. Over the ensuing years, the 
federal courts would repeatedly reject the tribe's 
continuing allegations of fraud and conspiracy among the 
government attorneys, often imposing sanctions on the tribe 
for repeatedly raising what the courts deemed to be
A O
"frivolous" claims. ° Nevertheless, the fraud charges would 
resonate throughout the extended course of the litigation, 
creating a disturbing atmosphere of hostility that would 
ultimately contribute to the dismissal of the tribe's claims 
for most of the lands it sought.
By October, 1975, the Omahas had completed the 
preparation of their claim for all the Iowa land to which 
they felt entitied. On October 6, attorney John T. O'Brien
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filed the tribe's second independent complaint in the 
Blackbird Bend proceedings. In the new action, docketed as 
Case No. C75-4067, the Omahas named nearly 100 separate Iowa 
landowners as defendants, and asserted title to three 
separate tracts of land totaling 11,300 acres on the eastern
4 9 .side of the river. 7 Tract One encompassed an additional 
3,490 acres within the Blackbird Bend meander lobe (in 
addition to the 2,900 acres within the Barrett Survey 
claimed for the tribe in the government's suit). [See Map 
10]. Tract Two was the "Monona Bend" area located north of 
Blackbird Bend, comprising 4,185 acres. Tract Three was a 
72 5 acre parcel farther to the north known as "Omaha Mission 
Bend." [See Map 11]. In addition, the tribe's complaint 
asked for damages in the amount of $50 million for the 
defendants' wrongful use of the land over the previous fifty 
years, in contrast to the government's complaint for the 
Omahas which sought no monetary relief.
As the dozens of Iowans named in the Omahas' complaint 
were served with court notices in the case, tensions rose 
again. Some of the defendants joined forces to hire former 
Iowa Congressman Wiley Mayne as their attorney, and all 
expressed a common resolve to fight for the land they had 
farmed for generations. One of the named defendants, Mrs. 
Howard Miller, voiced a common sentiment:
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MAP 10
Depicting the additional acreage within the Blackbird Bend 
lobe, but outside the Barrett Survey, claimed by the Omahas 
in Case 4067. The government's complaint on "behalf" of the 
tribe in Case 4024 sought only the area within the Barrett 
Survey line.
Source: "Motion of Omaha Indian Tribe To Have Disqualified
and To Enjoin Evan L. Hultman, United States Attorney," 
November 7, 1985, Case Nos. C75-4024, C75-4026, and C75-4067 
consolidated, Federal District Court For Northern District 
of Iowa, Western Division.
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MAP 11
Depicting all the additional acreage sought by the Omaha 
Tribe in Case 4067.
Source: Appendix prepared for United States Supreme Court,
Case Numbers 78-160, 78-161 consolidated, p. 148.
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My dad bought this land from the man who homesteaded 
it. He bought that land, we have title to it and we're 
not giving it up."50
Mayne counseled his clients to refrain from resorting to
"self-help" measures in defense of their land, despite their
understandable shock and anger at being told that they were
not rightfully entitled to their property.5^
The Omahas responded to the Iowans' resentment with
equal indignation, publicly asserting that those who were
now complaining about the tribe's claim had known for years
that the land belonged to the tribe, and had been merely
"squatting on the land for the last fifty years."52
Attorney John O'Brien defended his clients to reporters,
stating:
A great number of people who live there [in Monona
County] took over the land when the Missouri was a
wild river. They ran people off it and claimed it for
their own when it was really Indian land. . . . You're
going to hear they [the Omahas] are no-good, lazy 
devils. But they're hard working people trying to get 
ahead like anyone else.
Edward Cline reported that shots had been fired at the 
Omahas who were occupying the land, but that "authorities 
had failed to take action."54 Despite those hostilities, 
Cline expressed sympathy for the Iowans who were going to 
lose land to the Omahas. He pointed out, however, that the 
fault lay not with the Indians, but rather with the Iowans' 
attorneys who had failed to warn them of the potential 
problems with their title at the time they purportedly 
acquired the land.
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On January 26, 197 6, Judge McManus granted a motion 
filed by the Omahas seeking to have the three pending cases 
consolidated for trial.56 In so doing, he placed in issue 
the title to all the Iowa land claimed by the Omahas, 
thereby effectively overriding the the government's 
"constricted" complaint filed on the Omaha's behalf. Three 
months later, however, Judge McManus reversed course. On 
April 5, 1976, he entered a new order in which he held that 
the tribe's allegations in Case 4067 were "hindering an 
orderly and efficient administration of justice."57 McManus 
therefore severed the Omaha's claims for the additional 
acreage outside the "Barrett Survey Area" in Blackbird Bend, 
and their claims for the lands at Monona Bend and Omaha 
Mission Bend. The net effect of the April 5 order was to 
cause the case to proceed to trial on the "constricted" 
complaint originally filed by the government, leaving the 
Omahas' claims for the much larger additional areas "on 
hold" for more than eight years.58 While the severance 
order may have been grounded in legitimate procedural 
concerns, to the Omahas it signaled a judicial "sell-out" of
their claims, and offered further evidence of a continuing
6  9governmental conspiracy.
The case proceeded to trial before Judge Andrew W.
Bogue on the issue of title to the 2,900 acres within the 
Barrett Survey.* From November 1 to December 6, 1976, the
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parties presented voluminous and complex expert testimony 
and scores of maps, charts and other documentary evidence in 
seeking to establish the precise nature of the meanderings 
of the Missouri River from 1867 until the 1940s.60
From a purely legal perspective, the dispositive issue 
before the court became relatively straightforward. Under 
centuries-old principles of riparian property law, land that 
is moved to the opposite side of a river by reason of an 
"avulsion" remains the property of the original landowner. 
Courts have traditionally defined an avulsion as the sudden 
and clearly perceptible shift of identifiable land from one 
side of a river to the other. If, on the other hand, a 
river's current causes land on one side of the river to 
gradually erode away and slowly "re-emerge" by sedimentary 
action on the opposite side, the newly created land is 
considered an "accretion" to the property of the owner on 
that side of the river.61 At Blackbird Bend, therefore, the 
Omahas generally argued that their land had been shifted to 
the Iowa side by avulsion, while the Iowans claimed that the 
operative geologic forces had been those of erosion and 
accretion.62
While the relevant legal doctrines could thus be 
succinctly stated, the application of those principles to 
the movements of the Missouri River in the Blackbird Bend 
area from the 1860s to the 1940s was not nearly as clear-
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cut. A full examination of the massive amounts of evidence 
offered by the parties relating to the movements of the 
river is beyond the scope of this chapter, and is best 
presented in Judge Bogue's painstakingly-detailed analysis 
contained in his published decisions in the case.63 The 
difficulty of the court's task is reflected in dicta offered 
by the judge within his opinion:
The events which the court is obliged to 
reconstruct occurred long ago and they were events of 
nature; so far as we know these events were not 
observed in their entirety by any person who could 
today be a witness concerning them. . . .  In the 
process of pulling together the extensive and 
complicated evidence presented in this case, it becomes 
apparent that the movements of the Missouri River have 
not been so clean and precise that they easily fall 
into legal categories conveyed by the terms "accretion" 
and "avulsion.1,64
Despite those misgivings, Judge Bogue ruled in favor of 
the Iowa landowners on May 2, 1977. He held that the Omahas 
had failed to sustain their burden of proving that the 
Blackbird Bend area had been detached from their reservation 
and re-deposited on the Iowa side of the river, consistent 
with the theory of avulsion. Accordingly, he awarded title 
to all of the disputed land within the Barrett Survey to the 
Iowa defendants, and ordered that the funds generated by the 
Omahas' farming operations during the previous two years be 
paid to them as well.65
The continuing emotional and moral complexity of the 
dispute was reflected in a supplemental letter from the
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court delivered at the time of the decision. In the letter, 
Judge Bogue took the unusual step of revealing his personal 
feelings about the equities of the case. He wrote of his 
"distaste for the laws of avulsion and accretion which have 
brought about this seemingly unfair result," and criticized 
the original creators of the reservation for failing to 
define the boundaries "by degrees of longitude and latitude 
or some other permanent type of description." Bogue went on 
to declare that Blackbird Bend "should have remained the 
property of the Tribe for evermore no matter whether it was 
under water or divided in whole or in part by water, and no 
matter how it got that way." He concluded by suggesting 
that "the least that should be done is for the Congress to 
reimburse the Tribe for its loss. If this Court had the 
power to order such payment, you can rest assured it would 
be done."66
The District Court's "personal" sentiments did little 
to appease the Omahas. Incensed by the decision, they vowed 
to remain on the land despite the court's dissolving of the 
June 5, 1975 injunction which had given the tribe temporary 
possession. When Monona County Sheriff Albert Wood and 
County Attorney Stephen Allen served the "occupying" Omahas 
with a court order to vacate the property, Edward Cline told 
them that their attorneys were in the process of appealing 
the District Court's decision, and that the tribe would not
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comply.67 .As county officials began to "organize a force to 
remove the Indians as expeditiously as possible," the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals stepped in, issuing a temporary 
stay of Judge Bogue's decision.68 That temporary order was 
subsequently extended so as to allow the tribe to remain in 
possession of the land throughout the continuing 
litigation.69
On April 11, 1978, the Court of Appeals reversed the 
district court's decision, and ordered that title to the 
land be vested in the Omaha Tribe and the United States as 
trustee.70 Like Judge Bogue's opinion in the district 
court, the 8th Circuit's published decision contains a 
comprehensive analysis of both the voluminous evidence 
presented in the trial of the case, and the complex 
principles of law applicable to those facts. Although the 
appellate court disagreed with certain portions of Judge 
Bogue^s analysis regarding the defining characteristics of 
"avulsion" and "accretion," the more fundamental basis for 
its reversal of the lower court's decision was less 
esoteric. Writing for a unanimous three-judge panel, Judge 
Donald Lay held that the district court had improperly 
placed the burden of proof on the Omahas. Lay cited a 
rarely-invoked federal statute enacted in 1834, which 
provides:
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In all trials about the right of property in which an 
Indian may be a party on one side, and a white person 
on the other, the burden of proof shall rest upon the 
white person, whenever the Indian shall make out a 
presumption of title in himself from the fact of 
previous possession or ownership, (emphasis added).71
Judge Lay held that the 1854 Treaty established the Omahas'
"previous possession and ownership" of the land within the
original Barrett Survey. Thus, under the statute, the tribe
was entitled to a presumption of title in its favor, and the
burden of proof fell on the Iowans to establish that the
land had been entirely eroded away from the reservation and
7  7accreted to the opposite side.
After an exhaustive analysis of the massive trial 
record, this time in the context of the reallocated burden 
of proof, the Circuit Court ultimately held that the Iowa 
claimants had established "only speculative inferences" as 
to whether the river channel had moved as a result of
• • 7  3  •accretion or avulsion. Accordingly, the court held that 
the Iowans had failed to sustain their burden of proof at 
trial, thus necessitating judgment in favor of the Omahas.
Just as Judge Bogue had expressed his personal distaste 
for the result at the trial court level, the appellate court 
acknowledged the seemingly harsh effect of its decision:
We recognize that to require [the Iowans] to prove 
the cause of the river's movement occurring some 100 
years after the event is indeed an onerous burden.
This may seem to be an injustice when one considers 
that the [Iowans] have possessed and continuously 
farmed the land without protest for nearly 4 0 years. 
However, .‘. . the clear policy of the federal
government mandates that the interests of the Omaha
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Indian Tribe be given their historical and statutory 
protection. These important possessory land interests 
cannot be taken away on proof that is basically 
speculative and conjectural. 4
Naturally, the Omahas were gratified by the Court of 
Appeals' decision, while the Iowans expressed "shock and 
disappointment."75 Attorney Thomas Burke, representing one 
of the losing claimants, called the decision a "travesty" 
that would have far-ranging adverse consequences in other 
Indian land claims across the country.76 The Iowans asked 
the United States Supreme Court to accept the case for 
review, arguing that the 1834 statute created an 
unconstitutional judicial preference for Indians based
7  7solely upon race.
In November, 197 8, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the
7ft • •case. ° As the parties filed their briefs and awaited the
Court's decision, strong feelings continued to simmer at
Blackbird Bend. Harold Sorenson, one of the Iowa farmers
who claimed part of the disputed land, expressed concern
about the future stability of land titles throughout the
region, predicting "If [the Omahas] win this one, there's
nothing to keep them from just keeping on going."  ^ The
Omahas likewise viewed the fight in terms of its impact on
the future, but for them the essence of the matter was
different* A3 Tribal Council member Clifford Wolfe, Sr.
told a reporter:
We think about our children and grandchildren. From 
the income [derived from the Blackbird Bend land],
208
maybe they'll feel like we're people. Maybe it'll help 
their schooling, give them something to fall back on.
We want that land back. Anyway we can get it back, we 
want it back. 0
On June 20, 1979, the Supreme Court rendered its 
decision.8 -^ Like so many decisions of the high court, its 
opinion in the Blackbird Bend case failed to settle the 
matter outright, but rather returned the case to the lower 
courts for further consideration. The Supreme Court 
declared that the 8th Circuit had been correct in its 
application of the "burden of proof" statute to the 
individual Iowa claimants, but had erred in applying the 
statute against the state of Iowa itself, since a state 
could not be considered a "white person" under the terms of 
the statute.
On remand, the Circuit Court reconsidered its analysis
of the issues, but once again decided the case largely in
ft 7 .favor of the Omahas. * The court entered a final judgment 
awarding all but 700 of the 2,900 acres within the Barrett 
Survey area to the tribe. As to the 700 acres claimed by 
the state of Iowa, the court returned the case once again to 
the district court for further consideration, with 
instructions to place the burden of proof back on the tribe.
Over the next eleven years, the seemingly interminable 
litigation bounced back and forth between the district court 
and the 8th Circuit Court five more times on the issue of 
title to the 700 acres claimed by the state.83 Ultimately,
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the courts held that the Omahas had failed to meet their 
burden of proving title to the remaining 700 acres in 
dispute, and awarded the land to the State of Iowa.84 
Approximately 3 00 additional acres were awarded to various 
other non-Indian claimants for parcels that had previously 
been acquired by "fee patents." Thus, when the "Blackbird 
Bend I" litigation finally ground to a halt sixteen years 
after it commenced, the Omahas had been awarded title to 
approximately 1,900 acres out of the 2,900 acres within the 
Barrett Survey. In addition, the erstwhile "owners" of the 
land were awarded a judgment against the United States for 
almost $2 million, plus prejudgment interest, for the value 
of the improvements made to the property before it was 
returned to the tribe.
Meanwhile, the tribe's claims to the acreage outside 
the Barrett Survey within the Blackbird Bend lobe, and the 
additional land in the Monona Bend and Omaha Mission Bend 
areas to the north, remained to be resolved. [See Maps 10 
and 11]. Those much larger claims, which now became known 
as "Blackbird Bend II," had been severed and placed in 
abeyance by Judge McManus in 1979. As the claims in 
Blackbird Bend I were slowly resolved, Blackbird Bend II 
took center stage.85
The dozens of Iowa farmers whose lands were at issue in 
Blackbird Bend II had been following the convoluted
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proceedings in Blackbird Bend I for years. As the threat to
their lands was resurrected, tension within the community
rose to new heights. Monona County Sheriff Albert Wood
bluntly predicted bloodshed if the Omahas sought to "occupy"
any of the contested land:
The boys have deeds to the land. They have paid taxes 
on it. They aren't about to give it up. If they get 
pushed too hard, I know what will happen. The river 
will run red.
Although Wood's dire predictions of violence proved to be 
overstated, the Omahas' attempts to proceed with their 
remaining claims ultimately deteriorated into a long series 
of acrimonious confrontations and ad hominen attacks between 
the tribe's counsel, the attorneys for the Iowa landowners, 
and the federal judiciary. As the Omahas continued to press 
their charges of fraud, conflict of interest, and collusion 
on the part of their opponents and the courts, procedural 
conflicts among the attorneys escalated to the point that 
the district court ultimately imposed the harshest possible 
sanction against the tribe.
On May 29, 1990, Federal District Judge Warren Urbom 
entered an order in which he condemned the tribe's attorney, 
William H. Veeder, for his "systematic pattern of failure to 
comply with court rules and orders," and dismissed all of
Q *7
the Omahas' remaining claims. One year later, the 8th 
Circuit Court upheld Urbom's ruling, and assessed a penalty 
against the tribe of double the costs of the appeal for its
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continued prosecution of the "frivolous" claims of fraud and
Q  Q . , ,
conspiracy.00 The judicial denunciation of William Veeder
continued, as the court declared:
. . . Mr. Veeder continues to exercise scurrilous
disrespect for the judges involved in this case. He 
stands obsessed with the charges of fraud by Judges 
McManus and Urbom . . . notwithstanding this court's
prior dismissal of such a claim . . . Mr. Veeder
through his continued contumacious refusal to comply 
with the district court orders has done a great 
disservice to his client in important litigation. It 
is unfortunate in a case such as this that the client 
must live or die by the conduct of its counsel. 9
When the Supreme Court denied the tribe's request for it to
review the case later that year, the Omahas' claims were
finally extinguished. Four more years would pass, however,
before the courts resolved the last remaining issue in the
case.
After the dismissal of the Omahas' claims in Blackbird 
Bend II became final, two counterclaims against the tribe 
remained viable. Those counterclaims had been filed by the 
Iowans whose land the tribe had physically occupied since 
1975, and they remained at issue because the tribe continued 
to occupy the property even after the dismissal of, all its 
remaining claims. In April, 1993, the district court gave 
title to the land to the Iowans, and awarded them more than 
$400,000 for the rental value of the land during the tribe's 
occupancy. In January, 1995, the 8th Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision, and the 29 year old Battle of
9  0Blackbird Bend finally came to an end. u
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While the Iowans expressed joy and relief at the final 
disposition of the case, the Omahas vowed to fight on, 
suggesting that they might re-occupy the land or even take 
their claims to some other forum such as the United Nations
Q  "1
or the World Court. No such action was ever taken, 
although the tribe did make a futile request to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee for an "oversight hearing" to 
investigate its grievances against the judges and government
QO
attorneys. Notwithstanding the Omahas' lingering 
- discontent, the Battle of Blackbird Bend is almost certainly 
at an end. The tribe was left with the 1,900 acres awarded 
to it in the Blackbird Bend I litigation, and the Iowans 
whose land had been threatened in Blackbird Bend II escaped 
on procedural grounds, without being required to confront 
the merits of the Omahas' claims.
It is too soon to draw any sweeping conclusions about 
the long-term impact of the Blackbird Bend litigation on the 
Omaha tribe. Whatever "lessons" the case may hold will 
require more time to fully manifest themselves. It may 
certainly be said, however, that the Battle of Blackbird 
Bend represented one of the many steps taken by the tribe in 
the last few decades to "resurrect itself" as a vibrant and 
economically viable political and cultural entity. The 
courts' dismissal of most of the Omahas' claims as a 
punitive measure against the tribe's attorney casts an
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unsettling cloud on that determined effort. Nevertheless, 
the Omahas may take a measure of satisfaction in the fact 
that a portion of the land they recovered in Iowa is now the 
site of the tribe's successful gaming operation, Casino 
Omaha. That enterprise, combined with the farming 
operations on the remainder of the land, have contributed 
significantly to the tribal revenue base over the past 
several years. [See Figures 14-16]. They provide an 
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Casino Omaha —  "At Blackbird Bend" 
October 1995
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Tribal farming operations at Blackbird Bend. October 1995.
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of grievances against the government attorneys and the 
federal judges involved in the Blackbird Bend litigation. 
Although the letter is rambling, one-sided, and self-serving 
as to Veeder's culpability in the courts' dismissal of the 
tribe.'s claims, it is nevertheless a valuable reflection of 
the tribe's bitter outrage at the outcome in the Blackbird 
Bend cases. Despite repeated inquiries from the author to 
the staff of the Judiciary Committee, the Senate's response 
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CONCLUSION
Throughout its long history, the Omaha Tribe has 
exhibited a cultural resiliency that is both remarkable and 
inspiring. During the nineteenth century, the Omahas 
weathered every challenge that federal and state policy­
makers could place before them, from the repeated violations 
of solemn treaties to the disastrous allotment of tribal 
lands.1 In the modern era as well, the Omahas' resolve to 
maintain their political and cultural viability has been 
repeatedly put to the test —  in the lawlessness of the 
Public Law 280 years, the quest for retrocession, the long 
and tedious journey through the Indian Claims Commission 
(ICC), and the even more protracted odyssey of the Blackbird 
Bend litigation.
To their great credit, the Omahas have emerged from 
these struggles as a stronger and more resolute political 
and cultural entity. By aggressively pursuing that which 
was "rightfully theirs" —  in the halls of Congress, the 
state legislature, the ICC, and the federal courts —  the 
tribe has achieved a significant measure of compensation for 
centuries of past abuse. The establishment of a tribal law 
enforcement structure through retrocession, the creation of 
economic development projects from the proceeds of the ICC 
judgments, the opening of profitable Casino Omaha, and the 
initiation of additional tribal farming operations in
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Blackbird Bend have all helped advance the people. During 
the last few years, a sense of restrained optimism on the 
reservation has replaced more than a hundred years of 
deprivation and despair.2 As tribal member Wayne Tyndall 
recently observed, "People are working more than ever 
before. There is more self-esteem, and people are becoming 
more self-sufficient. The casino has really changed the 
complexion of the overall community. Everyone is thankful 
for that."3
Certainly Casino Omaha has been the key to much of the 
recent improvement in the reservation economy and morale.
As profits from the casino replenish the tribal treasury, 
Omaha leaders are striving to invest those proceeds in ways 
that will produce the best possible long-term return. Just 
as with the ICC judgments, the tribe has distributed a 
portion of the annual casino profits to its members on a per 
capita basis.4 The remainder of the annual revenues has 
been used for a multitude of development programs, including 
road repairs, school renovation and supplies, scholarship 
programs, expansion of health facilities, water system 
improvements, and a youth emergency shelter. The tribe is 
working with government officials and independent 
consultants to implement a comprehensive plan for sorely- 




Yet much remains to be done. As both tribal leaders 
and outside observers have acknowledged, the revenues 
generated by Casino Omaha are not a panacea for all of the 
tribe's remaining concerns. The tribe is acutely aware that 
the gambling well may run dry at any time.6 Indeed, as 
competing casinos proliferate in Council Bluffs, Iowa and 
elsewhere, and as Indian gaming operations throughout the 
country draw increasing Congressional scrutiny, the future 
of the Omahas' relatively isolated casino is far from 
certain.
As the Omahas look to the future, chronic problems 
linger for tribal attention. Among many other issues, the 
tribe must address pressing concerns related to drug and 
alcohol abuse, educational and medical deficiencies, and a 
continuing internal factionalism between on and off 
reservation members. Like all other tribes across the 
country, the Omahas must also prepare to weather impending
7reductions m  federal funding for Indian services.
Whatever problems remain to be addressed, however, the 
members of the Omaha Tribe can and should take strength from 
the remarkable perseverance demonstrated by their forebears. 
As this thesis is designed to demonstrate, the Omahas' 
collective character as "survivors" has been as notable in 
the modern era as at any other time in the tribe's long 
history. By withstanding the "dragon's nest" of PL 280,
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forging ahead with retrocession, and enduring years of 
litigation in the ICC and the federal courts, the Omahas 
have created for themselves an enduring foundation of 
political and cultural tenacity. That legacy should serve 
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Whereas  it is the pol i cy o f  Cong re ss ,  as 
rapidly as possible,  to make the Ind i ans  
wi th in the ter r i tor ial  l imits o f  the U n i t ed  
States subject  to the same laws a nd  en t i ­
tled to the same  privileges and r e s p o n ­
sibilities as are appl icable  to o ther  c i t izens 
o f  the U n i t ed  States ,  to end  the i r  s t a t us  as 
wards  o f  the  Un i t ed  States ,  and  to g r an t  
t hem all o f  the  r ights and p re roga t i ves  
per t a i ning  to A mer i can  ci t izenship;  and  
Whereas  the Indi ans  w i th in  the  ter r i tor ial  
l imits o f  t he  U n i t e d  States  should  a s s u me  
thei r  full responsibi l i t i es  as A m er i c an  
cit izens: N o w ,  therefore ,  be  it
Resolved by the House of R epresentatives (tbe  
Senate concurring),
T h a t  it is decla red to be the sense o f  C o n ­
gress that ,  at t he earl iest  poss ible  t ime,  all o f  
the  In d i an  t r i be s  and  the  i n d i v i du a l  
mem ber s  t h e r eo f  located w i th in  the  S ta tes  o f  
Cali fornia,  F lor ida ,  N e w  York,  and T e x a s ,  
and all of  the fo l l owing  na me d  Ind i an  t r i be s  
and individual  m e m b er s  t hereof ,  should  be 
freed from Fede ra l  supervi s i on  and  con t ro l  
and f rom all disabi l i t ies and  l imi ta t ions  sp e ­
cially applicable to Indians:  T h e  Flathead 
T r i b e  of Mon tana ,  the K lama th  T r i b e  of 
Oregon ,  the Men om ine e  T r i b e  of  W is con ­
sin, the Potowatamie  T r i b e  of  Kansas and 
Nebraska ,  and those me m b er s  o f  the C h i p ­
pewa T r ib e  who  are on  the T u r t l e  Moun ta in  
Reservat ion,  N o r t h  Dakota .  It is fu r ther  
declared to be the sense o f  Congress  that ,  
upon  the release of  such  tr ibes and i nd iv idu­
al member s  t her eof  f r om such disabil it ies 
and  l imitat ions,  all offices o f  the Bureau of 
I ndi an  Affairs in t he  States  o f  Cali fornia,  
Florida,  N e w  York,  and Tex as  and all other  
offices of  the Bureau o f  I nd i an  Affairs whose  
p r ima ry  pu rpose  was to serve any Ind ian  
tr ibe  or  individual  I nd i an  freed f rom Federal  
supervis ion should be abol i shed.  It is f ur ther  
declared to be the sense of  Congress  tha t  the 
Secretary of  the Int er ior  should  examine  all 
exist ing legislation deal ing wi th such In d i ­
ans,  and treaties be tween  the  Go ve rn m e n t  o f  
the Uni ted  States  and each such tr ibe,  and 
repor t  to Congress  at the earl iest  pract icable 
date,  but  not  later t han  J an ua ry  1, 1954, his 
r e commenda t i ons  for such legislation as, in 
his judgment ,  may  be necessary to a c c o m ­
plish the pu rposes  of  this resolut ion.
House Concurrent- Resolution 108 
U.S. , Statutes at Large 67 (August 1, 1953) : B132
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' A n  A e t ' t o  c o n f e r  J u r i s d i c t i o n . o n  t h e  S t M e s ^ o r  C a u T o r n i a . '  M i n n e s o t a ,  N e b r a s - ^ '  
k a ,  O r e g o n ,  a n d  W i s c o n s i n .  *<vith r e s p e c t  t o  c r i m i n a l  o f f e n s e s  a n d  c i v i l  
c a u s e s  o f  a c t i o n  c o m m i t t e d  or a r i s i n g  o n  I n d i a n  r e s e r v a t i o n s  - w i t h i n '
. ------------- _ s u c h  S t a t e s ,  a n d .  f o r  o t h e r  p u r p o s e s .  ~~ • -  , j  _ " . ’A ' U '  •
Be i t  p.) incted'by the Senate and 'Hovse of Representat ives nf t h e ' U n i  ted  
St-alcs of  America,  in Congress assembled, T h a t :  ■ ...
C h a p t e r  53 o f  t i t l e  IS, U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  Cone ,  is h e r e b y  a m e n d e d  by 
i n s e r t i n g  a t  t h e  e n d  of  t h e  c h a p t e r  a n a l y s i s  p r e c e d i n g  s e c t i o n  1151 
o f  s u c h  t i t l e  t h e  fol lowing-  n e w  i t e m :
“ I l f i2.  S t a t e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o v e r  o f f en se s  c o m m i t t e d  by  o r  a g a i n s t  
I n d i a n s  i n  t he  I n d i a n  c o u n t r y . "
Sec .  2. T i t l e  18. U n i t e d  S t a t e s  Code,  is h e r e b y  a m e n d e d  b y  i n ­
s e r t i ng :  in c h a p t e r  53 t h e r e o f  i m m e d i a t e l y  a f t e r  s ec t i on  l l i i l  a n e w  
s e c t i o n ,  to be  d e s i g n a t e d  a s  s e c t i o n  11G2, a s  f o l l o w s :
'■§ 11G2. S t a t s  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o v e r  o iTenses  c o m m i t t e d  by o r  a g a i n s t  
r a d i a n s  in t h e  I n d i a n  c o u n t r y  
" ( a )  E a c h  of  t h e  S t a t e s  l i s t e d  in t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t ab l e  s h a l l  h a v e  
j u r i s d i c t i o n  o v e r  o f f en se s  c o m m i t t e d  by  o r  a g a i n s t  I n d i a n s  in  t in; 
a r e a s  o f  I n d i a n  c o u n t r y  l i s t ed  o p p o s i t e  t h e  n a m e  o f  the S t a t e  to  t h e  
s a m e  e x t e n t  t h a t  s u c h  S t a t e  h a s  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o v e r  o f f ense s  c o m m i t t e d  
e l s e w h e r e  w i t h i n  t h e  S l a t e ,  a n d  t h e  c r i m i n a l  l a w s  of  su c h  Stale s h a l l  
h a v e  t h e  s a m e  f o r c e  and  e f f ec t  w i t h i n  s u c h  I n d i a n  c o u n t r y  a s  t h e y  
h a v e  e l s e w h e r e  w i t h i n  the  S t a t e :
" S t a t e  o f  I n d i a n  c o u n t r y  a lTected
C a l i f o r n i a  ...........................All I n d i a n  c o u n t r y  w i t h i n  t he  S l a t e
M i n n e s o t a  ...........................All . I n d i a n  country w i t h i n  the S t a t e ,  e x c e p t
t h e  Rod L a k e  R e s e r v a t i o n
N e b r a s k a  .................. All  I n d i a n  c o u n t r y  w i t h i n  t h e  S t a t e
O r e g o n  .................................. All I n d i a n  c o u n t r y  w i t h i n  t he  S t a t e ,  e x c e p t
t h e  W a r m  S p r i n g s  R e s e r v a t i o n
W i s c o n s i n  . . . : ................ All I n d i a n  c o u n t r y  w i t h i n  t h e  S t a t e ,  e x c e p t
t h e  M e n o m i n e e  R e s e r v a t i o n  j
“ (b )  N o t h i n g  in t h i s  s e c t i o n  s h a l l  a u t h o r i s e  t h e  a l i e n a t i o n ,  e n c u m ­
b r a n c e ,  o r  t a x a t i o n  o f  a n y  r e a l  o r  p e r s o n a l  p r o p e r t y ,  i n c l u d i n g  w a t e r  
r i g h t s ,  b e l o n g i n g  to any  I n d i a n  o r  a n y  I n d i a n  t r i be ,  ba n d ,  o r  c o m ­
m u n i t y  t h a t  is h e l d  in t r u s t  by  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a l e s  o r  is s u b j e c t  to a 
r e s t r i c t i o n  a g a i n s t  a l i e n a t i o n  i m p o s e d  by  t h e  . U n i t e d  S l a t e s ; . o r . s haM  
a u t h o r i z e  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  t he  u s c - o f  s u c h  p r o p e r t y  in a m a n n e r  i n c o n ­
s i s t e n t  w i t h  a n y  F e d e r a l  t r e a t y ,  a g r e e m e n t ,  o r  s t a t u t e  o r  w i t h  a n y  
r e g u l a t i o n  m a d e  p u r s u a n t  t h e r e t o ;  o r  s h a l l - d e p r i v e  a n y  l u d i a n - o r
a n y  I n d i a n  t r i b e ,  b a n d ,  o r  c o m m u n i t y ,  o f  a n y  r i g h t ,  p r i v i l e g e ,  o r  
i m m u n i t y  a f f o r d e d  u n d e r  F e d e r a l  . t r e a t y / ' a g r e e m e n t , -  o r  s t a t u t e - w i t h  
l v s p e c t  lo hun t i ng , "  t r a p p i n g , ' o r  f i s h i n g  o r  t h e ' x o n t r o l ,  l i c e n s i n g , - ' o r  
r e g u l a t i o n  I h e r e o f .  ' '    • •
" ( c j  T h e  p r o v i s i o n s  of s u c t i o n s . i l . 5 2  a n d  1153 o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r  s h a i l  
n o t  be a p p l i c a b l e  w i t h i n  the  a r e a 3 o f  I n d i a n  c o u n t r y  l i s t ed  in s u b  
s e c t i o n  ( a )  o f  t h i s  s e c t i o n . "
Public Law 83-280 
U.S., Statutes at Large 67 (August 15, 1953): 583
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Sec.  3. C h a p t e r  So o f  t i t l e  23, .  U n i t e d  States Code ,  i s  ' h er eby 
a m e n d e d  b y  inser t ing at  the ' end of the chapt er  analysis p reced ing  
sect ion 1331 of such title the fol lowing new item:
"IGtlO. S t a t e  c ivi l  j u r i s d i c t i o n  i n  a c t i o n s  to w h i c h  I n d i a n s  a r e  
p a r t i e s . "  ' ’
See .  4. T i t l e  23, .  U u i l e d  S t a t e s  C ode ,  is h e r e b y  a m e n d e d  b y  i n ­
s e r t i n g  in c h a p t e r - ' d o  t h e r e o f  i m m e d i a t e l y  a f t e r  s e c t i o n  1 3 5 9 ' a  n e w  
s e c t i o n ,  to b e  d e s i g n a t e d  as  s c c t i o u  13G0, a s  f o l l o w s :  .
"S 13G0. S t a t e ,  c ivi l  j u r i s d i c t i o n  i n  a c t i o n s  to w h i c h  I n d i a n s  a r e  
p a r t i e s  -  . ■ ■
" ( a )  E a c h  o f  t h e  S t a t e s  l i s t ed  in t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t a b l e  s h a l l  h a v e  
j u r i s d i c t i o n  o v e r  civi l  c a u s e s  o f  a c t i o n  b e t w e e n  I n d i a n s  o r  t o  w h i c h  
i; d i n n s  a r e  p a r t i e s  w h i c h  a r i s e  in  t h e  a r e a s  o f  I n d i a n  c o u n t r y  l i s t e d  
■ ippo . ' i t c  t h e  n a m e  o f  t he  S t a t e  to t h e  s a m e  e x t e n t  t h a t  s u c h  S t a t e  h a s  
j u r i s d i c t i o n  o v e r  o t h e r  civi l  c a u s e s  o f  a c t i u n ,  a n d  t h o s e  c iv i l  l a w s  o f  
: u e h  S l a t e  t h a t  a r e  of  g e n e r a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  to p r i v a t e  p e r s o n s  o r  
p r i v a t e  p r o p e r t y  sha l l  h a v e  t he  s a m e  f o r c e  a n d  elTcct  w i t h i n  s u c h  
I n d i a n  c o u n t r y  a s  t h e y  h a ve  e l s e w h e r e  w i t h i n  t h e  S t a t e :
’" S t a t e  o f  I n d i a n  c o u n t r y  a f f e c t e d
C a l i f o r n i a  .......................... Al l  I n d i a n  c o u n t r y  w i t h i n  t h e  S t a t e
M i n n e s o t a   All  I n d i a n  c o u n t r y  w i t h i n  t he  S t a t e ,  e x c e p t
the  R e d  L a k e  R e s e r v a t i o n
N e b r a s k a   Al l  I n d i a n  c o u n t r y  w i t h i n  t h e - S l a t e
O r c g u u  .................................. Al l  I n d i a n  c o u n t r y  w i t h i n  t he  S t a t e ,  e x c e p t
the  W a r m  S p r i n g s  R e s e r v a t i o n
W i s c o n s i n  .......................... Al l  I n d i a n  c o u n t r y  w i t h i n  t h e  S t a t e ,  e x c e p t
the  M e n o m i n e e  R e s e r v a t i o n
“ HO N o t h i n g  in t h i s  s ec t i on  s h a l l  . a u t h o r i z e  t he  a l i e n a t i o n ,  e n c u m ­
b r a n c e .  o r  t a x a t i o n  o f  a n y  r ea l  o r  p e r s o n a l  p r o p e r t y ,  i n c l u d i n g  w a t e r  
r i g h t s ,  b e l o n g i n g  to a n y  I n d i a n  o r  a n y  I n d i a n  tvibc,  b a n d ,  o r  c o m -  
. m u n i l y  t h a t  is h e l d  in t r u s t  b y  t he  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  o r  is s u b j e c t  to  a 
l ^ s t r i c t i n n  a g a i n s t  a l i e n a t i o n  i m p o s e d  b y  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ;  o r  s h a l l  
a u t h o r i z e - r e g u l a t i o n  o f  t he  u s e  of  s u c h  p r o p e r t y  in a 1 m a n n e r  i n c o n ­
s i s t e n t  w i t h ,  a n y  F e d e r a l - t r e a t y ,  a g r e e m e n t ,  o r  s t a t u t e  o r  w i t h  a n y  
. r e g u l a t i o n  m a d e  p u r s u a n t  t h e r e t o :  o r  s ha l l  c o n f e r  j u r i s d i c t i o n  u p o n  
t h e  S t u m  to- a d j u d i c a t e ,  in p r o b a t e  p r o c e e d i n g s -  o r  o t h e r w i s e ,  t h e -  
n w n r r s h i p  o r  r i g h t  to p o s s e s s io n  o f  s u c h  p r o p e r t y  o r  a ny "  i n t e r e s t  
t h e r e i n .  . . . - - -
“ ( c )  A n y  t r i b a l  o r d i n a n c e  o r  c u s t o m  h e r e t o f o r e  or. h e r e a f t e r  
a d o p t e d  by  a n  I n d i a n  t r i be ,  b a n d ,  o r  c o mm u n i t y . . i n  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  a n y  
a u t h o r i t y  w h i c h  i t  m a y  p o s s e s s  sh a l l ,  i f  n o t  i n c o n s i s t e n t ^ w i t h  a n y
a p p l i c a b l e  c i v i l  l a w  o f  t h e  S t a t e ,  b e  g i v e n  f u l l  f o r c e  a n d  e f f e c t  i n  t h e  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  c i v i l  c a u s e s  o f  a c t i o n  p u r s u a n t  to t h i s  s e c t i o n . ” 
S e c .  5. S e c t i o n  ~L o f  t h e  - Ac t - o f  O c t o b e r  5, 10-10 (G:l S t .nt .  Tdo ,  c h .  
GO-5), i s  h c r c - b y  r e p e a l e d , <J b u t  s u c h  r e p e a l  s h a l l  n o t  a l l e c t  a n y  p r o ­
c e e d i n g s  h e r e t o f o r e  i n s t i t u t e d  u n d e r  t h a t  s e c t i o n .
S ec .  0. X o t w .  t n s t a n d i n g  t h e - p r o v i s i o n s  o f  a n y  E n a b l i n g  A c t  f o r  
t h e  a d m i s s i o n  o f  a S t a l e ,  t h e  c o n s e n t  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a l e s  i s  h e r e b y  
g i v e n  -to t h e  p e o p l e  o f - a n y  S t a t e  to  a m e n d ,  w h e r e  n e c e s s a r y ,  t h e i r  
S t a t e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o r  e x i s t i n g  s t a t u t e s ,  a s  t h e  c a s e  m a y  be ,  t o  r e m o v e  
a n y  l e g a l  i m p e d i m e n t  to t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  o f  c i v i l  a n d  c r i m i n a l  j u r i s ­
d i c t i o n  :n  a c c o r d a n c e  with,  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h i s  A c t ;  P i u v i d c t l ,  
T h a t  t h e  p r u v i s i o n s  o f  t h i s , . A e t  s h a l l  n o t  b e c o m e  e f f e c t i v e  w i t h  r e ­
s p e c t  to s u c h  a s s u m p t i o n  off j u r i s d i c t i o n  b y  a n y  s u c h  S t a t u  u n t i l  t h e  
p e o p l e  i H e r c n f  I m r e  a p p r o p r i a t e l y  a m e n d e d  t h e i r  S t a t e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  
o r  s t a t u t e s  a s  t h e  c a s e  m a y  be .
Sec .  7. T h e  c o n s e n t  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  i s  h c r e h y  g i v e n  t o  a n y  
e t h e r  S t a t e  n o t  h a v i n g  j u r i s d i c t i o n  w i t h  r e s p e c t  to c r i m i n a l  o f f e n s e s  
o r  c i v i l  c a u s e s - o f  a c t i o n ,  o r  w i t h  r e s p e c t  to b o t h ,  a s  p r o v i d e d  f o r  i n  
t h i s  A c t ,  to a s s u m e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  a t  s u c h  t i m e  a n d  i n  s u c h  m a n n e r  a s  
t h e  p e o p l e  o f  the.  S La te  s h a l l ,  b y  a f f i r m a t i v e  l e g i s l a t i v e - a c t i o n ,  o b l i ­
g a t e  a n d  b i n d  t h e  S t a t e  to a s s u m p t i o n  t h e r e o f .
A p p r o v e d  A u g u s t  15,  1253.
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• Resolution Ho. 6
:i/TIERSAS, the Omaha Tribe of Uebra.ska is ?. federal- corporation, 
chartered under the Act of June 18, 1934 (4Q Stat 924) us 
amended, and under authority of Art. 4, Section. 1 (a) Con­
stitution. end Bylaws of the Omaha Tribe of ITebr?.s;ca as anended, 
and
rRIEESAS, the Civil and Criminal jurisdiction on the Gran " 
vation va.s transferred to the State of Tebrasha under ?u 
230, and
iTnERSAS, the operation of this law for a period of sixte 
has not been effective in providing adeouate protection 
lives and "property of the iuiucers of th_e Omaha. Tribe, -?n
BEERS A. S , under the Civil Eights Act of 1953, the S. 3. is author­
ized to accept retrocession of such, jurisdiction,
ITO’V, THZESEQEE, BE IT PESOL7ED, that the Omaha Tribal Council of 
the Oman?. Tribe of ITebraskn declares itself in favor of such 
retrocession and of the U. S. assuming full responsibility of 
providing adecuate law' end order services within the exterior 
boundaries of the Cnah?. Reservation,
BE IT RESOLVED BUEIHZ5., that the Omaha. Tribal Council rec_uests 
urgent action, upon this Resolution where this transfer nay bring 
tiie needed services in law and order to the Omaha Tribe.
• CERTIFICATE
T/E, the undersigned, Chairman and Secretary of the Omaha Tribal 
Council, certify that on the 29TH day of January, 1959} at its 
regular monthly meeting duly convened, the Cmaha Tribal Council 
voted to adoob the a.'oove Resolution by a. vote of 5 for end 0
oc-pi n e t .v . - 0  t    — -* *
Dated thus 29th day of January, 19o9r
-bo
Omaha Tribal Resolution 69-33, January 29, 1969









■ Ls=i=u.Tuim or 3^uw;ca- 
 ilcirrurrti a^ilou— —
-UXIIUTIYX KtiOLOTIO.T 17 ■
l A i . r w J u < e d -\t  U i ; l r l i t ! , r ,  c » u a « I 1 .  C . .  V .  K a l a a u l i t  i £ i - a  n ; - ------
-------------------------------- > r i c t ,  o m < - » i r t ,  w .  » .  X i i c » r « o c ) t ( . l t 5 H - U t » t x i < t  •
—   VUCR^AS, tlt« itatc of Nebraska, eas. cl*** civil—
ami crloinal jurisdiction over ladl.xnfi Indian t Jrri\07~f Lh ■
IM :  state by-the let of Cangrest of Aucust 15. 155j ten*rally  j
kno^-n iz fubllt Lau 230; and- —  ■■■■■— ---- - — ■ . . ^
  VMEXSUS, Lhd I s 1 u a p t  loiv o f  sucA  J u r l s < i i e t i o n  - |
f\Az led to : t « U U y  incressinc cons Tor 1 a* enforcement 
certain counties of Nebraska, and particularly In Thursco 
County ; and --------------- :--------------------------------
! I
" ■ "■ VKIRJLAw, became of restrictions In orl^inal- 
Crinii at i. 1 no ;n rnurnon tosmcy to inaaxn = u w  inunji triue*,- 
Thurston- County has noc had.a sufficient ta_r base to o««c the —
lne/taj Inc e«u: of law »nf«rt{«ne; and------------- ■-----------
-------------------------------;inc* 1157, i:ac« assistance £±z See
I
i
provided, for. law :nfor«o*«nC purpoxs 1a Thurston County, and the —
coat of this ai:ls:^\<« has lncrrned each bl«rw\iu*; and ■ ‘--------1
---------------------VxntAl, N b U e  Lae JO-28*, adopted as an let — *■■
oC Congress on April 11, 13*** cootalaj a nvastr of previsions— ^ 
deaLlng wllh. elill rlcJita and Jurisdiction of teilSAs ? and - ^
-------------------- VXE7XJ*S, See e loa *03 (a) of fu*lie* Lav 10- 23* — I
provide! that ch« lhalted Slates Is. authorised to accept s_r«tr^--i- 
cession of all* or any aeisvn of 12»e Jurisdiction hcquXred by- 
jt'te pursuant *.o Nblle Lav 26ff of 1153;' ----
-virtaiAS. a c:Mltc«« of J<v>cn of the
Lcclsl*tu*"0 -appointed Uy •.the'^CjceutlTc hoard.of the. Lcf^la 1st i>»e —— — 
j Councll^Tollo-rtnf: 'adond'ons^f hvhlie Lae • J0T2 6*“haa. atudAed the 
jproOlcor of lav. enfor«c*«ot In Indian areas of 'this state and th< ‘
.question of rcVrocYaxion'of Jurl^d-lctloo^* and hxx; >c t load—
,ers of th<-Ovoaha and * Y lnnc ba po tribes ,^ towvey officials , . and- -  * ^
j officials, o f the Bureau of Indian Affairs.** .
-MOV, TlL3 ^TDrrr TT V O L T E S  fcT T>3 Tl£^3 DC3 • 
T * -  -
o r  n i r  i^ z s .tjlsjca  u i c i i L s T O 'a r  j u  l i c i t : c m  s t s s i o h  a a s d t .l s i   --------—
|---------------------- 1 . Th-■»t C-Sc State of L!cbt~us?a be.-cTy ret.-r—  —
Jeedci to the United lOatea all Jurisdiction over offenses cos —^!
: olttcd by. ©c' acolnsc Indlsos in the arras of Indian eounrry locaud 
■ in Thursron. Caunry Xcbrula ,'"»«© uire^l—by —xh«— S-t-icu of. — O n s t a o —
i purao an t to. rub Lie Lav.280 of 1153, rierpt as-provided tn -........-
CparecrapA 2 *C this resolution, ----  ‘
L*2, 71 the rvtTO«es:iofl cf Jurisdiction c on—
; tcincd in pxrmcr»pb 1 . of this, resolution sbxUL not apply xo any --- ;
•offenses Lnrolvlnc *h« operation of w t o r  Tebielts on, public roads- 
ior MfJivayj . ----------------------k---------—  “ j
—  5 .. TbaC the Executive iAsrd o f  tbc Lo gl.i—  -
\ 1st 1 v«- Countil Is hereby iutb*rlicd and direcccd to. tzi'r iJ_L ooe- — 1
•• vsary action- Us pot. l i b  rira oluLion inLo.o£fectr 's ocJa _ a c "Z± orr t-o---
• lhcludi Lmnft*-ncs vlth lb* C* p*j“t»c-nt. o f  the Interior: ihd the -
j doyutr c x n  t *z StLrvau of ln«lian LCfxLrx eonctmlnc'tht xsmcpci ojv of —
. liv-cnforecreot rv s pons IbiLltle*. In’ tbar’ vre xs 0 f Lndixn- cecBirrr *----
I ooT»r<d by tbJ_a rra«Wtioo. — -------— ” |
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Nebraska Legislative Resolution No. 37, April 16, 1969.
"Retroceding" criminal jurisdiction on the Omaha Reservation 
back to the federal government
APPENDIX V
239
Ofr i ce  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r y
O M A H A  I N D I A N  R E S E R V A T I O N ,  ..
NE3R.
N o t i c e  o f  A c c e p t a n c e  o f  R e b r o c e s s i o n  : 
o f  J u r i s d i c t i o n  £
P u rsn e n c  to the a u th o r i ty  vested  tnd> 
th e  S ecre to ry  of the  In te r io r  by E xeca— 
tir e  O rder No. 11435 (33 ?JFL. 17339). I-', 
h e reb y  accept, as of 12:01 ann_, ejs_d, d 
O ctober 25. 1970. re tro cessio n  to the^- 
U n ited  S ta tes  of all Ju risd ic tio n  exercised ' 
by the S ta te  ot Nebraska, orer ocTensea-- 
cocam itted  by or ag a in s t In d ia n s  In the- 
a re as  cx In d ian  co u n try  lo c a te d  w ith in  
the boundaries of the O m a h a  In d iarc- 
Res e r r a t ic  a  in T h o ro tcn  C a u n ty , Nedr_^. 
3-S fodorrs: £;
lo t  3 c f  i< c . 04. T . 25 N .. P.. 5 S t 'o f  ' h e  2 L r h " - 
P r in c ip a l, i f  e n d !  a n : h e n c e  f  s_sc :o  h e  n o r h - " ;  
e a s t  c o r n e r  o f T . 24 N\. R . 7 S . o f  h e  S ixth .; 
P r in c ip a l  M endl& n-. h e n c e  s o u h .  t o  h e . . .  
s c r u h  lin e  c£ h »  O c a P a  I n d ia n  R e s e r r * —^ 
l i o n  m  c n z h i l l y  su rreye-d ; h e n c e  e a jx  a lc c g  — 
h e  s o u h  lin e  of h e  O m a h a  I n d ia n , . a r s e m ^ -  
; l o a  a s e n g in e ! ! j  r u r r - y e d  :o  c n e  U n e b -e-• 
r s -e e n  s e e n  22 a n d  33. T l 24 X ,  P.. 10 2_ a C '  
h e  S i x h  P r h d p e l  M e r id ia n :  h e n c e  a o r h ''-  
:o  h e  r o r h ^ e r t  c o m e r  c f  se-c. 2 '.. T . 2-4 ffn.
10 I .  c f  h o  S i x h  P r in c ip a l  M -enrib in:■; 
h e n c e  e a j t  Co h e  f a s t e n  b o u n d a r y  U no oXI_ 
h e  S ix e s  x f  tvebrxatac h e n c e  In. a '  t o r t iH - ’ 
■s-erterly C lr scd cn . a lo n g  a a id  b o u n d a r y  l ln o r  
:o  h e  n o r h  U ne o f sec . 35. T .  25  NO A. 9 Z_ - 
c f  h e  S i x h  P r in c ip a l M e r id ia n  e x te n d e d ;  
e a s t ;  h e n c e  ~ e r t  a lo n g  h e  s e c t i o n  l in e s  to  
h e  n c r h ^ c s t  c o m e r  of ’.c c  I o f  s e e .  28 . T . 0 5 '  
N .. P.. 7 I .  of 'h e  S i x h  P r in c ip a l  M e.-idLan; 
h e n c e  s o u h  to  h e  a o r h e n s c  c o m e r  o f  lo t  
3 of sec. 12. T. 25 N.. P . 7 Z. c f  h e  S i x h  
P r h c i p c i  M er .d la n ; h e n c e  -v e s t to  h e  c o r h -  
■va-st c o m e r  c f lo t  2. s ec . 10. T . 25 N . P.. 5 3- 
o f h e  S i x h  P r in c ip a l M e r id ia n ;  h e n c e  s o u h  
a ic n g  h e  —esc b o u n d a r y  l in e  o f h e  C r c a  
E n d ia n  P -eserra c ic n  as o r ig in a l ly  r u r r e je d  
to  h e  t e n :  o f b e g in n in g .
excep t cfTanses involving the  opera tion  
of mo cor ve nicies on public roads or high- 
or3.r3 x h ic h  re procession h s  pandered 
an d  o d ered  by L-egislativs P h sc lu tio n  No. 
37 passed by the L eg isla tu re  cf Me brands 
in  30 th  regular session c a  th e  16th cny 
of A pril 1969.
W a l t e r  J . n ic r r r .L .
S ecre to ry  of the. Interior.
O c ro sm  15. 1970.
[P .P .. h o c .  "0-14:319: P i le d .  O c t .  23 . 1970:
3 :4 7  a m .  I
35 Federal Register 16598, October 16, 1970.
The federal government's "partial" acceptance of N e b r a s k a ' s  
offer of retrocession, October 16, 1970
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Ltcisr-vTvns o r  uF.n.ii.sia 
r i c i m - s s c o b a  I c . d i s l a t u r s  nnsT ssdsioif
. . LICISLATr/t 3tt0CUTI0it is .
Introduced by C. V. Kolcqulse, lfith District
lTHIRtA.5, the eightieth Session of the hehras'aa 
State Legislature, IJS5, adopted Legislative Resolution 37, 
relating to the retrocession to the United States of Juris­
diction over offenses coccsitted by or against Indians in the 
areas of .Indian country located in Thurstcn Count/, hebras'ea, 
acquired by the State of llebrtsia pursuant to ?ublic Law 220 
of IS53 ; ar.d
Vdll.SAS, the United States has r.oc accepted 
retrocessicn ir. accordance alth the terra ar.d provisions of 
said Legislative Resolution j7-
:;ov, ThnHEvc.ti. z z  it .’.zxolyld sr imi ;j. z * o sr.s 
0? TMZ ZICHTI-SICOirt) alCISLATUP.r 0? hza.utsKA, ?L?-S7 szssrch:
1. That the action of the Lightieth Session of
the Nebraska State-Legislature-, 1?49%-'approving Legislative 
■Resolution 27 is rescinded, and the offer of retrocession 
therein contained is withdrarn.
■ 7 y  ; j :q  -.~2 . ~ ^ Thatr a duly -atCcsCed^co L-vy his. r< soiu- ^
'tion be transalttcd by .the Xlsrk of the legislature ‘to the • 
Secretary, of Interior of the United States. L  ''.7
/ V A , ,
I, Ylncent □. 3rosn, hereby certify that the 
foregoing is a true and correct copy of Legislative Resolu­
tion 16, whichl vas passed by the -Legislature of Nebraska in 
Ilghty-second Legislature, first Session, on the first day 
of ~ebruary, 1971.
CLJL2K O i Tll£ LICiSLATU.l:
Nebraska Legislative Resolution 16, February 1, 1971
Attempting to "rescind" the offer of retrocession 




Final Report to the American Indian Policy Review
Commission. Task Force Four: Federal. State, and Tribal 
Jurisdiction. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1976.
Indian Claims Commission. Omaha Tribe of Nebraska. Dockets 
11, 138, 225-A,B,C,D. New York: Clearwater Publishing
Co., 1973. [University of Nebraska at Omaha Microfilm 
Collection, Call # E98.C6U6].
Doran L. Morris, Omaha Tribal Chairman. Letter to Senator 
Joseph R. Biden, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. July 6, 1990. Unpublished. Available in 
the History Department office of Professor Michael 
Tate, University of Nebraska at Omaha.
Dillon S. Myer Papers. Harry S. Truman Presidential 
Library. Independence, Missouri.
Philleo Nash Papers. Harry S. Truman Presidential Library. 
Independence, Missouri.
Program and Proceedings. Third Annual Conference on Indian 
Affairs. "Indian Problems of Law and Order.1 Institute 
of Indian Studies, State University of South Dakota. 
June 16-17, 1957.
United States District Court, Northern District of Iowa, 
Western Division. Case Nos. C75-4024, C75-4026, and 
C75-4067. Court files and documents, 1975-1995. Sioux 
City, Iowa.
United States Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Case Nos.
77-1384, 1387 consolidated. Court files and documents,
1977-1995. St. Louis, Missouri.
United States Supreme Court. Case No. 78-161. Appendix and 
Briefs, October Term, 1978. Washington, D.C.
"Winnebago Agency Subject Files." Records of the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, Record Group 75, Federal Records 
Center, Kansas City, Missouri.
242
Government Documents
Decisions of the Department of Interior. Vol. 61, M-36184, 
1954 .
Kappler, Charles J., comp, and ed. Indian Affairs: Laws
and Treaties. Vol. 2. Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1904.
Nebraska Legislative Council. Report of the Legislative
Council Interim Study Committee on Judiciary - Indian 
Retrocession. Committee Report No. 226, 1976.
Nebraska Legislative Journal. "Message from Gov. Victor E. 
Anderson to The President, the Speaker, and Members of 
the Legislature," 1957.
_______ . Legislative Resolution 37, 1969.
Legislative Resolution 16, 1971.
Nebraska Session Laws. 1957, 1967, 1974.
Royce, Charles C., comp. Indian Land Cessions in the United 
States. Eighteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of 
American Ethnology, Part 2. Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1899.
United States Code. Title 18 sections 1153, 1162; Title 25
sections 194, 1323; Title 28 section 1360.
U.S. Congressional Record. 1953, 1956, 1961, 1968.
U.S. Federal Register. Vol. 33 (1968), Vol. 35 (1970).
U.S. Statutes at Large. Vol. 4 (1830), Vol. 10 (1854),
Vol. 22 (1882), Vol. 23 (1885), Vol. 36 (1910),
Vol. 43 (1925), Vol. 44 (1926), Vol. 60 (1946),
Vol. 67 (1953), Vol. 75 (1961), Vol. 78 (1964),
Vol. 80 (1966), Vol. 82 (1968).
U.S. Congress. House. Hearings on H.R. 459. H.R. 3235, and 
H.R. 3624 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the 
Interior and Insular Affairs Comm. 82nd Cong., 2nd 
sess. , 1952.
_. Providing For the Disposition of Funds 
Appropriated to Pay a Judgment in Favor of the Omaha 
Tribe. H. Report 891, 89th Congress, 1st sess., 1965.
243
 . Report With Respect to The House Resolution
Authorizing the Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs to Conduct an Investigation of the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs. H. Report 2503, 82nd Cong., 2nd 
sess., 1953.
_______ . H. Report 848. 83rd Cong., 1st sess., 1953.
_______ . H. Res. 698. 82nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1952.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 
Indian Affairs of the Committee on Interior and 
Insular Affairs. United States Senate, on S. 2010.
Parts 1 and 2, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 1975-76.
________. Providing For the Disposition of Funds Appropriated
to Pay a Judgment in Favor of the Omaha Tribe of 
Nebraska, and For Other Purposes. S. Report 1683, 89th 
Cong., 2d sess., 1966.
________. Providing for the Disposition of Judgment Funds of
the Omaha Tribe of Indians. S. Report 598, 87th Cong., 
1st sess., 1961.
_______ . S. Report 699. 83rd Cong., 1st sess., 1953.
_______ . S. Report 1553. 89th Congress, 2nd sess., 1966.
U.S. President. Public Papers of the Presidents of the 
United States: Harry S. Truman. 1946. Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962.
Court Decisions
Fontanelle v. Omaha Tribe of Nebraska. 298 F. Supp. 855
(D. Neb. 1969), aff'd. 430 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1970).
Kitto v. State. 98 Neb. 164 (1915).
Loval Band or Group of Creek Indians v. United States.
97 F. Supp. 426 (Ct. Cl. 1951).
Marion v. State. 16 Neb. 349 (1884).
Oliphant v. Suguamish Indian Tribe. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
244
Omaha Indian Tribe v. Jackson. 854 F.2d 1089 (8th Cir.
(1988), cert, denied 490 U.S. 1090 (1989).
Omaha Indian Tribe v. Tract I —  Blackbird Bend Area. 93 3 
F.2d 1462 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert, denied sub 
nom. Omaha Indian tribe v. Agricultural & Indus. Inv. 
Co. 502 U.S. 942 (1991).
Omaha Indian Tribe v. Wilson. 614 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1980), 
cert, denied 449 U.S. 825 (1980).
Omaha Indian Tribe v. Wilson. 575 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1978).
Omaha Tribe of Indians v. Fontanelle. 430 F.2d 143 
(8th Cir. 1970).
Omaha Tribe of Indians v. United States. 53 Ct. Cl. 549
(1918), rev'd in part and aff'd in part. 253 U.S. 275 
(1920).
Omaha Tribe of Nebraska v. Village of Walthill. 3 34 F. Supp. 
823 (D. Neb. 1971).
Omaha Tribe of Nebraska v. Village of Walthill. 460 F.2d 
1327 (8th cir. 1972).
Painter v. Ives. 4 Neb. 122 (1875).
Robinson v. Sigler. 187 Neb. 144, 187 N.W.2d 756 (1971).
Rupp v. Omaha Tribe. 45 F.3d 1241 (8th Cir. 1995).
State v. Goham. 187 Neb. 35, 187 N.W.2d. 305 (1971).
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States. 348 U.S. 273 (1955).
United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks. 341 U.S. 48 
(1951).
United States v. Omaha Tribe of Indians. 253 U.S. 275 
(1920).
United States v. Wilson. 433 F. Supp. 57 (W.D. Towa 1977).
United States v. Wilson. 433 F. Supp. 67 (W.D. Iowa 1977).
United States v. Wilson. 523 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Iowa 1981)
United States v. Wilson. 707 F. 2d 304 (8th Cir. 1982),
cert, denied 465 U. S. 1025 (1984) .
245
United States v. Wilson. 578 F. Supp. 1191 (W.D. Iowa 1984).
United States v. Wilson. 926 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1991).
Village of Walthill v. Omaha Tribe of Nebraska. 409 U. S. 
1107 (1973) .
Wilson v. Omaha Tribe. 442 U.S. 653 (1979).
Newspapers
Des Moines Register. May 1977, May-June 1991.
Lincoln Star. August-September 19 56, September-November
1957, November-December 1958, May 1961, February 1970, 
July 1970, August 1972.
Lincoln Sunday Journal and Star. May 1958, December 1958.
New York Times. August, 1953.
Omaha World-Herald. 1945-1995.
Pender [Nebraska] Times, July 1969.
Sioux City Journal. April 1973, May 1977, June 1987,
May 1991, November 1991, April 1993.
Walthill [Nebraska] Citizen. September 1956, December 1958 
June 1962, February 1964, January-February, 1970.
Oral Histories and Interviews
Alfred Gilpin, interviewed by Cynthia M. Dillenberg
(Oberwetter), May 12, 1977, Audiotape of 50 minutes, 
American Indian Oral History Project, Department of 
History, University of Nebraska at Omaha.
Oral History Interview with Dillon S. Mver. May 1974, 
transcript printed in Vol. 2, Harry S. Truman 
Presidential Library, Independence, Missouri.
246
Peter J. Peters, interviewed by Richard W. Peterson,
January 26, 1976, Audiotape of 30 minutes, American 
Indian Oral History Project, Department of History, 
University of Nebraska at Omaha.
Personal interview with Ed Zendejas, Omaha tribal member and 
former Omaha Tribal Judge, September 14, 1995.
Books. Theses, and Dissertations
Boughter, Judith A. "Betraying Their Trust: The
Dispossession of the Omaha Nation, 1790-1916."
Master's thesis, University of Nebraska at Omaha, 1995.
Cadwalader, Sandra A., and Vine Deloria, Jr., eds. The 
Aggressions of Civilization. Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1984.
Canby, William C., Jr. American Indian Law. St. Paul: West 
Publishing Company, 1988.
Fay, George E., comp. Charters. Constitutions and Bv-Laws 
of the Indian Tribes of North America: Part 13. 
Midwestern Tribes. Occasional Publications in 
Anthropology, Ethnology Series, No. 14. Greeley, 
Colorado: Museum of Anthropology, University of 
Northern Colorado, 1972.
Fixico, Donald L. Termination and Relocation: Federal
Indian Policy. 1945-1960. Albuquerque: University of 
New Mexico Press, 1986.
Justice and the American Indian: The Impact of Public Law 
280 Upon the Administration of Justice on Indian 
Reservations. Washington, D.C.: National American 
Indian Court Judges Association, 1974.
Meriam, Lewis. The Problem of Indian Administration. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1928.
Murray, William G. Appraisal of Omaha Tract in Nebraska, 
1854. New York: Clearwater Publishing Co., 1957.
Philp, Kenneth R. John Collier's Crusade for Indian Reform, 
1920-1954. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1977.
247
Prucha, Francis Paul. American Indian Treaties. The History 
of a Political Anomaly. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1994.
_______ . The Great Father: The United States Government and
the American Indians. 2 vols. Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1984.
Rosenthal, Harvey D. "Their Day in Court: A History of the 
Indian Claims Commission." Ph.D. diss., Kent State 
University, 1976.
Smith, G. Hubert. Omaha Indians: Ethnohistorical Report on 
the Omaha People. New York: Garland Publishing, 1974.
Strickland, Rennard, and Charles F. Wilkinson, eds. Felix S. 
Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law. Revised Ed. 
Charlottesville, Virginia: Michie Bobbs-Merrill, 1982.
Sutton, Imre, ed. Irredeemable America: The Indians' Estate 
and Land Claims. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico 
Press, 1985.
Tate, Michael L. The Upstream People: An Annotated Research 
Bibliography of the Omaha Tribe. Native American 
Bibliography Series. No. 14. Metuchen, New Jersey: 
Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1991.
Washburn, Wilcomb E. Red Man's Land/White Man's Law: A
Study of the Past and Present Status of the American 
Indian. New York: Scribner, 1971.
Wunder, John R. Retained Bv The People. A History of
American Indians and the Bill of Rights. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1994.
Articles
Bohn, Dorothy. "'Liberating' the Indian, Euphemism for a 
Land Grab." The Nation 178 (February 10, 1954):
150-151.
Camp, Laurie Smith. "Land Accretion and Avulsion: The
Battle of Blackbird Bend." Nebraska Law Review 56
(1977): 814-35.
248
Carriker, Robert C. "The Kalispel Tribe and the Indian 
Claims Commission." Western Historical Quarterly 9 
(January 1978): 19-31.
Clinton, Robert N. "Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian 
Lands: A Journey through a Jurisdictional Maze."
Arizona Law Review 18 (1976): 503.
_______ . "Development of Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian
Lands: The Historical Perspective." Arizona Law Review 
17 (1975): 951.
Collier, John. "Back to Dishonor." Christian Century 71 
(May 12, 1954): 578-80.
Danforth, Sandra. "Repaying Historical Debts: The Indian
Claims Commission." North Dakota Law Review 49 (Winter 
1973) : 359-403.
Ehrlich, Daniel Henry. "Problems Arising From Shifts of the 
Missouri River on the Eastern Border of Nebraska." 
Nebraska History 54 (Fall 1973): 341-63.
Formanek, Rjean K. "Blackbird Hills Indian Land Dispute
Settled by Placing the Burden of Proving Title on the 
Non-Indian Party and Incorporating Nebraska Water Law 
Into the Federal Standard." Creighton Law Review 13 
(Summer 1980): 1098-1102.
Friedman, Howard M. "Interest on Indian Claims: Judicial 
Protection of the Fisc." Valparaiso University Law 
Review 5 (Fall 1970): 26-47.
Goldberg, Carole E. "Public Law 280: State Jurisdiction 
Over Reservation Indians." UCLA Law Review 22 
(February 1975): 535-594.
Herzberg, Stephen. "The Menominee Indians: Termination to 
Restoration." American Indian Law Review 6, no. 1
(1978): 143-186.
Hood, Susan. "Termination of the Klamath Tribe of Oregon." 
Ethnohistory 19 (Fall 1972): 372-392.
Hoover, Herbert. "Yankton Sioux Tribal Claims Against the 
United States, 1917-1975." Western Historical 
Quarterly 7 (April 1976): 125-142.
249
Le Due, Thomas. "The Work of the Indian Claims Commission 
Under the Act of 1946." Pacific Historical Review 26 
(February 1957): 1-16.
Lurie, Nancy O. "The Indian Claims Commission." Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 
436 (March 1978): 97-110.
McKee, Howard I. "The Platte Purchase." Missouri 
Historical Review 32 (January 1938): 129-47.
Nielsen, Richard A. "American Indian Land Claims: Land
versus Money as a Remedy." University of Florida Law 
Review 25 (Winter 1973): 308-26.
Suzuki, Peter T. "Retrocession and Jurisdictional Issues 
Facing the Omaha Tribe of Nebraska." Man & Life. 
Journal of The Institute of Social Research and Applied 
Anthropology 18 (January-June 1992): 1-10.
Thomas, Mark W. "Constitutional Law —  Equal Protection -- 
Supreme Court Upholds Validity of Preferential 
Treatment of Indians in Land Disputes -- Wilson v.
Omaha Indian Tribe." Creighton Law Review 13 (Winter
1979): 619-32.
Vance, John T. "The Congressional Mandate and the Indian
Claims Commission." North Dakota Law Review 45 (Spring 
1969): 325-336.
White, John R. "Barmecide Revisited: The Gratuitous Offset 
in Indian Claims Cases." Ethnohistorv 25 (Spring 
1978): 179.
Wilkinson, Charles F. "Civil Liberties Guarantees When
Indian Tribes Act as Majority Societies: The Case of
the Winnebago Retrocession." Creighton Law Review 21, 
no. 3 (1987-88): 773-799.
